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ABSTRACT
A significant pastoral problem for some Catholics flows from the dissonance they
experience when attempting to integrate certain Church teachings with the leading of their
conscience as they make moral decisions. All Catholics do not accept every established moral
answer or position provided by the Church and integrating those differences between the
Church teaching and one’s conscience can be difficult—a difficulty affecting parishioner,
priest, and Church. This problem is, in part, rooted in and reinforced by the fact that there are
two theological strands in the Church’s tradition regarding morality. One strand suggests that
the moral response is to obey normative Church moral teachings, whereas the other strand
suggests that the moral response is to follow your conscience which is informed by Church
teaching. The pastoral problem of understanding and exercising conscience while striving
to be informed by and responsible to normative Church teachings is at the heart of this research
in order to ameliorate the polarization and division that is currently present in this arena.
One of the unstated assumptions and/or insufficiently developed concepts within the
primacy of conscience debate between obedience to tradition and following individual
conscience is the status of agency as it relates to primacy. The principal thrust of this study of
primacy of conscience is that agency is a critical element in understanding the meaning and
function of primacy of conscience within the relationship between the social group (as reflected
in the terms tradition and teaching) and the individual (as reflected in the term primacy of
conscience)—an agency that is interdependent and at times in conflict. This pastoral
ii

theological study employs Larry Graham’s psychosystemic approach to pastoral theology as it
expands the conversation by identifying the pastoral problem of primacy of conscience and the
role of agency from a pastoral theological methodology that examines relevant personal and
pastoral experience, historical antecedents to the problem, and appropriate conceptual
theological and secular resources.
As this study reviews the long and varied history of conscience in the Catholic tradition
as illustrated in several critical historical moments, it identifies the problematic character of the
two strands within the tradition and reveals the importance of a more developed understanding
of agency in light of the tradition’s inherent ambiguity. By integrating Albert Bandura’s
systemic Social Cognitive Theory, this study offers an enhanced understanding of agency from
a disciplined behavioral scientific perspective on the social-personal interfaces involved
in decision-making in general (i.e., self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social
persuasion) which apply to moral concerns and, consequently, amplifies an understanding
of primacy of conscience that can inform priestly counsel to Catholics seeking moral
guidance.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PASTORAL PROBLEM
For pastoral theology contends that unaddressed theological issues often
arise from the particularity of human experience, including the actual
practice of ministry, and that further interpretation of what actually takes
place in concrete experience has the potential for constructing new
theological understandings or clarifying unresolved matters in the
tradition.1
Some Catholics experience dissonance when attempting to integrate certain Church
teachings with the leading of their conscience as they make moral decisions. As a priest for the
last twenty two years, I have experienced numerous Catholics, myself included, struggling at
times between following their conscience and being obedient to the authority of the Church’s
teaching. Frequently this dissonance is addressed confidentially within the context of pastoral
care, counseling, or confession and the topics are quite diverse (e.g., contraception, pacifism,
divorce, obligation to pay taxes, sexual orientation). Yet occasionally this experience of
dissonance for Catholics gets writ large, as recent public controversies during the United States’
presidential elections of 2004 and 2008 clearly demonstrate.2 In either instance, what becomes
immediately apparent is that not all Catholics accept all established moral answers provided by

1

Larry Kent Graham, Discovering Images of God: Narratives of Care among Lesbians
and Gays (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 2.
2

See Eric Gorski, “Catholic Politicians Scolded,” The Denver Post A1, April 15, 2004;
and Laurie Goodstein, “U.S. Bishops Urged to Challenge Obama,” New York Times
A15, November 11, 2008.
1

the Church and that managing differences between the Church teaching and one’s conscience
can be difficult—a difficulty affecting parishioner, priest, and Church.
In ministering as a priest, I have observed manifestations of this difficulty ranging
from the affective and cognitive to the behavioral and organizational. It is not
uncommon for adults to feel as if they are being treated like children or to judge the
Church as antiquated, irrelevant, or rigid. Disengagement and/or acquiescence reflect
just a portion of the range of behaviors that accompany this struggle. On the
organizational level, priests, as representatives of both the pastoral ministry and
hierarchical governance of the Church, can feel caught “between a rock and a hard place”
to the degree that it seems like they must side either with the parishioner or the Church
teaching. This conflict observed in my pastoral work is clearly documented as a larger
problem for U.S. Catholics in general and is reflected in several studies that identify the gap
between Church teaching and the actual beliefs and practices of many Catholics.3
In many instances a critical pastoral problem emerges, regardless of the particular
moral issue being engaged, if the result of an individual’s moral decision-making differs from a
specific normative Church teaching. Although potential complications are manifold in this

3

See Jennifer Ohlendorf and Richard J. Fehring, “The Influence of Religiosity on
Contraceptive Use among Roman Catholic Women in the United States,” The Linacre
Quarterly 2, (2007): 135-144; Andrew Greeley, The Catholic Revolution: New Wine, Old
Wineskins, and the Second Vatimican Council (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2004); L. W. Tentler, Catholics and Contraception: An American History (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004); R. Fehring and A. M. Schlidt, “Trends in Contraceptive Use
Among Catholics in the United States: 1988-1995,” The Linacre Quarterly 2, (2001):
170-185; Andrew Greeley, The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Beliefs of American
Catholics (New York: Scribner, 1990); George Gallup, Jr. and Jim Castelli, The
American Catholic People: Their Beliefs, Practices, and Values (New York: Doubleday
& Co., Inc., 1987); and John Deedy, American Catholicism: And Now Where? (New
York: Plenum Press, 1987).
2

situation, at base a serious pastoral problem comes into play. Some pastoral careseekers and
providers are unclear as to whether or not Catholics can simultaneously be faithful to the
tradition and authority of the Church while occasionally differing from it because of the
guidance of their conscience as related to a specific moral topic. Does such a difference
necessarily translate into a compromised or deficient status within the Church (e.g., being
considered anything from unfaithful or sinful to even heretical or not truly Catholic)?
Central to this pastoral problem is the fact that the normative teaching of the Church
has two strands in the tradition regarding being a moral Catholic that can readily give rise to
quite the moral conundrum. One strand suggests that the moral response is to obey the specific
teaching regarding the topic at hand. Yet the other strand suggests that the moral response is to
follow one’s conscience, even if it differs from a specific normative moral teaching of the
Church. Very often the moral teachings of the Church and the dictates of a Catholic’s
conscience coincide, yet that is not always the case. When it is not, how to understand and
navigate that dissonance can be both complicated and troublesome. The pastoral problem of
understanding and exercising conscience while striving to be informed by and responsible to
normative Church teachings is the starting place of this research.
Addressing the Pastoral Problem
Pastoral theology not only recognizes, but also employs pastoral problems
such as the one identified as resources that may lead toward greater
understanding, if not amelioration and/or resolution of a given pastoral problem.
This project is pastoral theological in method and purpose, as it addresses
occasions when Catholics experience dissonance when attempting to integrate
certain Church teachings with the leading of their conscience as they make moral
3

decisions. By pastoral theology, I mean “…the branch of theology which
develops theoretical understandings of and practical guidelines for the ministry of
care.”4 The pastoral theological method that I am utilizing has several features. It
begins with theological questions that arise in pastoral practice and serve as a
ground and generative guide for the method. It moves to the tradition to see how
the tradition has addressed those questions. If the tradition has not adequately
addressed them, pastoral theology refines and refocuses the questions for
contemporary exploration. To develop more adequate theological answers,
pastoral theology draws upon contemporary resources, from both theology and
secular sciences.5
In order to anecdotally illuminate the theological questions of this dissertation as
they arise in pastoral practice, I will first draw upon one example of my personal
experience as a Catholic struggling with following specific Church teachings and the
leading of conscience while making a moral decision. My personal experience is being
engaged for principally two reasons. First, on an illustrative level, this example is
appealed to in order to concretize and illuminate the type of questions and complications
that can surface for a Catholic when encountering the two strands in the tradition regarding
being a moral Catholic. Second, on a more profound methodological level, this personal
experience reflects how “…pastoral theology contends that unaddressed theological issues

4

Larry Kent Graham, Care of Persons, Care of Worlds: A Psychosystems Approach to
Pastoral Care and Counseling (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1992), 20.
5

Nancy Ramsay, “A Time of Ferment and Redefinition,” in Pastoral Care and
Counseling: Redefining the Paradigms, ed. Nancy J. Ramsay (Nashville, TN: Abingdon
Press, 2004), 5.
4

often arise from the particularity of human experience, including the actual practice of
ministry…”6 In this example, my particular experience is an expression of an encounter
with an unaddressed theological issue arising for me on a very personal level. Yet also,
as a priest in ministry for over twenty years, in the actual practice of ministry I have
witnessed and journeyed with a variety of Catholics encountering and struggling with the
very same unaddressed theological issue I had come to recognize, even though the
specific content has differed substantially from person to person (e.g., birth control,
sexual orientation, and divorce). Both my experience and my pastoral assessment of the
similar experience of others have led me to identify the pastoral theological problem to be
addressed by this dissertation.
My Personal Pastoral Theological Double-bind
After thirteen wonderful and formative years as a member of a religious order
within the Roman Catholic Church (i.e., the Congregation of the Mission), I terminated
my relationship with the religious order, left active ministry as a Roman Catholic priest,
and later was married.7 Without going into great detail or the whole process of that lifealtering choice, I can readily state that the final decision to not fulfill what were explicitly
understood as lifetime vows, both as a member of a religious order and as a priest, was
profoundly difficult on a variety of levels. The normative teaching of the Church
regarding the permanency of ordination to the priesthood was then and still remains very

6
7

Graham, Discovering Images of God 2.

The Church is broader than Roman Catholicism and includes all other Christian
denominations. Yet in order to avoid repeated use of the lengthier phrase “Roman
Catholic Church,” from this point forward in this study the term “Church” will only refer
to the Roman Catholic Church unless otherwise noted.
5

clear.8 Comparable to the Catholic understanding of the sacrament of matrimony, the
sacrament of holy orders is understood as being for the lifetime of the person receiving
the sacrament.9 Similarly, permanent vows in a religious order are clearly considered just
that—permanent!
How was and am I to understand this decision morally, both as it relates to myself
as well as the Church? Can the act of breaking permanent lifelong vows, whether they be
those of being a member of a religious order or a priest, ever be morally justified, given it
is counter to the normative teaching and tradition of the Church? Given this normative
teaching, is such a choice and act necessarily darkened by the shadow of being judged as
wrong, unfaithful, sinful, or the like? Or can such a choice ever be considered a
responsible and moral act, even though differing from normative Catholic teaching?
When considering the possibility of terminating my permanent vows with the
Congregation of the Mission and leaving active ministry as a Roman Catholic priest, in
addition to being aware of the normative teaching of the Church regarding the
permanency of vows in a religious order and priestly ordination, I was also aware that the
Church teaches its members, whether lay or cleric, that they are obliged to follow their
consciences in all matters. In fact, I even knew that the Church has a doctrine called
primacy of conscience, although I was not particularly well versed in it at the time.
8

The functional terms “normative teaching of the Church” and/or “tradition” will be used
when referring to the teaching role of the Church. The more technical Roman Catholic
term Magisterium, which also refers to the teaching role of the Church, will be kept to a
minimum simply because the other terms are more readily accessible in their meaning.
9

In like fashion, for purposes of ease, when the terms “Catholic” or “Catholicism” are
used they will only refer to Roman Catholics and Roman Catholicism (e.g., not Eastern
Orthodox, Coptic Catholic Church, and Polish National Catholic Church) unless
otherwise indicated.
6

Primacy of conscience is basically the doctrinal name for what has been described thus
far as the obligation to follow one’s conscience, even if it differs from normative Church
teaching.10 How was I to understand the responsibility and obligation to follow my
conscience if it seemed to be moving in a direction that was inconsistent with the
Church’s normative teaching regarding the permanency of religious vows and ordination?
I did know that the Church’s understanding of primacy of conscience presumed that
Catholics act from an informed conscience, that is, a conscience that is engaged with and
formed by the Church tradition as well as other relevant secular resources related to the
matter in question. The Second Vatican Council stated that secular scientific insights
have a significant role in the formation of a Catholic’s understanding of faith and,
consequently, conscience.11
Given that I have multiple theological degrees, am gifted with being relatively
intelligent, and am an ordained priest, I am inclined to say that I was, by and large, as
informed as the next person, and probably more than most. In short, I would say that my

10

Significant terms introduced in this first chapter (e.g., primacy of conscience, pastoral
theology, and the legalistic and personalist schools) will receive only the barest definition
in this chapter as is necessary for the flow. Focused elaboration and development of the
terms will be forthcoming in the subsequent chapters.
11

For example, “In pastoral care sufficient use should be made, not only of theological
principles, but also of the findings of secular sciences, especially psychology and
sociology: in this way the faithful will be brought to a purer and more mature living of
the faith.” This quote is taken from “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World (Gaudium et Spes),” in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar
Documents, ed. Austin Flannery, O. P. (Collegeville, IN: The Liturgical Press, 1992),
966-967. This text will serve as the reference for all Second Vatican II documents used
in this dissertation. Further, an English translation of Latin titles for Church documents
will be used in this dissertation for ease of reading. The original Latin title will be given
in the first reference to any particular text and will be retained if used in quotes by any
other author.
7

choice fulfilled the expectation of being made from an informed conscience, yet therein
lies the rub and a principal question of this dissertation. Just as I was aware of the
Church’s position regarding the permanency of religious vows and ordination (i.e., a
topical normative Church teaching), I knew that primacy of conscience also stood among
the array of normative Church teachings within the tradition. A Catholic making a moral
decision from an informed conscience can be, as I was, confronted by ambiguity in the
tradition of the Church. How does the Church’s normative teaching regarding primacy of
conscience stand in relationship to other normative Church teachings (e.g., the
permanency of religious vows and ordination) when one does not seem to reinforce the
other? Is there a pecking order or trump card among them?
At first blush it can seem as if the principal question is whether or not a Catholic
can deviate from normative Church teaching and not be considered wrong and/or sinful.
As important as that question may be, it is far from the only relevant question in play.
Upon deeper examination it becomes clear that the situation is much more complicated. As
stated earlier, the Church has two strands in the tradition regarding being a moral Catholic—
one strand stating that a Catholic follow Church teachings regarding any particular moral topic
and the other strand stating that a Catholic must always follow one’s conscience, even if it
differs from Church teaching. When those exceptions occur where the leading of conscience
differs from the normative teaching of the Church, in a sense, a situation is created that is
analogous to what is called, in psychological terms, a double-bind. That is, either choice
or direction is, at least in part, a losing proposition (i.e., conformity to a given normative
teaching may go against the mandate to follow one’s conscience which may be
suggesting an alternative course or, conversely, conformity to following one’s conscience
8

may go against the mandate to conform to a specific normative Church teaching). In
short, fulfilling both mandates can seem mutually exclusive, resulting in a “damned if
you do or damned if you don’t” situation, so to speak.
Expanding the Problem of Conscience
This particular experience of some Catholics and the unaddressed theological issues
that give rise to it is not an esoteric theological conundrum irrelevant to the Catholic population
at large in the United States. Although my personal and pastoral experience suggested that
this pastoral problem of the primacy of conscience in relation to obedience to established
Church teaching was broad in scope it has become increasingly concrete and clear that
this question can and frankly does affect many members of the Church and is far from
resolved. The presidential campaigns of 2004 and 2008 are two major public events that
blatantly manifest the breadth of its potential embrace for Catholics in the United States.
The understanding and exercise of primacy of conscience became an explicit topic of
discussion for many Catholics during both these elections, from Catholics in the pews to
the National Catholic Conference of Bishops, and the tension and lack of clarity is
indisputable.
So as another example of how “unaddressed theological issues often arise from
the particularity of human experience” as well as an expression of the two strands within
the tradition regarding being a moral Catholic, I will draw upon the most recent 2008
U. S. presidential election as a concrete and large scale expression of the theological and
moral conundrum Catholics may face regarding understanding and applying primacy of
conscience as related to normative Church teachings. Although both U. S. presidential
elections drew national attention and press coverage regarding the topic of primacy of
9

conscience, I will limit my focus to the latter election of 2008 for three principal reasons.
First, one example will be sufficient to make the necessary point. 12 Second, the 2008
election resulted in a large number of Catholics being the subject of judgment as related
to the normative Church teaching on abortion and conscience.13 Third, and most
importantly, the very problem identified regarding two strands within the tradition
regarding being a moral Catholic was clearly manifest within and by the representative
teaching authorities of the Church itself. It is important to not confuse this public
example with my own experience or actual practice of ministry, although presumablely
this event did translate into the actual practice of ministry for those who were directly

12

Given that I will not review the 2004 U. S. presidential election, a brief summary is in
order. During the election, presidential candidate Senator John Kerry, a Roman Catholic,
was the principal target of judgment and potential penalty by the Church hierarchy due to
his pro-choice political platform. Senator Kerry argued that a Catholic, be they a
candidate or a voter, could support a pro-choice position due to the Church’s teaching
about the obligation to follow one’s conscience, that is, the doctrine of primacy of
conscience. Archbishop Chaput of the Archdiocese of Denver and some like-minded
bishops argued and lobbied that Senator Kerry should be penalized by denying him
communion due to his pro-choice status and its inherent relationship to the topic of
abortion. They prioritized the Church’s normative teaching on abortion, suggested that a
pro-choice platform such as Kerry’s primarily supported abortion rather than moral
decision-making, and basically skirted the issue of primacy of conscience. Senator Kerry
did not reside in the location under these bishops’ jurisdictions and was never denied
communion by the bishop where he resided.

13

It is paramount to underline that the specific moral issue (i.e., abortion) being
addressed in this public example of the muddled understanding of primacy of conscience
in the 2008 election is not the focus of the dissertation. As important as the topic of the
value of life is, whether addressed when discussing abortion, capital punishment,
weapons of mass destruction, or an array of other relevant domains, this example is
included in order to concretize and illuminate the scope of the confusion and potential
complication contemporary U. S. Catholics may encounter related to integrating any
specific normative Church teaching and the obligation to follow one’s conscience.
10

involved with the situation and it commensurate pastoral care.14 In sum, this public
example draws upon a large-scale concrete experience to demonstrate the contemporary
confusion and complication operative regarding the Church’s teachings related to
primacy of conscience and, consequently, the context potentially affecting U.S.
Catholics’ understanding and exercise of primacy of conscience.
Immediately upon the election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United
States, Father Jay Scott Newman, pastor of St. Mary’s Catholic Church in Greenville,
S.C. stated the following in his homily on November 9, 2008.
In response to this [election], I am obliged by my duty as your shepherd to
make two observations:
1. Voting for a pro-abortion politician when a plausible pro-life
alternative exists constitutes material cooperation with intrinsic evil,
and those Catholics who do so place themselves outside of the full
communion of Christ’s Church and under the judgment of divine law.
Persons in this condition should not receive Holy Communion until
and unless they are reconciled to God in the Sacrament of Penance,
lest they eat and drink their own condemnation.
2. Barack Obama, although we must always and everywhere disagree
with him over abortion, has been duly elected the next President of the
United States, and after he takes the Oath of Office next January 20th,
he will hold legitimate authority in this nation. For this reason, we are
obliged by Scriptural precept to pray for him and to cooperate with
him whenever conscience does not bind us otherwise. Let us hope and
pray that the responsibilities of the presidency and the grace of God
will awaken in the conscience of this extraordinarily gifted man an
awareness that the unholy slaughter of children in this nation is the

14

Drawing upon the 2008 U. S. presidential election is not an attempt to do public
theology, as that has distinct characteristics that will not inform the methodology of this
dissertation. For further reference on public theology, see Larry Kent Graham, “From
Relational Humanness to Relational Justice: Reconceiving Pastoral Care and
Counseling.” in Pastoral Care and Social Conflict, eds. Pamela Couture and Rodney
Hunter (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1995), 220-234.
11

greatest threat to the peace and security of the United States and
constitutes a clear and present danger to the common good.15
As Father Newman interpreted his obligation to fulfill his duty as a priest and
pastor, it is fairly clear in his first observation that his judgment is that those who voted
for President Obama (i.e., according to Newman, a “pro-abortion” politician) have
committed a sin that needs attention. Curiously, although he refers to the binding
character of conscience in his second observation as it may condition cooperation with
the newly elected president, the statement does not seem to recognize the possibility that
such a dynamic may have been operative for those who voted for Obama and were
conscious of the fact that his political platform is pro-choice. In short, Father Newman’s
statement predominantly reflects the strand of the tradition that suggests that the moral
response for Catholics is to obey the specific teaching regarding the topic at hand, in this
instance, abortion. The exercise of conscience, as presented by Father Newman, seemingly
applies to only social and civic responsibilities and teachings, but not to those of the Church.
For those sitting in the pews who voted during the 2008 election, these words were
anything but indifferent. One can just imagine how this message might have been received
by the members of St. Mary’s Catholic Church in Greenville or in the Diocese at large.
But actually we need not speculate nor wonder as to how Father Newman’s message was
received by the official representatives of the Diocese itself.

15

Father Jay Scott Newman, “Homily on November 9, 2008 [emphasis added],” retrieved
11/22/2008 from http://www.catholic.org/politics/story.php?id=30564; the full text of the
homily is available at this URL.
12

In slightly more time than Christians claim it took Jesus to rise from the tomb, on
November 14th, Monsignor Laughlin from the Office of Administration for the Diocese
of Charleston issued the following response to Father Newman’s homily.
As Administrator of the Diocese of Charleston, let me state with clarity
that Father Newman’s statements do not adequately reflect the Catholic
Church’s teachings. Any comments or statements to the contrary are
repudiated. The Catechism of the Catholic Church states, “Man has the
right to act in conscience and in freedom so as personally to make moral
decisions.” ….Christ gives us freedom to explore our own conscience and
to make our own decisions while adhering to the law of God and the
teachings of the faith. Therefore, if a person has formed his or her
conscience well, he or she should not be denied Communion, nor be told
to go to confession before receiving Communion.16
Monsignor Laughlin’s response, in contrast to Fr. Newman’s homily, predominantly
reflects the strand of the tradition that states that Catholics must follow the leading of
conscience, even if it differs from normative Church teaching. Although the Monsignor
claimed and intended that his response on behalf of the Diocese would be a statement of
clarity, it is not far-fetched to think that even after this sincere effort, perhaps the
Catholics of South Carolina, as well as other U.S. Catholics, were still a bit confused.17
The fact of the matter is that Fr. Newman and Monsignor Laughlin do not reflect
some bizarre difference of opinion between themselves regarding how to be a moral
Catholic. Their expressions are actually manifestations of two well established positions
regarding conscience within Catholic moral theology—the legalistic perspective and the
personalist perspective. In very broad strokes, the legalistic perspective emphasizes Church

16

docnotes.catholic-doc.org/statement/Statement%20on%20Voting%20and%20
Communion.pdf
17

For a more in-depth perspective on the topic, see Laurie Goodstein, “U.S. Bishops
Urged to Challenge Obama,” New York Times A15, November 11, 2008.
13

teaching as the dominant way by which the objective dimensions of morality are understood. It
claims that this morality is founded upon the existence of absolute and universal moral
principles. Furthermore, it considers the Church hierarchy as the principal means by which
moral truth is expressed. The personalist perspective elevates the personal responsibility and
autonomy of individuals when it comes to morality. Although it acknowledges the Church as a
great and unique resource regarding moral matters, it emphasizes conscience as the mediator of
the divine moral law. Additionally, it opposes ethical systems that claim to be founded upon
absolutist principles.18
The Potential for Constructing New Theological Understandings
If a relatively intelligent priest with multiple theological degrees finds himself
muddled and mired when trying his best to be a responsible moral Catholic, is it
surprising to find in the actual practice of ministry that any numbers of Catholics have
also found themselves painted into the corner of this moral conundrum within the
tradition? If Catholic Senator Kerry, in the midst of a presidential campaign where one
media gaff may turn the political tide, and an Archbishop, whose national statements are
presumably well measured and pastorally strategic, find themselves in an unresolved
theological logjam regarding primacy of conscience, would we expect to discover that
their experience regarding the doctrine itself is an anomaly and that no other Catholics
are similarly stumbling over this log on their Catholic moral roads? If duly placed
Catholic teaching authorities in the same historical moment and geographical context,
who are obliged by office to serve and teach the very same Catholic constituency,

18

Linda Hogan, Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition (New York:
Paulist Press, 2000), 29.
14

radically differ, if not contradict one another, is it not possible to claim that a serious
pastoral problem is present, requiring sustained reconsideration of key theological issues
within the tradition? The question of primacy of conscience is an “unresolved matter in the
tradition” that extends well beyond a Catholic Senator and Archbishop, well beyond a
Monsignor and a pastor, and even well beyond an individual Diocese and its membership for
that matter.
As stated earlier in the summary sketch of the pastoral theological method
employed, after a particular pastoral problem emerges, the focus turns to the
tradition to explore how it has addressed the issues at hand. If the tradition has
not sufficiently addressed them, as is the case with primacy of conscience,
pastoral theology refines and refocuses the questions for further examination in
order to develop more adequate theological answers. This examination appeals to
the insights of both theology and secular sciences. The theological resources that
I will principally use for this purpose are historical Catholic documents (e.g.
Second Vatican Council) and Catholic moral theology, especially from the
personalist perspective. These will be used to set both the historical and
contemporary context of the debate on primacy of conscience in general as well
as focus upon current perspectives of the meaning and function of primacy in
particular. In addition to utilizing these theological materials, the secular material
I will use is principally Albert Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory (SCT),
especially his research on agency.19 In order to establish a broader and
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contemporary context for engaging the intersection between both theological and
psychological interpretations and critiques of the concept of conscience, I will
also draw upon Thomas Srampickal’s comparative analysis of conscience as
articulated in both the documents of the Second Vatican Council and several
major schools of empirical psychology.20
A Systemic Perspective of Agency in Clarifying Primacy of Conscience
Even a cursory review of the pastoral problem presented reveals an array of
dynamics that contribute to its complexity. The need to reflect upon, understand, if not
integrate differences is clearly operative and is manifest in a variety of ways. For
example, 1) the relationship between the two theological strands in the tradition regarding
being a moral Catholic; 2) the relationship between differing interpretations of what is the
moral choice in a given circumstance; 3) the relationship between differing parties in the
Church ranging from parishioner to priest; and 4) the relationship between differing
voices of authority ranging from pastor to diocesan representative. This list is far from
exhaustive, yet even these obvious examples point to the fact that the pastoral problem is
clearly both relational and multi-faceted.
Relational differences always have the potential of being interpreted from an
either-or perspective that can, in turn, result in polarization. The question of who is right
and who is wrong can readily introduce itself into relational differences and potentially
result in one party being pitted against the other. This possibility is far from hypothetical,
as the examples reviewed testify to this reality. Further, the question of who is right and
20

Thomas Srampickal, The Concept of Conscience in Today’s Empirical Psychology and
in the Documents of the Second Vatican Council (Innsbruck, Austria: Resch Verlag,
1976).
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who is wrong is far from merely an academic exercise, as it bears real substance and
consequence in the lives of Catholics and the Church (e.g., denying communion to a
person). Engaging differences within relationships inevitably has an influence on those
involved. That is, being in relationship involves agency or power and the impact of that
agency may be particularly difficult in the face of differences that are of high value for
the parties involved. In short, one dimension of all relationships is the presence of
agency which inherently and necessarily has a real affect, whether positive or negative,
upon all the participants.
Understanding the multitude of relationships present in this pastoral problem as
well as the embedded agency or power within those relationships presses for an approach
or perspective that is capable of constructively engaging those particular dynamics. A
systemic perspective is well suited for just such an endeavor, inasmuch as it is highly
relational and recognizes the dynamic of agency within relationships. In order to address
the complexity of primacy of conscience as a pastoral theological construction of agency
for Catholic moral decision-making, this dissertation will principally appeal to a systemic
perspective both in the arguments made as well as the resources drawn upon. Therefore,
a brief introduction to a systemic perspective is in order as well as a basic orientation to
how systemic theories will be employed.
First and foremost, a systemic perspective is oriented toward understanding how
things influence one another within the context of the whole. Whether one draws upon
the classic systemic theory claim that “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” or
Thich Nhat Hanh’s spiritual tenet that “we are here to awaken from the illusion of our
separateness,” a systemic perspective views reality through a holistic lens. The very title
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of Ken Wilber’s systems theory book A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for
Business, Politics, Science, and Spirituality captures the inclusivity of this approach—a
systemic perspective examines the context as a whole including the relationships within
it.21
In understanding whatever might be considered the whole within a given reality, a
systemic perspective examines the relationships that comprise the whole as well as the
various influences operative within those relationships. A systemic perspective emerges
from a particular context or whole by attending to the complex interactions that comprise
the relationality within it. As applied to the pastoral experience, the diversity of potential
relationships has the breadth and depth of whatever demographics might be considered
within the overall context. A systemic perspective will often have the following
characteristics: attention to ongoing processes and transactions; emphasis on the whole
rather than the parts; appreciation for the cooperation and mutuality of influences; and
openness to both/and thinking rather than seeing possibilities only in terms of either/or.22
Very broadly defined, “…systemic thinking is a view about the universe, or a
picture of reality, that affirms that everything that exists is in an ongoing mutual
relationship with every other reality.23 Throughout this dissertation, a systemic
perspective will be understood and employed in this fashion. Furthermore, from this
systemic perspective, this research will integrate systemic theories, specifically Larry
Graham’s psychosystems approach to pastoral care and counseling and Albert Bandura’s
21
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Social Cognitive Theory. Although Graham and Bandura’s systemic theories emerge
from differing disciplines, pastoral theology and social psychology respectively, both find
a common mooring and great resonance in the preceding broad definition and common
characteristics of a systemic perspective.24
This very broad definition of a systemic perspective develops throughout the
dissertation as Graham and Bandura’s systemic theories are explored in greater detail and
applied to the question of primacy of conscience, especially in terms of agency. As the
systemic perspective is elaborated in this research, the question as to how a person’s
agency is systemic and not merely individualistic is both critical to the pastoral problem
at hand and vital as a theoretical underpinning of this dissertation. Both Graham and
Bandura’s systemic theories examine this question in detail and offer substantial
constructive possibilities. For example, Social Cognitive Theory examines the reciprocal
and interactive agential framework within which personal and social dynamics emerge
and are operative such that one cannot be fully understood in isolation from the other
(e.g., individuals are both products and producers of social systems).25 Finally, although
a general orientation will be given to both of these systemic theories, only particularly
salient and relevant dimensions will be engaged in depth (e.g., agency) due to the
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A systemic perspective manifests itself within a variety of disciplines and
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necessary limits of this research and the possibility of substantial meaningful outcomes
and contribution.
Agency is one dimension and way to understand and examine systemic
relationality and its inherent multiplicity.26 Moral decision-making inherently involves and
reflects agency, and an unclear and/or underdeveloped understanding of it seems to be central
to the pastoral and theological problem of the relationship of primacy of conscience to
normative Church teaching. Further interpretation suggests that a systemic understanding of
agency is important in addressing the issue. The primary interpretation of agency in this
dissertation is drawn from Bandura’s SCT that understands agency as the capacity “…to
intentionally make things happen by one’s actions.”27 Core questions that relate to agency are:
1) how are moral decisions understood and made in circumstances when normative
Church teaching and primacy of conscience seem to be at odds?; 2) what might be the
understanding and role of agency in the process for all parties involved?; and 3) when
agencies conflict, how are disparate claims adjudicated?
One of the unstated issues within the primacy of conscience debate between topical
normative Church teaching and following individual conscience is the status of agency as it
relates to primacy. It is the argument of this dissertation that the act of claiming primacy of
conscience to guide moral decisions that may occasionally differ from Church teaching
requires an adequate view of agency that systemically combines individual authority with

26

A similar term for agency is power. Further, the term “authority” is commonly used when
identifying a person, role, or group that has a particular claim to express agency or power
within a particular relationship and/or context. Although all three terms will be used
throughout this dissertation, agency will be the primary focus and terminology employed.
27

Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective,” 2.
20

communal teachings and norms. The doctrine of primacy of conscience inherently speaks of
such agency, yet this has not been sufficiently developed. Primacy of conscience reflects an
agency by which Catholics, both clergy and laity, engage both the Church’s normative
teaching and one’s own context, and can be morally responsible and faithful to the
tradition and authority of the Church, even if Catholics make specific judgments that put
them in opposition to certain Church teachings or if their judgments are ultimately wrong.
The thesis of this dissertation is that a constructive pastoral theological appropriation
and interpretation of the personalist view of primacy of conscience in the Roman Catholic
tradition, when primacy is amplified by the implications drawn from social psychologist
Bandura’s SCT view of agency, is a critical resource for helping contemporary U.S. Catholics
and their spiritual guides to make moral decisions that are informed but not controlled by the
established tradition of the Church. The personalist view of primacy of conscience will be
addressed in detail in Chapter 3, but for the moment suffice it to say that the personalist
perspective moves toward examining the importance of agency within the relationship between
the individual Catholic and the Church, although not from the discipline of social psychology.
I will argue that the personalist strand of the debate on conscience is consistent with and
supported by a more comprehensive understanding of the meaning and function of
primacy with respect to the exercise of conscience. Further, I will contend that the
personalist position resonates with and is enhanced by the identification of agency as a
central construct inherent within the concept of primacy.
This turn toward agency brings several questions about primacy of conscience
into the foreground. This dissertation reflects my attempt to examine several of those
questions. For example:
21

•

How is agency predominantly understood within the current debate
regarding conscience, and in what other ways might it be understood?

•

Is there something beneficial within the concept of primacy of conscience
that has either been “lost” or not yet discovered within the tradition?

•

Does the concept of “primacy” within the tradition of conscience hint at or
even push toward a certain interpretation of agency?

•

What difference or benefit might a systemic perspective of the human
person within society offer regarding understanding primacy of conscience
and agency in conversation with Church teachings and authority?

•

Might we better and further understand primacy in light of the insights
regarding agency from Bandura’s SCT?

•

How might the personalist perspective of primacy of conscience be
bolstered by SCT’s systemic perspective and insight into agency?

My attempt to explore and respond to these and other questions comprises
Chapters 2 through 5 of this research. Before entering the core of this research reflected
in those chapters, three final pieces will be addressed. First, I will identify my personal
location given that the pastoral theological method for this dissertation recognizes and
employs contextuality. That is, the pastoral theological method for this research
acknowledges that the specifics of the social situation influence and inform the pastoral
theological reflection itself in both content and process. Second, the principal literature
that informs and serves as resources for this dissertation will be examined. Finally, an
outline of the chapters will orient the reader as to how the research will unfold and
progress throughout the dissertation.
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Location and Identity
I need to identify my own social location and context, as it is inherently and
necessarily an influence operative in this research. I am a middle-aged, middle-class,
Caucasian citizen of the United States who is married with two children and living in
Colorado. I come from an Irish Roman Catholic family of ten and was ordained a Roman
Catholic priest in 1987. I was in a religious order for thirteen years and left ordained
ministry as a Roman priest in order to marry. I am currently a Ph.D. candidate with a
concentration in psychology and religion specializing in pastoral theology. Prior to
accepting a call to serve as a pastor and priest in an alternative Catholic community, I had
a private pastoral counseling practice. As the opening of this chapter states, I have
experienced the topic of this dissertation both in my personal life and in my practice of
ministry.
In terms of the theoretical context of this dissertation, I locate myself within the
pastoral theological framework that was synthesized by Seward Hiltner and
modified/enhanced by subsequent pastoral theologians who nevertheless retain
foundational dimensions of his seminal insights (e.g., Larry Graham). This pastoral
theological framework will readily emerge with much greater detail within Chapter 2. In
terms of the scope of this research, given the historical and geographical breadth and
diversity of Catholicism, as well as the significant shifts marked by the Second Vatican
Council, this dissertation's principal location of this pastoral problem will be post-Vatican
II Catholicism in the United States, even though the debate is situated within a broader
historical and geographical context.
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Literature and Resources
Before delving into the heart of the research, a dissertation literature review is
pretty standard fare. Given that the research is usually focused within a specific domain
(e.g., English literature), the review serves as a basic platform that orients the reader on at
least three levels. First, the review sets the overall parameters of the field and literature
being engaged by the dissertation. Due to the breadth of a discipline’s literature related
to almost any specific topic, these parameters within the field itself function as a
preliminary identification of the resources being considered for the research and the
limits operative (e.g., historical periods, geographical locations, and languages). Second,
within these overall identified parameters, often the review sketches dominant and/or
significant positions within the literature that will have a bearing on the research, whether
that is historical background, cutting-edge theory, or whatever is pertinent to the project.
Generally this also includes a position(s) that the dissertation intends to advance as well
as any differing position(s) that must be addressed given a potential challenge that it
might present to the direction the research is taking. Finally, the literature review usually
narrows in focus as principal theorists and corresponding texts are identified. At the end,
within the limits identified, these resources serve as representative voices within the
given field and, although far from exhaustive, are adequate to move the research forward.
Clearly this structural and methodological approach to a literature review within a
dissertation has and does serve a vital purpose, even if it may, at times, seem to distract
from the primary focus of the dissertation. However, research methodologies and topics
differ substantially and the structure of the dissertation should correspond to and work
with those differences in a responsible manner that best suits the project itself. Inasmuch
24

as this dissertation is founded upon a pastoral theological method that is by design crossdisciplinary, the normal structure of a literature review just described is not well suited to
serve the purposes of this research.28 Specifically, this dissertation broadly incorporates
four fields of research—pastoral theology, moral theology, historical theology, and social
psychology. The cumbersome, if not counterproductive, nature of navigating an initial
literature review across such an array of fields and commensurate resources is probably
readily apparent. Nevertheless, a dissertation’s identification and delimitation of the
literature and resources operative in the research is important and vital.
The value of an initial review of the literature and resources mooring a pastoral
theological dissertation can be readily accomplished by understanding how pastoral
theology engages its resources and, therefore, what presentation of literature is
appropriate. Basically three points not only sketch a framework for understanding how
the literature and resources are operative within this dissertation, but also set a general
and partial understanding of the pastoral theological method that will be employed. First,
cross-disciplinary studies such as pastoral theology, by definition, draw upon literature
and resources from varying fields. The primary research of a given field, understandably,
emerges from the field itself (e.g., moral theology, historical theology, and social
psychology) and not from cross-disciplinary applications. Therefore, the crossdisciplinary researcher, in this instance a pastoral theologian, generally appeals to the
theory and claims of a given field in a summary fashion that is intended to illuminate or
enhance an understanding of the topic at hand. Further, as it is not its principal purpose,
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Chapter 2 will develop the pastoral theological method in detail, including its crossdisciplinary structure.
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pastoral theology as cross-disciplinary research rarely, if ever, directly advances the
specific fields themselves, as it draws upon their resources in order to enhance
theological insight. For example, the benefit that pastoral theology receives from a
neuro-scientific understanding of brain activity ordinarily does not further neuro-science
in an immediate or direct way.
Consequently, the charge of the cross-disciplinary researcher is to accurately and
responsibly represent whatever given disciplines are being integrated into the research.
In addition to the more obvious dimensions of accurately representing a given field (e.g.,
statements that correctly present the theory and research), a significant reflection of the
responsible use of the integrated resource is to not overextend the claims being made by
the cross-disciplinary application. In this research, for example, it is essential to be clear
that the final result will be a pastoral theological conversation informed and illuminated by the
insights of moral theology, historical theology, and social psychology, but is not in the final
analysis a moral theology, historical theology, or social psychology as such. That being the
case, although in-depth literature reviews are appropriate within the specific fields themselves,
they are not well suited to cross-disciplinary studies both due to the nature and limits of the
method itself (i.e., the integration of the theory and claims of a given field in a summary
fashion) as well as pragmatic concerns (i.e., the sheer quantity that would be involved across
multiple fields).
Second, as a dimension of an accurate and responsible use of multiple fields,
identifying the portion of the discipline being integrated is critical, as it also functions to
avoid an overextension of what might be claimed. For example, even though this
research draws upon social psychology, it integrates a very small portion of what social
26

psychology incorporates. SCT is but one expression of the many theories that fall under
the larger umbrella of social psychology. Further, Bandura’s framing of social cognitive
theory represents only one expression of a variety of social cognitive theories. Resources
like social psychology or, more specifically in this limited instance, SCT are employed with the
interest of potentially gaining insight and perspective into the question and problem the
theological project is addressing. Both the possibilities and limits of the contribution of SCT
will be identified and explored. However, it is not incumbent upon pastoral theology to
identify, let alone resolve, the differing positions within social cognitive theory itself, provided
the theory and research being employed (e.g., SCT) still has formative power within its own
field.
Third, although an in-depth initial review of the literature across an array of disciplines
is not well suited for the opening chapter of a cross-disciplinary dissertation, it should be noted
that the depth of literature and resources informing the project are embedded throughout the
text. Ultimately, greater exposure and engagement with the variety of literature operative in the
research emerges, even if not in the form of an initial literature review. The depth of resources
reflected in the footnote references alone is but one example of the resources being integrated.
Further, as another reflection of a responsible use of multiple fields, the process for and
development of a bibliography is vital. The bibliographic procedure reflects a
comprehensive identification of potentially pertinent resources that may relate to the
topic at hand.29 From the inception of this dissertation, the bibliographic procedure has
functioned to identify and substantiate the current status of literature regarding the topic
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as well as what contributions might be possible. The bibliographic procedure, in turn,
results in a bibliography that reflects and serves as a greater platform of potential
resources informing the research. In sum, the bibliography functions as a broad and
efficient review of the potential literature informing the cross-disciplinary research.
With those three points in mind, the remaining portion of this section regarding
literature and resources will identify principal theorists and literature from the fields of
pastoral theology, moral theology, historical theology, and social psychology that
contribute to this cross-disciplinary conversation. These authors and their work represent
a stable perspective within their corresponding disciplines, but are neither exhaustive nor
definitive. They resonate well with the pastoral and theological problem central to this
dissertation, and offer credible resources for constructively responding to it. The outline
of chapters reflects where each discipline will receive its principal development.
As a cross-disciplinary methodology, pastoral theology frames the structure and
discourse of the entire dissertation, whether explicitly or implicitly. In Chapter 2 pastoral
theology is explicitly addressed with significant detail, as it articulates the methodology
present throughout the dissertation. This methodology can be seen as having several
intersecting movements within the overall pastoral theological enterprise: reflecting on
personal and pastoral experience; defining a pastoral theological problem to be
addressed; identifying the historical antecedents to the problem; and finding appropriate
conceptual resources—both theological and secular. All of these are parts constructively
work together according to the pastoral theological methodology.
As Chapters 3 and 4 explore historical theology, moral theology, and social
cognitive theory, pastoral theology provides the intersection of these resources as they
28

illuminate and inform the pastoral theological question being addressed. For example,
the pastoral theological method has given rise not only to the theological question itself,
but also to identifying and critically evaluating relevant resources that potentially promise
a better understanding of and/or responding to the pastoral need inherent in the situation.
In short, pastoral theology is a methodological standpoint that orders all the parts of this
study. In terms of a specific pastoral theology, Larry Graham’s work provides a
contemporary expression of a method for pastoral theology that initially emerged in the
late 1950’s with Hiltner’s text Preface to Pastoral Theology: The Ministry and Theory of
Shepherding.30 This method of pastoral theology, as noted previously, is a contextual
pastoral theology, but what makes Graham’s framing particularly well suited for the
research of this dissertation is the systemic perspective it brings to understanding
relationships and agency. The principal pastoral theological texts drawn upon from
Graham are Care of Persons, Care of Worlds: A Psychosystems Approach to Pastoral
Care and Counseling and Discovering Images of God: Narratives of Care among
Lesbians and Gays. In addition to Graham, an array of theologians who similarly locate
themselves within pastoral theology are engaged as well throughout the dissertation.31
In terms of historical theology, within the last decade Linda Hogan has emerged
as one of the more noted historical theologians researching the topic of conscience within
Catholicism. Her text Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition stands
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Larry Graham is the principal advisor of this dissertation. Other pastoral theological
articulations were available, but Graham was a student of Hiltner and his own
formulations of pastoral theology are well attested in the field and seem relevant to this
topic. After due consideration, his work was chosen as a major methodological
orientation.
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as a prominent contemporary expression of research in this arena.32 Although Hogan’s
historical embrace of the topic exceeds the parameters of this dissertation, her research of
the 13th century with Thomas Aquinas up and through the Second Vatican Council
reflects the general historical orientation of this project.
Yet beyond simply the timeframe and topic of conscience, Hogan’s historical
methodology is especially relevant to substantiating and understanding the moral
conundrum regarding encountering two strands within the tradition when a Catholic is
making moral decisions. Rather than minimizing differences in the Church’s teaching,
Hogan intentionally and specifically brings them into the light. In short, the differences
within the tradition regarding conscience are concretely identified within the historical
texts as well as the potentially commensurate tension, ambiguity, and confusion that may
surface for Catholics. Additionally, the majority of the historical texts presented on the
topic of conscience are from the Church itself in the form of Conciliar and Papal
statements, especially from the Second Vatican Council. This is due to not only the
authoritative claim they hold for Catholics, but also the public and comprehensive
character they reflect in terms of normative Church teaching regarding the doctrine of
primacy of conscience.
In terms of moral theology, two principal moral theological perspectives within
Catholicism that have consolidated since the Second Vatican Council are engaged—the
Revisionist and Traditionalist schools. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick are
representative of the Revisionist school and Germain Grisez is representative of the
Traditionalist school. Further, their research reflects the dominant Catholic framings of
32
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the doctrine of primacy of conscience, namely, the personalist and legalistic perspectives.
Given the prominence of these moral theologians for Catholicism within the United
States, the corpus of their work spanning over twenty five years has been consulted for
the moral theological mooring of this project regarding conscience. Even though these
three moral theologians specifically represent the Catholic moral theological field, they
also resonate with and reflect a relatively similar position in the ecumenical dialogue
within the Christian communion at large, especially as related to Christian ethics and
morality.33
In terms of social psychology, as noted previously, the research of Bandura
represents not only a fraction of the discipline itself, but also only a portion of the social
cognitive theories available as well. Over the last three decades, Bandura’s research with
SCT has explored a systemic understanding of relationality. Broadly SCT complements
and contributes to the resources of this research on two foundational levels. First, it
shares and enhances the dynamics and dimensions of contextuality and a systemic
perspective that are operative in the pastoral theological method I am utilizing. Graham’s
work with agency as an important dimension of power explores the pastoral and
theological situation in systemic terms. The integration of Bandura’s work gives social
scientific grounding for this view, and offers resources Graham does not for relating this
to the personalist view of primacy of conscience. Second, within the SCT systemic
theoretical framework, agency and its dimensionality have been at the forefront of its
research. SCT offers more disciplined behavioral science research and theory on the
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For a more in-depth discussion of the broader ecumenical dialogue, see James
Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1978).
31

social-personal interfaces involved in decision-making in general (i.e., self-reflectiveness,
perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion) which apply to moral concerns and,
therefore, have implications for amplifying an understanding of primacy of conscience.
Given the introduction of SCT in 1986 with Bandura’s seminal work Social Foundations
of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory, this text serves as the starting point
of the subsequent corpus of SCT literature.34
Outline of Chapters
Chapter 2 develops in depth the pastoral theological method employed in this
dissertation. Graham’s work Care of Persons, Care of Worlds serves as the principal
pastoral theological method of this research. It is systemic in nature and draws upon
foundational pastoral theological principals present in Seward Hiltner’s pastoral theology
Preface to Pastoral Theology. This method reflects upon and integrates concrete human
experience, theological resources, and cognate resources in the process of pastoral
theological construction. It constructively contributes to both pastoral theology and
practice. Graham’s contribution of systemic thought to the understanding of pastoral
theology is of particular importance, as it presents a framing of agency that is highly
relevant to an enhanced understanding of primacy of conscience. Although the pastoral
theological method that I am using is Protestant in origin, it will be related to Catholic
moral reflection in order to contribute voices and resources to the debate and problem
that heretofore have not been included.

34

Albert Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986).
32

The constructive character and foundation of pastoral theology will be laid out in
this chapter, particularly as it recovers and develops dimensions of the Catholic tradition.
Also, the theological resource and role of primacy of conscience will be introduced.
Similarly, foundational aspects of Bandura’s SCT will be introduced as a relevant social
psychological resource for this research in its understanding of agency. In order to
illuminate the pastoral theological method being employed, a pastoral vignette will be
integrated throughout the chapter as a means to concretize both the need and difficulty
experienced by some Catholics when making moral decisions that may differ from
certain Church teachings or tradition. Finally, the importance and inevitability of
theological anthropology within pastoral theology will close out the chapter.
Chapter 3 addresses the Catholic tradition in order to explore what resources the
Church has to offer in order to understand and address questions regarding the doctrine of
primacy of conscience. The principal theological resources employed will be drawn from
the fields of historical and moral theology. Both Catholic historical and moral theology
surface two points directly related to this research—the presence of ambiguity and the
necessity for agency. First, both theologies present a tradition that has diversity and,
therefore, corresponding ambiguity. Second, this shared conclusion of a diverse tradition
that inherently faces ambiguity necessitates understanding agency more fully when
examining primacy of conscience.
After establishing a working definition and theological framework of primacy of
conscience, the historical portion of this chapter will begin from the point of Thomas
Aquinas and his articulation of the doctrine of primacy of conscience. The long and varied
history of conscience in the Catholic tradition will be reviewed in summary fashion vis-à-vis
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three critical historical moments—the Reformation and subsequent Council of Trent (15451563) as symbolized by Martin Luther, the rise of modernism and the subsequent Syllabus of
Errors (1864) as symbolized by John Henry Newman, and the Second Vatican Council (19621965).
This historical review of the doctrine of primacy of conscience from Aquinas to
and through the Second Vatican Council culminates with the Church’s call to recover and
reclaim conscience within the tradition. This mandate from the Second Vatican Council
ultimately results in the subsequent consolidation of the legalistic and personalist
perspectives regarding the doctrine of primacy of conscience. These two perspectives
reflect the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools respectively and will be illuminated
through a review of the Basic Goods Theory as expressed by Grisez and the Proportionate
Reason Theory as expressed by McCormick and Curran. This summary examination will
demonstrate the incontestable ambiguity in the tradition and thereby argue for the
necessity of both understanding and exercising agency when considering primacy of
conscience.
The diverse and even contradictory trajectories of the doctrine that have been
shown through the historical review will be summarized by Hogan’s historical
theological understanding of ambiguity within the Catholic tradition of conscience and
drawn upon to support the development of the doctrine of primacy of conscience through
a pastoral theological interpretation of personal and communal agency. Operating from a
historicist perspective, the concept of a homogenous tradition is rejected, as the diversity,
plurality, and permeability of contexts exist across both time and topic. Hogan’s work
demonstrates this type of plurality within the Catholic tradition regarding conscience and
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reflects a historicist sensibility and analysis, even if not overtly. Ultimately, in addition
to identifying the personalist perspective on conscience as one of the two dominant
contemporary perspectives within the field of moral theology, her historical analysis
bolsters the personalist perspective on the topic.
Chapter 4 addresses the concept of agency as interpreted through the lens of
Bandura’s perspective on SCT. Bandura’s insight into agency and its implications can
help recover, as well as amplify and expand the initial understanding and role of primacy
within the doctrine of conscience. By drawing upon SCT, as one distinct and well
established social cognitive theory, this chapter intends to offer support for the
personalist view of conscience when primacy is amplified with the implications drawn
from an SCT understanding of agency.
The chapter opens with framing the limits of how scientific theory and data is
employed, especially in terms of agency and SCT. Then a recent historical mooring and
baseline follows to provide an understanding for the contemporary intersection between
psychology and Catholic moral theology regarding the concept of conscience. Thomas
Srampickal’s comparative analysis of conscience will serve as one expression of the
broader context in its exploration of both theological and psychological interpretations
and critiques of the concept of conscience. His research includes the concept of conscience
in the empirical psychology of his day, an examination of the use of the concept of conscience
in the documents of the Second Vatican Council, and a synthesis of how the empirical
psychologies during the period of the Second Vatican Council intersect with the understanding
of conscience operative in the documents of the Second Vatican Council.
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From this historical location, an overview of Bandura’s SCT serves as a starting point
for understanding his theory and research regarding agency. SCT will serve as the platform for
understanding individual and communal agential dynamics as related to the possible meaning
and function of primacy when exercising conscience. Bandura’s SCT view of agency
integrates critical psychological and anthropological advances operative from a systemic
perspective. From the systemic foundation of SCT, more nuanced dimensions of the theory
will be considered. This will include what SCT considers the normative cognitive dynamics of
self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion as they may relate to
better understanding agency within the exercise of primacy of conscience.
Bandura’s conceptualization of agency facilitates a more sophisticated
interpretation of the dynamic interplay between the agency of the individual and the
Church when considering the exercise of primacy of conscience (i.e., agency operates
within a reciprocal individual and communal interaction). This chapter principally
explores dimensions of agency beneficial for interpreting the meaning and function of
primacy of conscience from a personalist Catholic viewpoint, including both a broad
examination of individual and communal agential dynamics from a SCT systemic
perspective as well as specific dimensions and factors operative in the exercise of agency
itself. SCT presents agency in a way that supports and amplifies the personalist
interpretation of primacy of conscience and its prioritization of the personal autonomy
and responsibility of individuals in moral matters while taking seriously the communal
agency of the tradition. This systemic perspective resonates and aligns readily and
profoundly with the personalist perspective where authoritative moral agency finally resides in
the primacy of conscience of the acting moral agent. Primacy of conscience becomes the moral
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voice of the individual expressing initiating agency as it emerges as an expression of the
Church community. It neither ignores nor displaces normative Church teaching, just as
normative teaching neither ignores nor displaces it.
Chapter 5 functions constructively to develop an enhanced understanding of
primacy of conscience through a pastoral theological integration of agency as understood
through Bandura’s SCT. Informed and supported by the depth of research in the
preceding chapters (e.g., pastoral theology, moral theology, historical theology, and
social psychology) regarding the topic of conscience and agency, this chapter interprets
and synthesizes those resources and concrete experience as it attempts to construct an
enhanced pastoral theological understanding of primacy of conscience. This pastoral
theological construction of agency for Catholic moral decision-making is intended to
better clarify the unresolved matter in the tradition when a Catholic encounters the two
strands of normative Church teaching and primacy of conscience. Possible amelioration
and/or resolution of the pastoral problem identified will be explored and illuminated visà-vis examples of pastoral practice. In short, Chapter 5 will begin to articulate how both
the Church and the Catholics that comprise it might benefit from a pastoral theological
articulation of the doctrine of primacy of conscience from a personalist perspective, when
primacy is amplified with the implications drawn from Bandura’s SCT view of agency.
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CHAPTER TWO
EMERGING PASTORAL THEOLOGY
There are occasions when the use of valuable
data is hindered because basic theory is inadequate.35
Whether one makes a cursory contemporary review or an extensive historical
study of pastoral theology, it is immediately apparent that the term is anything but
univocal. Regardless of whether the pastoral theology is principally Catholic or
Protestant in origin, the content, meaning and purpose for theological reflection pertinent
to pastoral situations is quite diverse. That being said, it is vital to locate and define the
pastoral theology operative throughout this dissertation, given this project is pastoraltheological in both method and purpose. Additionally, as I articulate my pastoral theological
method, several dimensions of the pastoral problematic identified in Chapter 1 will be engaged
and illustrated, especially the paradigmatic shift between individualistic and systemic thinking
as well as the role of agency within relationships.
First, an overview of this chapter is in order. It will begin by identifying and
elaborating dimensions of my pastoral theological method, including its compatibility
with Catholicism. A pastoral vignette will serve as a means to illustrate both the need and
complication experienced by some Catholics when making moral decisions that may differ
from certain Church teachings or tradition. The constructive character of pastoral theology
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will be engaged, particularly as it recovers and develops dimensions of the Catholic
tradition. The resource and role of primacy of conscience will be introduced, but will receive
its principal development in Chapter 3. Similarly, dimensions of Albert Bandura’s SCT will be
identified as a resource for this dissertation in its understanding of agency, but Chapter 4 will
engage in greater detail its contribution to this research. Larry Kent Graham’s contribution of
systemic thought to the understanding of pastoral theology will be incorporated, especially as it
articulates a framing of agency. Finally, the importance of theological anthropology within
pastoral theology will close the chapter.
Currently, three general definitions substantially cover the diverse continuum of
how pastoral theology is understood. One view positions the pastoral theological project
within the development and articulation of “…practical principles, theories, and
procedures for ordained ministry in all of its functions.”36 Basically this approach is
limited to establishing procedures and/or techniques that chart the normative course by
which ministry is delivered, predominantly if not exclusively by a denomination’s
publicly recognized ministers. A second view focuses pastoral theology within the
parameters of practical theology and, more specifically, the theory and practice of
pastoral care and counseling.37 In this instance, the practical quality of the work is most
salient, as theological reflection is predominantly directed toward the development of
pastoral caregiving practices. The third and final view frames pastoral theology as “a
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form of theological reflection in which pastoral experience serves as a context for critical
development of basic theological understanding.”38
Without calling into question the particular pastoral value possible in the first and
second view of pastoral theology, given that they are complementary rather than
competitive with the third view, this dissertation will limit its method to the third or last
approach where “…pastoral theology is not a theology of or about pastoral care but a
type of contextual theology, a way of doing theology pastorally.”39 Consequently, as this
method engages theology pastorally, it generates new theological understandings in order
to better address the pastoral issue or question at hand. In reflecting upon this method of
pastoral theology, John Patton distinguishes between context and contextuality. 40 The
former is understood as the overall situation or location pertinent to a given circumstance
whereas the latter is the recognition that these particularities of the social situation
influence and inform the pastoral theological reflection itself in both content and process.
Although this approach to pastoral theology currently enjoys substantial currency
within the field, this has not always been the case.41 In 1958 Seward Hiltner’s groundbreaking work Preface to Pastoral Theology: The Ministry and Theory of Shepherding
introduced a systematic integration of a variety of resources in the creation of this now
38
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prevalent contextual pastoral theological method. The array of specifics Hiltner
identified to nuance his pastoral theology is less of a concern in this research than the
seminal and enduring foundational theoretical structure he coined. As noted in the
opening chapter, this pastoral theological method has several dimensions. Beginning
with theological questions that emerge in pastoral practice, it explores the tradition to see
how those questions have been addressed. If the tradition’s response seems deficient,
pastoral theology refines and refocuses the questions for contemporary exploration. In
constructing more adequate theological responses, pastoral theology also draws upon
contemporary resources, from both theology and “cognate secular materials”42 The term
cognate secular materials or sources basically refers to the sciences and other disciplines
that are not explicitly theological (e.g., psychology, human biology, cultural
anthropology, sociology, ethnography), yet are relevant to the conversation at hand.
The prescient quality of Hiltner titling his work a “Preface” clearly has been born
out, as a number of noteworthy critiques and advances have transpired in the nearly five
decades since he penned his work.43 For example, William Clebsch and Charles Jaekle’s
Pastoral Theology in Historical Perspective augments Hiltner’s initial shepherding
perspective and corresponding functions of healing, sustaining, and guiding with an
additional pastoral function of reconciling.44 In a similar vein some three plus decades
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later, Carroll Watkins Ali’s In the Name of Survival and Liberation: A Preface to Pastoral
Theology in the African-American Context appealed to the importance and limits of
contextuality and added the pastoral functions of survival and liberation as relevant for
the African-American community.45 Larry Kent Graham’s work Care of Persons, Care of
Worlds: A Psychosystems Approach to Pastoral Care and Counseling made the
paradigmatic shift from an individualistic approach to a systemic one.46 Graham’s
advance will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
Nevertheless, the principal theoretical formulation—pastoral theology is
dialectically and contextually constructed by drawing upon secular knowledge, theology,
and the practice of ministry in the process of advancing theological understanding—
basically remains in force today both within the field and this dissertation. As pastoral
theology is created, three basic dimensions of Hiltner’s pastoral theology remain
foundational to this day. Watkins Ali summarizes them as being:
(1) Hiltner’s methodological approach set the precedent for bringing
theological reflection to bear on concrete human experience; (2) Hiltner’s
approach is provisional and encourages the identification of a problematic
within the ministry situation as the conceptual basis for pastoral
theological reflection; and (3) Hiltner’s approach is interdisciplinary and
employs cognate resources.47
It needs to be emphasized that pastoral theology is not simply a method or process of
handling data; it also has a theological output. These three dimensions summarized by
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Watkins Ali inform the process of developing more adequate theological understandings
of and responses to the pastoral problem at hand and the corresponding theological issues
present. In other words, this method of doing theology pastorally generates pastoral
theological advances.
The theological problem that is at the heart of this dissertation, arising from the pastoral
practice that will be described and documented, is how to address theologically two strands in
the Church’s tradition regarding being a moral Catholic. One strand suggests that the moral
response is to obey, whereas the other strand suggests that the moral response is to follow your
conscience. These two strands reflect an ambiguity and create conflict, inasmuch as the Church
seems to offer contradictory advice as Catholics are faced with moral decision-making. How
does a lay person, priest, or pastoral theologian address this theological conflict responsibly and
faithfully? This dissertation examines and advances that theological question by developing
the underdeveloped doctrine of the primacy of conscience through the theological creativity
of pastoral theology.
A Protestant Pastoral Theological Method for Catholicism?
Certainly and sadly Christian history is rife with manifestations of how Catholics and
Protestants have been anything but civil, let alone Christian, to one another. Theology has been
no exception. The documents of the Council of Trent overflow with examples: “And if
anyone should read or possess books by heretics or writings by any author condemned
and prohibited by reason of heresy or suspicion of false teaching, he incurs immediately
the sentence of excommunication.”48 In short, if someone possessed a book by Martin
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Luther they were considered damned to hell, given the understanding of the
consequences of excommunication at the time.
With the pall of that historical backdrop, this research would be remiss to not address at
the outset the compatibility and appropriateness of applying Hiltner’s pastoral theological
method to Catholicism. The most critical concept to underscore is the distinction between
method (the process) and content (the product). Hiltner’s method addresses how pastoral
theology is done, not what its outcome will necessarily be.49 The simplest and strongest
precedent that parallels this contemporary theological application is Thomas Aquinas’
integration of Aristotelian philosophy with his theological investigations. In this work, the
Church’s theology integrated a philosophical method from the Greek culture without potential
concerns regarding content prohibiting the integration. Similarly, a pastoral theological method
developed by a person of Protestant faith can be engaged without detriment to Catholic pastoral
theological inquiry and its outcomes.
Not only does Hiltner’s method intersect denominational lines, but it also crosses
disciplinary ones as it requires a pastoral theological interaction with the sciences or other
cognate resources. Employment of cross-disciplinary methodologies is a long standing practice
within Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular with Aquinas as its model.
Specifically within pastoral theology, Clebsch and Jaekle’s research demonstrates that “in
every historical epoch, pastoring has utilized—and by utilizing has helped to advance and
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transform—the psychology or psychologies current in that epoch.”50 Similarly, in the spirit of
Aquinas’ integrative theological endeavor, the Second Vatican Council, as quoted in Chapter 1,
calls for this type of interaction with secular sciences (e.g., psychology, sociology,
anthropology) in the document “Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern
World.”51 Consequently, the sciences or other cognate resources, like SCT, as conversation
partners with pastoral theology are not only compatible with Catholicism, but also actually part
of its historical and current tradition.
Finally, and very much to the point at hand, John McDonough Cassem’s dissertation
at Catholic University of America addresses this question in detail from the perspective
of the renowned contemporary Catholic theologian Bernard Lonergan and affirms the
feasibility of this integration and application.52 His research reflects an ecumenical age
that strives to overcome an adversarial history by responding to the Second Vatican
Council call: “In fidelity to conscience, Christians are joined with others in the search for
truth and for the genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of
individuals and from social relationships.”53 Not only are Christians (i.e., Catholics and
Protestants) identified under a common moniker by Catholics, they are also called to
collaborate with “others in search for truth and genuine solution[s].” In sum, peoples of
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other faiths as well as the sciences are valued as conversation partners and resources for
theological reflection.
A Pastoral Theological Illustration of Primacy of Conscience
Watkins Ali’s articulation of the three salient dimensions of pastoral theology can
be illustrated in a pastoral vignette. The vignette will illustrate how theological questions not
previously seen can arise and even shape new theological understandings. It will be helpful to
now provide a cursory sketch of how this process will be manifest in this research on
primacy of conscience, but full development will obviously only occur as the dissertation
proceeds. Primacy of conscience can be more fully understood through attending to these
three critical elements that have been overlooked or minimized: the actual experiences
and resolutions of dedicated and faithful Catholics, neglected yet pertinent resources in
the tradition, and a critical appropriation of cognate secular materials. That is, this
illustration of pastoral practice is not merely reflecting theologically on an experience, but also
engaging questions with the possibility of different and advanced theological perspectives.
The first dimension Watkins Ali identifies is bringing theological reflection to
bear on concrete human experience. To that end and consistent with the pastoral
methodology itself, a brief pastoral vignette will be introduced here in order to locate the
type of human experience that this research is theologically reflecting upon. Sue came
into my office with a story not terribly uncommon, yet often terribly troubling in the
tension, confusion and disempowerment it reveals.54 Her problem was that she was
taking “the pill,” fully knowing the Roman Catholic Church forbids this and other
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artificial means of contraception. Yet along with her acknowledgement of this
“officially” forbidden behavior, she also struggled to explain and justify her choice as one
that made sense to her given all her circumstances. From her perspective, they already
had more children than she and her husband could adequately provide for given the fact
they lived below the poverty line and there were already likely signs of their children
being stunted from the family’s impoverishment. Further, she was fearful of the short
and long-term consequences of her husband’s violent and abusive behavior, especially
when he was intoxicated, for her present children. Resisting his sexual advances carried
its own threat and the thought of divorce further complicated the inadequacies of
providing for the children and was equally or more looked down upon by the Church.
Therefore, the use of artificial contraception seemed to her to be the best possible choice
in her world that was far less than an ideal one. Nevertheless, given her Roman
Catholicism, she knew the Church’s teaching and wanted to do the right thing, even if
that simply meant talking it over with a priest and getting his perspective. Sue considered
herself a “good” Catholic and had always been taught to follow her conscience and was
not sure if that was, in fact, what she was now doing by taking the pill.
First, in terms of the concrete human experience that will focus this theological
reflection, it is indisputable that some Catholics like Sue experience dissonance when
attempting to integrate certain Church teachings with the leading of their conscience
when they make moral decisions. What becomes immediately apparent in the human
experience is that not all Catholics accept and practice all established moral answers
provided by the Church. This human experience sits squarely within the exercise of
conscience and the corresponding question of and tradition regarding its primacy.
47

Benedict Ashley appeals to an array of data to illustrate the difference between normative
Catholic teaching and some Catholics’ actual behavior as well as their perception of the impact,
or lack thereof, of these choices on their standing as a Catholic:55
…Between 1963 and 1990, the percentage of Catholics attending Church
at least once a week fell from 71 percent to 40.5 percent. In 1972, 21
percent of Catholics saw nothing wrong with premarital sex; by 1990, the
number had risen to 44 percent. In 1987, 70 percent of Catholics surveyed
said “yes” in answer to the question, “Can one be a good Catholic without
going to Church every Sunday?” Sixty-eight percent said “yes” to the
question, “Can one be a good Catholic without obeying the Church’s
teaching on birth control?” Thirty-nine percent responded “yes” to the
same question about abortion.56
These topics (i.e., Church non-attendance, premarital sex, birth control, and abortion) and
others like them have been and remain problematic and areas of dissension. They are
indicative of a potential tension and problem that surfaces, inasmuch as non-compliance
with normative Church teaching on these topics may be considered sinful, as interpreted
from a limited magisterial perspective—a “good” Catholic neither believes nor does these
things, at least not without erring or sinning!
Although the data from these surveys was not explicitly attempting to explore the
presence and/or function of primacy of conscience, they clearly relate to the concrete
human experience being examined. What is of particular interest with this data is that
some degree of deviance from official Church teaching does not necessarily result in
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these persons experiencing themselves as sinful, rather they continue to identify
themselves as “good” Catholics.57 Further, these numbers do not merely reflect outliers
or anomalies that may either be too difficult and/or without sufficient merit to interpret.
Rather, they identify a dynamic that is fairly substantial. In fact, entire organizations
with tens of thousands of members exist that reflect groups that consider themselves
“good” Catholics, although differing with certain magisterial positions of the Church.58
How is this to be accounted for and what key, if any, might primacy of conscience hold
in its understanding?
Therefore in reflecting upon the concrete human experience just identified, the
theological resources that I will principally use are historical Catholic documents (e.g.,
Second Vatican Council and other magisterial texts) and Catholic moral theology,
especially from the personalist school as reflected in the work of Charles Curran and
Richard McCormick.59 These theological resources will be used to set both the historical
and contemporary context of the debate on primacy of conscience in general as well as
focus upon current perspectives of the meaning and function of primacy in particular.
These resources, without doubt, clearly support the legitimacy and complexity of Sue’s
question and uncertainty as well as other Catholics in similar situations. For example, the
“Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” states:
57
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Lay people should also know that it is generally the function of their wellformed Christian conscience to see that the divine law is inscribed in the
life of the earthly city….Let the lay people not imagine that their pastors
are always such experts that to every problem which arises, however
complicated, they can readily give a concrete solution, or even that such is
their mission. Rather, enlightened by Christian wisdom and giving close
attention to the teaching authority of the Church, let lay people take on
their own distinctive role.60
The second dimension of the pastoral theological method Watkins Ali presents is “the
identification of a problematic within the ministry situation as the conceptual basis for
pastoral theological reflection.” As pastoral practice demonstrates, managing the
differences between the Church teaching and one’s conscience can be very complicated. As a
priest, I have witnessed these complications revealed in the affective and cognitive as
well as the behavioral and organizational. This complication manifest in pastoral practice
is confirmed by a number of research studies, especially within the arena of the Church’s
teaching on contraception and the actual beliefs and practices of many Catholics.61
In those instances when a Catholic’s moral decision-making differs from the
Church’s normative teaching, a serious pastoral problem often emerges. Independent of
the specific moral issue being addressed and the array of complications that may be
involved in the situation, the serious foundational question is whether or not Catholics
can simultaneously be loyal to the Church’s teaching while occasionally differing from it
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because of the leading of their conscience as related to a given moral issue. Is a
Catholic’s status within the Church necessarily compromised if following one’s
conscience in a particular instance leads to differing from normative Church teaching?
Generally there are two interpretations of this problem. One interpretation of the
discrepancy between Church teaching and many Catholics’ actual beliefs and practices is
that it reflects deterioration caused by influences external to the Church. Therefore, some
Catholics “…are alarmed by what they see as a collapse of Christian moral standards in
the Church and a disastrous compromise with liberal Protestantism and still worse with
secularism.”62 From this perspective, “…the core of Catholic identity has been lost.
These people who dissent, who have adopted other sources of authority as their guide for
moral life and liturgical consciousness, have thrown away the crowning glory of
Catholicism.”63 Although this negative interpretation attempts to explain sources of
influence contributing to this dissonance or gap, it does not seem to address how and/or
why these Catholics continue to identify themselves as “good” Catholics, and not simply
converts to liberal Protestantism or secularism.64
A second interpretation—the one which forms the basis of this study—is that
these types of data, both from pastoral care experiences and sociological studies, reflect
the functioning of the long standing traditional, albeit increasingly submerged and
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underdeveloped, Catholic doctrine of primacy of conscience. At first glance in these
experiences of dissonance, the principal concern often seems to be the topical one, be it
contraception, terminating artificial life support, or any specific moral issue. Yet in the Church
moral decision-making itself has an inherent, and largely unrecognized, ambiguity and tension
in its position on obedience to the authority of Church teaching and the obligation to follow
one’s conscience, even if conscience leads in a different direction than the Church normatively
teaches.65
In short, the pastoral problem identified reflects both individual and institutional
complications regarding primacy of conscience. From this second interpretation which situates
primacy of conscience as operative and central in its interpretation, one could certainly wonder,
if not make the argument that Sue is merely and essentially applying Paul VI’s directive to
parents in the Encyclical “The Development of Peoples (Popularum Progressio)”:
It is finally the right of the parents having completely examined the case to
make a decision about the number of their children; a responsibility they take
upon themselves keeping in sight their duty to God, themselves, the children
already born, and the community to which they belong, following the dictates
of their conscience instructed about the divine law authentically interpreted and
strengthened by confidence in God.66
The third dimension of this pastoral theological method that Watkins Ali identifies is its
interdisciplinary character, especially its employment of cognate resources. The critical
appropriation of cognate secular materials informing this research is from the field of
psychology. Specifically, I have chosen Bandura’s work as my principal resource from the
discipline of social psychology in order to expand and explicate the agential dimensions
65
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involved in an act of claiming primacy of conscience. Conscience is not an explicit term
employed by Bandura nor is it synonymous with behavior, cognition, or a combination of the
two. Nevertheless, conscience is inextricably related to both cognition and behavior inasmuch
as the exercise of conscience necessarily involves both judgment and action, which are central
concepts in Bandura’s thought as well as in Catholic moral reflection. As defined by Catholic
moral theologian Charles Curran, “conscience is generally understood as the judgment about
the morality of an act to be done or omitted or already done or omitted by the person.”67
Bandura’s SCT, as one among a number of social cognitive theories, is
particularly relevant for this research for three reasons.68 For starters, he enjoys both
prominence and longevity within his field, especially in terms of research on agency and
its dimensionality.69 Additionally, his conceptualization of agency facilitates a more
sophisticated interpretation of the dynamic interplay between the agency of the individual
67
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53

and the Church operative in the exercise of primacy of conscience (i.e., agency operates
within a reciprocal individual and communal interaction). Finally, his research examines
cognitive and behavioral dimensions of agency (i.e., the role of self-reflectiveness,70
perceived self-efficacy,71 and social persuasion72) that have implications for unexplored
dimensions of the function of primacy of conscience.73
Finally, in broadly locating primacy of conscience within this pastoral theological
method, an additional comment is in order lest the reader be confused regarding the focus of
this research. Almost any discussion of conscience inevitably calls forth illustrations, that
is, how might understanding primacy of conscience manifest itself in the context of any
real or hypothetical moral situation? Certainly the contextuality of this pastoral
theological method necessitates engaging concrete human experience and refrains from
purely abstract analysis. Therefore, although specific moral examples that are vital to
human agency (e.g., Sue’s question regarding contraception or others within the arena of
sexuality) will be occasionally used in this dissertation in order to both inform and
illustrate the principal concept being addressed (i.e., primacy of conscience) and the
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concrete situation from which it emerges, it is important to recognize that this research is
not attempting to further a particular analysis of any given moral issue or topic.
Enhancing the theological and pastoral resources available to Catholics, be they lay or
cleric, regarding the challenge of negotiating certain official Church teachings and
following their conscience is the exclusive interest of this research. The diverse topics or
issues actually operative as the content occasionally engaged by primacy of conscience
ultimately remain for individuals and ministers to determine as is relevant for their lives,
community, and world.
Exploring the “Lost”
For many Catholics like Sue, often there surfaces a sense of something being
“lost” or absent. Most Catholics will readily claim to being called to follow their
conscience, yet this is not necessarily synonymous with having sufficient clarity or
direction as to what that actually means in principle and practice. Although many
Catholics join with common secular and religious parlance in readily appealing to the
concept of "following one's conscience," often this may be as generic and diffuse as
"following a gut feeling" and, therefore, not truly reflective of the Church's tradition of
conscience nor adequate for its fully functional exercise. A superficial, if not biased,
interpretation of this dynamic would place the dominant, if not sole, responsibility for
this lacking upon the individual. It might sound something like, “If you would have
simply taken the time to inform yourself, you would not find yourself in this quandary.”
Yet upon deeper examination, it is irrefutable that this alone is not the sole factor
operative in this conundrum.
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Fine tuning the second dimension Watkins Ali has identified regarding “a
problematic within the ministry situation as the conceptual basis for pastoral theological
reflection,” Lapsley and Patton have articulated how recovering and discovering a
dimension of theology that has been “lost” can be both illuminating and vital. Patton
claims that "…a characteristic element in pastoral theology [is] recovering a dimension of
an important human problem that has been lost or insufficiently emphasized in
contemporary theology.”74 From one perspective, for something to be lost simply means
that its current whereabouts are unknown or unclear, but it still exists and potentially can
be recovered and found. Thus the method functions constructively by retrieving and
recovering as well as emphasizing and elaborating insufficiently engaged or developed
theological concerns. Graham articulates the constructive and nuanced character of this
pastoral theological process:
For pastoral theology contends that unaddressed theological issues often
arise from the particularity of human experience, including the actual
practice of ministry, and that further interpretation of what actually takes
place in concrete experience has the potential for constructing new
theological understandings or clarifying unresolved matters in the
tradition.75
Basically, exploring what was “lost” serves not only as an entry point to the
“unaddressed theological issues” (e.g., confusion about and/or loss of agency in the
exercise of conscience), but it also can potentially construct enhanced theological insights
and resolve contemporary problematic or complicated questions in the tradition.
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“Unaddressed theological issues [that] often arise from the particularity of human
experience” generate problems like the one some Catholics experience when trying to
integrate certain Church teachings, whether they are unresolved or misunderstood matters
in the tradition (i.e., primacy of conscience). Examining the pastoral data (i.e., the setting
and acts of ministry and the personhood of the one carrying out the act of ministry) in
light of theology and cognate secular knowledge is precisely how the tradition is
experienced as living. In a sense, what is “found” is seldom, if ever, in the identical state
in which it was lost and therein lies the constructive process. Highlighting this
methodological dimension of something being “lost” is particularly apropos for this
project inasmuch as critical theological dimensions of conscience have been
demonstratively lost or insufficiently emphasized, at least in terms of their accessibility
and prevalence within contemporary laity and clergy alike.
A salient example of Catholic pastoral theology recovering what has been lost is
clear in the Second Vatican Council as it addresses nothing less than the topic at hand—
primacy of conscience. First, it is important to note that early in the Second Vatican
Council’s proceedings John XXIII recognized that “the deposit of faith or revealed truths
are one thing; the manner in which they are formulated without violence to their meaning
and significance is another.”76 In short, John XXIII was identifying the possibility, if not
the actuality, that the resources of the faith tradition are not always fully accessible to the
faithful, be they lay or cleric, due to potential complications and/or detriments in their
transmission. Or harkening back to Patton’s words, “a characteristic element in pastoral
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theology [is] recovering a dimension of an important human problem that has been lost or
insufficiently emphasized in contemporary theology.”
Therefore, in order to ameliorate how the interpretation and subsequent
presentation of the faith tradition has been or can be compromised, the Second Vatican
Council was charged with making its work “predominantly pastoral in character.”77 The
Second Vatican Council was principally doing pastoral theological work as the Church
was “bringing herself up to date where required,”78 part of which was recovering what
was lost or compromised in the historical transmission of the tradition. Even an
extremely brief review of the tradition related to primacy of conscience will readily
demonstrate this point.
When the Second Vatican Council examined the tradition regarding primacy of
conscience, it did not confront theological subtlety and nuance, but rather a blatant
example of the tradition being formulated in a manner that was far from being “without
violence to its meaning and significance.” Primacy of conscience was present as early as
the third century, as reflected in Lactantius’ relatively obscure statement that “unless the
act is done freely and from the heart it is an accursed abomination.”79 Aquinas’ oft
quoted, enduring, and topically relevant “Anyone upon whom the ecclesiastical
authorities, in ignorance of the true facts, impose a demand against his clear conscience
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should perish in excommunication rather than violate his conscience,”80 continues to
reveal how primacy of conscience has long enjoyed its place within the Catholic tradition
and moral teaching.
That being said, it is difficult, if not flatly impossible, to reconcile the relatively
recent Church statement by Pius IX in 1864 when he promulgated “Condemning Current
Errors (Quanta Cura)” in response, or maybe better said, in reaction to the rise of
modernism. “Condemning Current Errors” condemned:
…that erroneous opinion which is especially injurious to the Catholic
Church and the salvation of souls, called by our predecessor Gregory XVI
insane raving, namely, that freedom of conscience and of worship is the
proper right of each man, and that this should be proclaimed and asserted
in every rightly constituted society.81
Primacy of conscience was being lost in the tradition, or at least insufficiently
emphasized, and the Second Vatican Council from its pastoral approach and concern was
attempting to recover it.
Hardly more than a century following Pius IX’s tenure, the Second Vatican
Council begins a broad recovery of the doctrine of primacy of conscience, as its original
“meaning and significance” truly colors an array of magisterial documents from “The
Dogmatic Constitution of the Church (Lumen Gentium)”82 and “The Pastoral Constitution
on the Church in the Modern World”83 to the “Declaration on Religious Freedom
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(Dignitiatis Humanae).”84 The degree of this recovery and, by extension, how lost it had
become is certainly manifest in the “Declaration on Religious Freedom” which states:
The human person sees and recognizes the demands of the divine law
through conscience. All are bound to follow their conscience faithfully in
every sphere of activity….Therefore, the individual must not be forced to
act against conscience nor be prevented from acting according to
conscience, especially in religious matters.85
This dissertation, in the spirit and trajectory of the Second Vatican Council and through
the pastoral theological methodology identified, will continue and further the recovery of
dimensions of the tradition of primacy of conscience that have been lost as well as
explore dimensions that were never adequately or fully developed. One particularly
relevant resource for understanding this dynamic of “losing or recovering,” let alone
developing, dimensions of tradition is historicism. This will be addressed in the next
chapter as a lens to understand and work with the ambiguity within the tradition that
complicates this pastoral situation and theological question.
Contemporary Advances in Pastoral Theology
Given the provided distillation of Hiltner’s principal pastoral theological insight, a
variety of contemporary definitions of pastoral theology that appeal to this theoretical
mooring are possible.86 Graham states that pastoral theology’s
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task is to develop theory and practice for the ministry of care. It draws the
resources for its creative work from the setting and acts of ministry, the
living tradition, cognate secular knowledge, and the personhood of the one
carrying out the act of ministry. Methodologically, these resources are
ordered by praxis…. Pastoral theology, like practical theology, contributes
not only to the formulation of theory and practice relevant to the ministry
of care, but also recovers, corrects, and expands viewpoints in other
branches of theology and ministry.87
In Graham’s Care of Persons, Care of Worlds, from which this definition is taken, he
provides a particular advance of a substantial limitation within Hiltner’s original
formulation which happens to be extremely relevant for this research—the paradigmatic
shift from an individualistic to a systemic perspective. A systemic perspective, as
defined by Graham, is “a manner of interpreting reality which emphasizes togetherness,
ongoing processes and interactions, and cooperation and reciprocal influence rather than
autonomy and separateness.”88
Even though Hiltner was uniquely insightful, he was still a man of his times and
this is manifest in the individualistic approach operative in his pastoral theology.89 Not
only were Hiltner and the psychological culture in which he was embedded still deeply
invested in psychodynamic theories of the self,90 but also the religious culture
surrounding him predominantly, if not exclusively, associated ministry with the acts of
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the pastor or formally recognized minister—an individual, if you will.91 Both of these
influences reinforced an individualistic quality to his pastoral theology, not surprisingly
given this zeitgeist. This individualistic slant is symbolically revealed in Hiltner’s
employment of Anton Boisen’s term “living human documents” as a dominant pastoral
theological metaphor.92
Hiltner was not alone in this limitation, as it captivated the imagination of the
pastoral theological field at the time.93 This individualistic orientation ultimately
consolidated into the field’s dominant paradigm of the era—the clinical pastoral
perspective. The weight of this paradigm was reflected and reinforced by the discipline’s
principal reference text The Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling. Nancy Ramsay
identifies both its prevalence and features:
The clinical pastoral perspective that predominates in the Dictionary is
more clinically focused on relationally conceived selves in the immediacy
of their lived experience with their social context often in the background.
It values an existential focus on being over doing that recognizes moral
issues but does not take up their political and social consequences.94
Whether we examine prominent influences like Rogers, Freud, and Fromm prior to the
publication of Preface,95 or subsequent contributors following a similar trajectory, the
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clinical pastoral perspective emerging from it largely mirrors the dominant individualistic
model of care in much of the United States culture at the time within these disciplines.96
Not surprisingly other disciplines as well labored under the limitations of an
individualistic orientation, not the least of which is the arena of moral theology where the
debate regarding primacy of conscience has predominantly been located.
It is vital to stress that identifying a theory or even a paradigm’s limits does not
necessarily undermine any and all value it might enjoy, whether in the past or present.
For decades the clinical pastoral perspective contributed to great gains in pastoral
theology, care and counseling and many persons continue to be its beneficiaries.97
Nevertheless, the clinical pastoral perspective only goes so far in what it is capable of
accomplishing. In other words, the limitation was less about what it did accomplish than
the recognition of what it neither did nor could adequately address. As noted earlier,
“there are occasions when the use of valuable data is hindered because basic theory is
inadequate”98—this was one of those occasions inasmuch as the psychology employed
was highly individualistic. The basic theory with its corresponding individualistic bias
was incapable of adequately examining and integrating “valuable data” from the social
context and arena, be it the impact of race, culture, gender, power, or class.99
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As previously noted though, Hiltner left the door of theological development and
advancement wide open predominantly by virtue of the method itself as well as
identifying his work as a preface rather than a final word on the subject. The field of
pastoral theology, informed by systemic perspectives and developments emerging in
psychology and other social sciences, began to recognize the individualistic character of
its focus and the commensurate limitations. Further, inasmuch as the theory incorporates
reflection upon and examination of the pastoral data (i.e., the setting and acts of ministry
and the personhood of the one carrying out the act of ministry), it also became apparent
from this perspective that amelioration and/or resolution of pastoral problematics were
often hobbled due to the lack of sufficient attention to and integration of the social
context with all its influencing factors, be they constructively or destructively oriented.
A number of pastoral theologians started knocking on this door of theological
development and advance by exploring alternative metaphors that were systemically
rather than individualistically oriented.100 New systemic metaphors like the “living
human web” came to the fore.101 One of the principal emerging paradigms eclipsing the
clinical pastoral paradigm was the communal contextual paradigm that Ramsay describes
succinctly:
The communal contextual paradigm draws on the ecological metaphor of a
web to describe tensively held dual foci. The first is on ecclesial contexts
that sustain and strengthen community practices of care. The second is on
100
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the widened horizons of the field that conceive of care as including public,
structural, and political dimensions of individual and relational
experience.102
Nevertheless, even with the theoretical progress and promise inherent in a systemic
perspective, the unique challenge remained as to how to not simply trade one problem for
another. In other words, how can providing a corrective for the limitations of an
individualistic perspective by integrating a systemic perspective not unintentionally result
in a systemic perspective that similarly loses sufficient sight of and appreciation for the
individual?
Psychosystemic Pastoral Theology and Agency
This was the theoretical and practical conundrum facing pastoral theologians
during this time of development and transition. It was a task of integration that needed to
incorporate what was of value in both individualistic and systemic perspectives, all the
while minimizing, if not striving to eliminate, the complications that occur when either
perspective is taken to the extreme at the exclusion of the other. Obviously this broad
sweeping theoretical challenge for pastoral theology’s paradigm has implications for
whatever pastoral issue or need may arise, but it has particular import for this discussion
of primacy of conscience inasmuch as a vital dimension of the problem itself is how to
best understand the relationship between the individual and the Church in terms of
agency.
Sensitive to and uncomfortable with the unnecessary polarization between either
the individual or the social being the dominant or exclusive focal point for care, Graham
unsuccessfully sought an extant coherent theory that could “…synthesize individual
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healing with a fuller engagement with the world.”103 In time, both the very absence of
and need for such an integrated theory for pastoral theology gave rise to Graham
outlining a new theoretical framework which he subsequently labeled,
“psychosystemic.”104
This neologism draws upon an understanding of and the interaction between both
the words “psyche” and “systemic.” According to this theory,
the term, ‘psychosystemic,’ refers to the reciprocal interplay between the
psyche of individuals and the social, cultural, and natural orders. This
interplay is not neutral or static; it is value-laden and teeming with
possibilities. The character of persons and their worlds come into being
by the mutual influences of each upon the other.105
The key to addressing this theoretical and practical conundrum was neither approaching it
as an “either-or” proposition thereby losing sight of the individual or the context, nor
even as a “both-and” proposition by merely standing the individual and context both side
by side without any real interaction, let alone integration. The psyche and the system are
part of one another such that “…psyches create systems and systems create psyches.”106
To speak comprehensively of one without the other is not only contrived, it is inadequate
and inaccurate. One cannot and does not exist without the other and understanding their
relationship is potentially a source of great pastoral theological insight, especially in
terms of agency.
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Although Graham identifies four dimensions of systemic thinking that inform the
psychosystemic perspective,107 the dimension that is particularly vital to the pastoral
problematic at hand is the “…affirmation that all elements of the universe are
interconnected, standing in an ongoing reciprocal relationship to one another.”108 The
advances of psychology, particularly family systems theory, and process theology inform
this systemic perspective and its commensurate reciprocal interconnectedness and
relationality.109 These contemporary influences nuance and elaborate what, nevertheless,
has been a seminal and enduring theological perspective of and metaphor for relationality
within Christianity—namely Paul’s analogy of the Church as the body of Christ
(1 Corinthians 12).110
This interconnectedness and relationality bears a variety of qualities that have a
bearing upon the dynamic and interactive process of a person living in the world,
including contextual organization, creativity, bi-polar power, contending values and
reciprocal transactions. Graham’s summary states:
The universe consists of an interacting systemic whole, organized from
smallest to largest units, or components. These components are actual
occasions of experience, persons, families, societies, culture, and nature.
They are linked by five interrelated connecting elements. Contextual
organization refers to the identity and continuity of a component or entity.
Contextual creativity points to the capacity for intentionality and change.
Bi-polar power describes the inherent capacity for an entity to be
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influenced by and to influence others. Contending values delineated the
qualitative dimension of an entity’s becoming and influence upon others.
Reciprocal transactions account for the mutual exchanges of power,
creativity, and values in and between organized and changing entities.111
Certainly insight into the question of primacy of conscience can be gained by focusing
the exploration through any of these given lenses, but understanding the concept of bipolar power is uniquely illuminating as it interprets agency.
Given the prevalence of an array of psychological diagnoses incorporating the
word “bi-polar,” from the outset it is important to clearly state that the term is not being
employed in accord with DSM-VI nomenclature for any given clinical psychological
diagnostic category.112 Rather, “bi-polar power refers to the capacity of each element
within the system and the system as a whole to receive and to provide influence.”113 The
bi-polar character of power is precisely in the combination and interaction of both agency
and receptivity.114 As such, no given party, be it the individual or the Church, is solely a
source of influence or, conversely, the recipient of influence. Every entity, whether an
individual or social one, is caught up in an inextricable web of agential and receptive
interactions through the exercise of both agential and receptive power.
Graham, revealing his mooring in process theology, describes agential power as
“the energy by which creativity reaches its goals, and which complements the capacity of
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organized structures to be receptive.”115 Creation comes into being by virtue of agential
power which, in turn, presumes receptive power. Ultimately, and most broadly
understood, power is “…the capacity to influence and to be influenced by the
environment”116 and, more specifically, power is a manifestation and expression of the
relationality of agency, both by way of initiation and reception.
Psychosystemic Pastoral Theology and Social Cognitive Theory
Although Graham clearly made advances upon the limitations identified in
Hiltner’s original work, certainly other pastoral theologians have as well. Nevertheless,
Graham’s particular accomplishment and its now well established position within the
field of pastoral theology is uniquely suited for this research regarding agency precisely
because of both its systemic perspective and its appreciation for agency. Recalling the
thesis of this dissertation, a constructive pastoral theological appropriation and interpretation
of the personalist view of primacy of conscience in the Catholic tradition, when primacy is
amplified with the implications drawn from a SCT view of agency, is a critical resource for
helping contemporary U.S. Catholics and their spiritual guides to make moral decisions that are
informed but not controlled by the established tradition of the Church. Few, if any, pastoral
theologies are better suited to interpret and integrate SCT’s view of agency than
psychosystemic pastoral theology. A cursory overview will quickly demonstrate the resonance
of the distinct, yet similar, systemic theories that interpret agency in a manner that provides a
corrective for the limitations of an individualistic perspective by integrating a systemic
perspective without losing sight of and appreciation for the individual. In short, both
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Graham’s and Bandura’s theories affirm, reinforce and expand the necessary agential
foundation of a personalist view of primacy of conscience.
Although not without nuance and difference, agential power as defined within the
psychosystemic perspective fundamentally resonates with Bandura’s definition of
agency. For Bandura, agency means the capacity “…to intentionally make things happen by
one’s actions.”117 At a minimum, “making things happen by one’s actions” presumes both
agential power as a source of influence and receptive power which reflects the structured
context being affected or influenced.118
The psychosystemic perspective is both supported and elaborated by Bandura’s SCT
and research. Similar to Graham’s theoretical framing, SCT posits that human functioning
results from a dynamic interplay of personal, behavioral, and environmental influences.119 This
dynamic interplay functions such that “…internal personal factors in the form of cognitive,
affective, and biological events, behavioral patterns, and environmental influences all operate
as interacting determinants that influence one another bidirectionally.”120 This bi-directionality
essentially corresponds to Graham’s bi-polar power and view of reciprocal transactions,
consequently according to Bandura, agency functions interactively for the individual and the
social system:
Although the self is socially constituted, by exercising self-influence human
agents operate generatively and proactively, not just reactively, to shape the
character of their social systems. In these agentic transactions, people are
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producers as well as products of social systems. Personal agency and social
structure operate interdependently.121
Therefore at the core, and most critically, SCT examines the reciprocal and
interactive agential framework within which personal and social dynamics emerge and
are operative such that one cannot be fully understood in isolation from the other. Like
the psychosystemic perspective, this framing of agency facilitates understanding and
integrating individual and communal agential dynamics. Both must be present if the
Catholic view of primacy of conscience is to assist parishioners and priests, and become
more fully intelligible to the tradition itself. Defining and explicating dimensions of
agency are beneficial, if not essential, for interpreting the meaning and function of
primacy of conscience, especially from a personalist Catholic viewpoint. The
psychosystemic perspective and SCT present agency in a way that supports the
personalist interpretation of primacy of conscience and its prioritization of the personal
autonomy and responsibility of individuals in moral matters while not losing sight of the
importance of the communal agency of the Church tradition.
In exploring a personalist Catholic viewpoint, Chapter 3 will situate agency
within the debate between the legalistic and personalist schools regarding primacy of
conscience. The principal thrust of this examination of primacy of conscience will be
that agency is a critical element in understanding the meaning and function of primacy of
conscience within the relationship between the Church as a social group and the
individual as a member—a primacy whose structure implicitly places the concept of
agency at the center as interdependent of and at times in conflict with the social group,
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the Church. Further, Chapter 4 will enhance this discussion with both a broad
examination of individual and communal agential dynamics from a SCT systemic
perspective as well as specific dimensions and factors operative in the exercise of agency
itself. Yet to come full circle within the present chapter, a brief examination and
application of bi-polar agency from a systemic perspective to our previous vignette is in
order.122
Vignette from a Systemic Perspective of Agency
We can readily concretize this conversation regarding agency from a systemic
perspective that identifies a bi-polar power consisting of agential and receptive dimensions by
revisiting the brief pastoral vignette of Sue. It will serve as an application of the pastoral
theological method which opens a venue for understanding this concrete human experience and
relational dynamic. Given the bi-polar character of power, it is necessary to examine this
question from both the position of Sue and the Church as they interact. The first examination
will be from the perspective of the Church exercising agential power and Sue manifesting
receptive power and the second examination will be the reverse. One irrefutable explicit intent
of the Church’s teaching is that it makes a difference or has influence in how Catholics
understand and attempt or strive to live their lives. It is intended, if not expected, to be
influential and formative in a Catholic’s life. Sue certainly acknowledges this in her
recognition of and respect for engaging the Church’s teaching. She is neither ignorant nor
simplistic in her engagement of her tradition. Over the course of Sue’s life through a variety of
122
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sources, from parents and family members to priests and religious education teachers, the
Church has exercised agential power and influence in the formation of her worldview just as
she has expressed receptive power by incorporating it into herself.
At first blush, it seems relatively straightforward that agential power or influence
exercised by the Church is manifest in the teachings of the tradition, yet that alone does
not help fully understand or explain her complicated situation. Upon further
examination, what becomes immediately apparent is that Sue’s ambiguity in this situation
is not simply of her own making. Even if the Church’s teaching on reproduction,
especially contraception, were absolutely homogenous, definitive and clear (which, by
the way, it is not), Sue’s problem would remain, given that the more foundational source
of the problem lies elsewhere. As stated earlier, the Catholic Church’s teaching on moral
decision-making itself has an inherent, and largely unrecognized, ambiguity and tension
in its position on obedience to the authority of Church teaching and on the obligation to
follow one’s conscience.
Historically when the doctrine of primacy of conscience was originally
formulated there were views of natural law that argued a rightly informed conscience
would be in line with the moral teachings of the Church since there could really be no
alternative available. That is, there was a presumed natural affinity between human
conscience, natural moral law, and the teaching of the Church. Both the problem and
possibility of today is that the assumption of this coherence as well as views of natural
law, let alone the Church’s capacity to know it, have been and are being reinterpreted in
light of any number of modern advances. Chapter 3 will examine this development in
more detail.
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Sue’s complication, uncertainty and ambiguity are not simply about the specific
topic of contraception. She is also confused about the teachings regarding primacy of
conscience or, at the heart of the matter, the relationship of her agency with the Church’s.
Just as the Church has influenced her perspective on reproduction, especially in terms of
contraception, it has similarly contributed to the formation of her perspective regarding agency
and decision-making as reflected in the doctrine of primacy of conscience. In short, Sue’s
situation and corresponding struggle regarding moral decision-making, in part, is the byproduct of the Church’s influence and agential power in its teaching related to agency.
This is the inherently complicated tradition that has been “handed down” to her. Because
the Church has both “lost or insufficiently emphasized in contemporary theology”
primacy of conscience and the role of agency in addressing important human problems,
the individual alone does not shoulder the responsibility for the pastoral problematic at
hand. Sue’s receptive power is partly the embodiment of the Church’s agential power
and influence as it has communicated theological ambiguity related to primacy of
conscience and, therefore, agency.
In reversing the roles, Sue also is in the position of agential power while the Church is
positioned in the receptive role. As a faithful and informed Catholic, she is cognizant of the
Church’s position on artificial contraception while at the same time being well aware of the
Church’s teaching of primacy of conscience, even if somewhat uncertain or unclear of its
application. Being positioned within the sacramental vocation of marriage, she has a vantage
point of understanding and responsibility both as wife and mother. In light of years of
experience in these roles, her conscience, as she understands it, is leading her to take
contraceptive measures in order to accomplish what she perceives as the greatest overall good.
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On the one hand this direction seems to directly contradict the Church’s specific moral teaching
regarding artificial contraception, yet on the other hand it also seems to conjure up and resonate
with the Church’s teaching regarding following her conscience—a potentially more profound
and deeply rooted teaching. Sue’s agency includes her influence in naming the problem, if not
one source of its cause (i.e., confusion and ambiguity in the Church’s doctrine of primacy
of conscience).
The Church, in this instance, now stands in the receptive role as it relates to the
quandary being presented by Sue. How the Church receives her agential power and influence
is less important, at least in the immediate point being made in this research, than the direction
itself. That is, whether the Church receives Sue’s power with condemnation and rejection or
affirmation and acceptance, the key point is that the Church is acting with receptive power as
revealed in a response, whatever that might be. Nevertheless, if the Church receives it by
excommunicating her, it is also, in turn, acting agentially. This is an expression of the
reciprocal nature of agency identified by Bandura and Graham. This brief analysis illuminates
the bi-polar quality of power, even if in very simple and less than comprehensive terms.
One might argue that this is purely theoretical and without consequence, as Sue hardly
has power on par with the Church and therefore, in fact, really does not nor cannot truly
exercise agential power that really corresponds to the Church being in the position of receptive
power. Whether or not that may or may not the case, as one could readily appeal to any
number of individuals whose agential power, even if exceptional, has in fact consolidated
change in institutions and organizations, it is sufficient in this research to recall that we are not
actually dealing with an individual as such or alone, but rather the demographic of individuals,
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be they lay or cleric, who constitute and express the agential power being symbolized in this
vignette through the person of Sue.
Before moving on to the next chapter, which will engage theological resources
regarding primacy of conscience, a pastoral theological claim that is implicitly operative in this
research needs to be made explicit. The concept of agency is a theoretical means of framing
not only human interaction, but the human person as well and, as such, is an inherently
anthropological concept. Similarly, be it specifically the legalistic or the personalist approach
to the doctrine of primacy of conscience or the general framework of the Traditionalist or the
Revisionist toward the Catholic tradition, clearly a significant, if not primary anthropological
claim is at hand. Unless and until the anthropological issue regarding the presence and function
of agency within the doctrine of primacy of conscience is recognized and appreciated, it is
unlikely that the breadth and depth of the pastoral problematic being presented can be either
truly understood and/or ameliorated. The important role of anthropology merits further
attention, even if only at this point to underline its vital role.
Theological Anthropology at the Crux of Pastoral Theology
Whether or not the most pressing deficiency in pastoral care was or still is the
lack of an adequate theological anthropology as claimed by Lapsley, clearly how we
understand the human person, theologically or otherwise, factors enormously into how
we experience ourselves and the worlds we create.123 From the pastoral theological
perspective, ultimately the question of primacy of conscience, let alone the more
foundational consideration of human agency, is grounded in the question of and necessity
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for a theological anthropology. How do we theologically understand the human person’s
existence and experience within the human community? The conversation is clearly not
exhausted by appealing merely to the spectrum of sciences and their informative and
divergent claims, as they generally and intentionally lack the theological perspective.
Nevertheless, they are a critical conversation partner in the question and serve well as a
significant starting place.
Pastoral theology necessarily incorporates theological anthropology, whether or
not it is explicitly identified, and the sciences make a vital contribution to the
conversation. Wolfhart Pannenberg claims that theological anthropology’s starting point
should not be dogmatic presuppositions about humanity, but rather should “…turn its
attention directly to the phenomena of human existence as investigated in human biology,
psychology, cultural anthropology, or sociology and examine the findings of these
disciplines with an eye to implications that may be relevant to religion and theology.”124
Within Catholic theology this perspective is well established from Aquinas to Karl
Rahner, at least in implicitly and in principle, given the theological axiom of grace
building upon nature.125 As will be evident in the next chapter, these resources have been
overlooked and/or minimized in the process of understanding primacy of conscience as
an expression of interactive human agency.
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theological construct that continues to remain in force within significant Catholic
theological conversations, but merely its recognition.
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Inasmuch as conscience assumes an individual interacting within a context of an
array of relationships, the question of a psychological theory of personality naturally
emerges as a potential candidate to orient a theological anthropology. Casting a vote for
a particular candidate has great bearing on the direction of this research and its
subsequent under-girding theological anthropology, since “…each personality theory is
an attempt to give some insight into the complex process of identity formation, meaning
making, and interaction with others and the society.126 Though a number of personality
theories and, therefore anthropologies are possible, this research will limit itself to the
anthropological mooring of SCT for the following reasons.
First and foremost, as has been already noted, SCT explicitly and extensively
explores and explains the interactive dynamic of human agency that is particularly
relevant for research on primacy of conscience. Secondly, without overthrowing or
losing the insights rooted in psychological theories that highlight the individual,127 SCT’s
foundation within social psychology and its systemic perspective invite a new voice into
the pastoral theological conversation that has, until relatively recently, been
predominantly listening to the more individualistically oriented psychological theories.128
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Therefore the anthropological claim of SCT theory and, therefore, a principal one that
informs the theological anthropology of this research is that the human experience
inherently and necessarily incorporates agency. Or in Bandura’s words, “the capacity to
exercise control over the nature and quality of one’s life is the essence of humanness.”129
In the quest to “exercise control over the nature and quality of one’s life,”
individuals depend upon and are formed by a variety of voices and resources in their
worlds, not the least of which are those that are considered reflections of the sacred or
divine. The Church’s tradition is one such voice and resource in the world, however
beneficial or detrimental it may in fact be. Sue and Catholics like her, as they try to live
their lives productively, responsibly, and faithfully, are truly affected by the Church’s
agency as reflected in its teachings. The next chapter will examine the Church’s teaching
and tradition regarding primacy of conscience and, consequently, agency.

129

Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective,” 1.
79

CHAPTER THREE
THE PROBLEMATIC TRADITION OF CONSCIENCE
“The truth is that many of the key theological texts on conscience, including very recent
ones, can be used either to promote or to curtail personal autonomy. The texts pull in
both directions.”130
As the preceding chapter noted, a theological problem regarding primacy of
conscience has arisen from pastoral practice: the role and understanding of agency
between the individual and the Church’s teaching or tradition. Although any number of
factors may contribute to the struggle many Catholics experience with both following
their consciences and being obedient to the authority of the Church, the inevitability of
agency in the face of ambiguity within the tradition will be the focus of this research.131
This chapter will explore the Catholic tradition regarding primacy of conscience through
the disciplines of historical and moral theology. Nevertheless, this dissertation is a
pastoral theology and, as such, even though it draws upon other disciplines to inform
itself, it is not to be confused with the type of work and corresponding methodologies of
those other disciplines. In other words, this chapter is intended to inform the pastoral
theological process of this dissertation, but is neither historical nor moral theology.
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For example, developmental issues related to authority, cultural, ethnic, or gender
variables that may also factor into and necessarily affect the relationship between the
individual and the Church.
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Therefore, the historical and moral theology employed in this chapter present the current
context in which this pastoral theology is located, but this research does not attempt to
directly refute or reinforce any position from a historical or moral theological
methodology.
An overview will be helpful prior to addressing the tradition of conscience. This
chapter will engage the Catholic tradition in order to explore what resources the Church
has to offer in order to understand and address questions regarding primacy of
conscience. Historical and moral theology will be the principal resources employed.
After establishing a working theological framework of primacy of conscience, a historical
review will broadly track the doctrine of primacy of conscience from Aquinas to and
through the Second Vatican Council and the subsequent consolidation of the legalistic
and personalist perspectives regarding the doctrine. These two perspectives reflect the
Traditionalist and Revisionist schools respectively and will be illuminated through a
review of the Basic Goods Theory and the Proportionate Reason Theory. This summary
examination will demonstrate the incontestable ambiguity in the tradition and thereby
argue for the necessity of both understanding and exercising agency when considering
primacy of conscience. As stated earlier, if the tradition has not adequately addressed the
question at hand or even has contributed to its complication and lack of clarity, pastoral
theology attempts to refine and refocus the question for contemporary exploration. The
pastoral theological method utilized in this dissertation functions constructively by
retrieving and recovering, as well as by emphasizing and elaborating, insufficiently
engaged or developed theological concerns.
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Catholic historical and moral theology, each in their own way, surface two points
directly related to this research—the presence of ambiguity and the necessity of agency.
First, both theologies present a tradition that has diversity and, therefore, corresponding
ambiguity. Hogan’s historical work surfaces diversity and ambiguity directly and
explicitly, whereas the moral theology of Grisez, McCormick and Curran manifest it
indirectly and implicitly by virtue of representing differing schools of thought (i.e.,
legalistic and personalist). Second, this shared conclusion of a diverse tradition that
inherently faces ambiguity necessitates understanding agency more fully when examining
primacy of conscience. Further, although both theological methods point to the question
of agency and address it within the limits of their disciplines, neither provide a
constructive pastoral theological appropriation and interpretation of the personalist view of
primacy of conscience, when primacy is amplified with the implications drawn from a SCT
view of agency, though they do implicitly make the case for it.
As stated in Chapter 1, the technical term Magisterium will be keep to a minimum
when referring to the Church’s teaching role, as the functional terms “normative Church
teaching” and/or “tradition” are more immediate, if not clearer, in meaning. Some of the
most salient theological questions that have surfaced in pastoral practice regarding the
question of primacy of conscience have been illustrated in the vignette about Sue.
Distilled down, those theological questions are encapsulated in how a Catholic, whether
lay person or cleric, responsibly and morally navigates the ambiguity inherent in the two
differing approaches within the Church’s tradition regarding moral decision-making. The
choice often is framed as “simply and always obey the normative teaching of the
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Church,” or “follow one’s conscience that is informed, but not bound, by that very
teaching.”
The Church's teachings on conscience and its primacy seem to assume an approach
within which an individual potentially can make informed moral and religious decisions
effectively.132 Nevertheless, as briefly noted in the preceding chapter’s example of the Second
Vatican Council’s own recovery and development of the concept of conscience, historically the
Church’s teachings regarding conscience, let alone its primacy, have neither been consistent
nor readily available. In short, the Catholic doctrine of primacy of conscience has been
diversely understood and employed as the tradition’s way to understand the challenge of
managing religious and moral questions while remaining faithful to the Church. The ambiguity
of this complicated reality and history has, in turn, contributed to the pastoral problem at hand.
Currently, an understanding of the doctrine of primacy of conscience remains
unresolved not only within the academic arena, but also within the day-to-day existence of
Catholics where its presence is requisite in order “to do good and avoid evil”133 and its absence
is problematic. Inevitably any number of factors contributes to this lack of clarity, yet there is a
structural ambiguity in the tradition that gives rise to the difficulty some Catholics experience
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when attempting to integrate following conscience and being obedient to the authority of the
Church that merits particular focus. As Hogan aptly notes:
The Catholic approach to conscience is deeply ambiguous. On the one
hand conscience is regarded as the most fundamental and directly personal
way that the individual apprehends moral goodness and truth. The
Church’s constant but little publicized teaching is that conscience must
always be obeyed. However, there is also an expectation that the
judgments of conscience will be in agreement with Church teaching. As a
result there is an immediate and inevitable tension between conscience and
the other moral authorities in Catholicism.134
Hogan argues “…that the current disagreements about the authority of conscience visà-vis Church teachings are an inevitable consequence of the Church’s failure to confront the
ambiguities in its own understanding of conscience.”135 As this chapter moves to “clarify
unresolved matters in the tradition” through a brief historical review of conscience and its
primacy, a principal outcome will be confronting the illusion of theological homogeneity
within the tradition. Not only will this review illuminate some of the origins of the conundrum
of the pastoral problem identified, but more importantly it will serve to demonstrate the
inescapability of exercising agency when making moral decisions and/or exercising primacy of
conscience given the ambiguity operative in the tradition. The presence of theological
heterogeneity necessitates reflection and choice which, in short, demands exercising agency
which must, therefore, be adequately understood and nuanced in order to do so responsibly.
An “informed conscience”—the classical Catholic term in moral theology—presumes being
informed about agency and not simply theological topics. An informed conscience is a term
that identifies that the individual is engaged with and therefore informed by relevant
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resources regarding the moral question at hand. The Church teaching is considered a
principal, if not the principal, relevant resource to engage.
The problem is not that Catholicism has a fundamentally and irreversibly flawed
tradition of conscience, but rather that the understanding and application of the role of
conscience, particularly its primacy, has been lost and/or underdeveloped in the course of
time. During different historical periods various aspects of the doctrine were considered
for a variety of reasons, creating holes or even contradictions that resulted, on closer
examination, in an ambiguous status for the teaching. This ambiguity is particularly
pronounced in the relationship between the individual’s agency and the authority or
agency of the Church’s teaching. How can agency within the context of the relationship
between an individual and the Church be better understood and shared? This project
addresses that question precisely at the point of an individual’s agency as interpreted
through the doctrine of primacy of conscience. Therefore, conscience is not the question,
but rather its relationship to Church teaching and tradition by way of its agency and
primacy!
The principal thrust of this examination of primacy of conscience is that agency is
a critical element in understanding the meaning and function of primacy of conscience
within the relationship between the social group (as reflected in the terms tradition and
authority) and the individual (as reflected in the term primacy of conscience). Primacy of
conscience offers a structure of decision-making that inherently places the concept of
agency at the center as interdependent with the tradition and at times in conflict with it.
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Primacy of Conscience Examined
Before engaging the historical review of the tradition, it will be helpful to establish first
a basic understanding of primacy of conscience and the limits that will be operative in this
research regarding conscience. As defined by Catholic theologian Charles Curran and widely
agreed upon across both the legalistic and personalist perspectives, “conscience is generally
understood as the judgment about the morality of an act to be done or omitted or already done
or omitted by the person.”136 Although the concept of conscience emerges even in biblical
literature,137 this study’s point of departure addresses the idea of conscience (conscientia) and
its primacy beginning with the work of Thomas Aquinas, because of both its clarity of
articulation and enduring influence. Aquinas’s principal discussion of the topic of
conscience appears in the Summa Theologica.138 His early forays into the conversation
regarding conscience occurred in Commentary on the Sentences (a text comparable to a
dissertation) and Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (questions 16 & 17) while he was at
the University of Paris from 1257 until 1259.139
Aquinas engages what was at that time the critical debate140 regarding the difference
between the judgment of conscience by which some particular thing or action is judged good or
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evil (syneidesis) and the “…habit of practical reason by which one knows the first principles of
the natural law—do good and avoid evil, act according to right reason” (synderesis).141 In sum,
Aquinas understood conscience as the application of the known first principles of natural law
(synderesis) to the particularities of one’s conduct (syneidesis).142 Further, it is within this
tension between the particularity of syneidesis and the generality of synderesis that Aquinas
articulates the role of the primacy of conscience.143 My research will focus upon primacy of
conscience within the arena of syneidesis, or the appropriateness of individual conduct, and is
not a full analysis of all factors in any given moral decision.
A key factor in the discussion of conscience is the long-standing doctrine of primacy of
conscience. Primacy of conscience, briefly stated, is the obligation to follow one’s informed
conscience, even if it differs from Church teaching.144 It presumes knowledge of and
engagement with the Church’s tradition and teachings, yet it orders the relationship in a way
that retains limited freedom, responsibility, and ultimately, personal agency; that is, following
one’s conscience cannot be mere conformity, as choice and responsibility are inescapable
dimensions of human existence and supported by Church teaching. At the same time, neither is
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it simply a matter of substituting one’s own predilections for Church authority, since
conscience is always informed by and engaged with the moral tradition of the Church.
Primacy of conscience, dating back to Aquinas,145 states “every conscience, true or
false, is binding in the sense that to act against conscience is always wrong.”146 The Catholic
tradition states that “every one of us is bound to obey [our own] conscience”147 as informed by
“a law inscribed by God”—a tradition reinforced in the promulgation of the new 1983 Code of
Canon Law.148 How primacy functions in relationship to conscience might be most succinctly
expressed in the following decree:
Women and men have the right to act in conscience and in freedom so as
personally to make moral decisions. They must not be forced to act
contrary to their conscience. Nor must they be prevented from acting
according to their conscience, especially in religious matters.149
For example, if the Church did not consider slavery a sin, but the person’s conscience
considered it such, it would be immoral for that person to practice slavery regardless of the
Church’s permissive stance. To conform to a teaching one does not believe is tantamount to
going against conscience, or in other words, not recognizing and exercising its primacy.
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Finally, it should be noted that the obligation to follow conscience is not the assurance of errorfree judgment.150
This position continues to be reinforced in the doctrine of the Church, even if relatively
submerged or misunderstood. The ultimate point of choice and responsibility resides in the
individual who resides in the Church. Conscience, inasmuch as it is human, cannot be
adequately understood, let alone exercised, in a theoretical or practical vacuum devoid of
operative constructs for an individual’s agency. The doctrine of primacy of conscience
implicitly speaks of such agency, yet these dimensions have been “lost” in the doctrine’s
understanding and/or are not yet fully understood and articulated.
The very word “primacy” implies a hierarchy of power that bears implications
for the understanding and exercise of conscience. Yet whether one attends to the limited
space afforded conscience and its primacy in the texts intended for the everyday Catholic,
or one examines the current debates among Catholic moral theologians, the tradition of
conscience does not currently command adequate attention, especially in terms of the
nuance of agency and power. The Vatican’s current Catechism of the Catholic Church, a
hefty 803 page text, has only five pages dedicated to the discussion of conscience in
general and primacy of conscience merits little more than a mention. The section of
conscience is placed within Part 3 of the text (Life in Christ) which comprises 190 pages,
including 113 pages discussing the Ten Commandments and normative moral
teachings.151
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This dissertation will exclusively address moral decisions where primacy of conscience
and agency are determinative in outcomes opposed to the Church’s normative teaching.
Primacy of conscience emerges as a possibility only if and when a conflict or difference with
the tradition exists. This research is focused upon and limited to those exceptional moments
when conscience differs from dominant strands of tradition and authority precisely because that
is the only context in which the possibility of primacy of conscience might be exercised.
Further, it is predominantly within that arena of tension and difference that complications and
pastoral needs emerge regarding the exercise of conscience. It is certainly both recognized and
emphasized that conscience is often in accord with and affirming of tradition and authority, but
those moments and dynamics seldom introduce complications as well as pastoral needs and
therefore do not merit the same degree of attention nor include the possibility of primacy of
conscience being operative.
Finally, the distinction between authoritative and infallible teaching will be maintained
as well in order to remain within the boundaries of syneidesis (i.e., the particularities of one’s
conduct). Authoritative teaching from the Church bears varying degrees of weight or leverage,
yet at the end of the day remains non-infallible teaching.152 This teaching, in fact, constitutes
the vast majority of Church teaching and certainly is what most commonly presents itself in
pastoral settings and questions of conscience. Infallible teachings in the Catholic Church,
regardless of how one understands them and whether or not they are accepted, remain at an
extreme minimum. Presently the Church has only two doctrines that have been proclaimed as
infallible teaching—papal infallibility and the immaculate conception of Mary. Neither are
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direct moral teachings from the Church on a specific issue and, as such, are engaged in
different theological arenas and are not relevant for this research.153 Therefore, the Church’s
authoritative or non-infallible teaching regarding any particular moral topic chosen for the
purpose of demonstration or illumination in this dissertation fall within that realm. Granted
“…‘non-infallible’ is a convoluted way of saying ‘capable of being wrong,”154 and my
personal preference would be to simply use the term “fallible,” nevertheless the term “noninfallible” is the dominant nomenclature within these Catholic theological conversations and
will consequently be used when necessary.
Historical Review
The long and varied history of conscience in the Catholic tradition will be
reviewed in summary fashion vis-à-vis several critical historical moments—the
Reformation and subsequent Council of Trent (1545-1563), the rise of modernism and
the subsequent “Syllabus of Errors” (1907), the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and
the subsequent consolidation of two principal schools of Catholic moral theology (i.e.,
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the Traditionalist and the Revisionist) as well as two corresponding distinct perspectives
regarding conscience (i.e., the legalistic and the personalist). Key influential figures from
those periods that will be engaged are Martin Luther, John Henry Newman, Germain
Grisez, Richard McCormick, and Charles Curran. The first two figures will be discussed
in summary fashion addressing the broader historical background. The latter three will
be explored in some detail inasmuch as they represent contemporary voices of the larger
debate of Christian morality and ethics from the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools as
well as the legalistic and personalist perspectives.
Seminal concepts and expressions of conscience pre-dated the work of Aquinas
by thousands of years. In terms of philosophical influences, in the Greek tradition,
reaching as far back as the fifth century B.C.E., Democritus of Abdera is credited with
what is possibly the first written use of the term syneidesis in reflecting upon
conscience.155 In the Latin tradition, dating back as far as 100 B.C.E., both Cicero (10646 B.C.E.) and Seneca (3 B.C.E. - 65 C.E.) employ and consider the term conscientia,
which is roughly the Latin counterpart to the Greek word syneidesis.156 In terms of
Jewish and Christian religious influences, scripture scholars have aptly noted its presence
in the Hebrew bible,157 the Talmud and Jewish casuistry,158 let alone New Testament
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studies, particularly the Pauline corpus.159 These sources and the array of subsequent
works that attempt to further enhance an understanding of conscience, from Roman
casuistry and Patristics160 to the Penitential tradition161 and resources from the early
Middle Ages,162 were the murky theological waters into which Aquinas waded. For as of
yet, clarity and systematic articulations of conscience were still a distant horizon. Hogan
summarizes the location into which Aquinas enters as follows:
Prior to Aquinas, thinking on the subject [i.e., conscience] is random and
disconnected. Although some significant features of both the nature and tasks
of conscience had been established, there was no coherent account of the role
of conscience in Christian life….Aquinas was both a great synthesizer and an
original thinker. One can see this in his work on conscience, which became a
benchmark for all subsequent work on this topic.163
Although far from resolving all the questions before him, not to mention that Aquinas’
conclusions, even if enjoying favor, were not uncontested,164 his work significantly clarified
and enhanced the debate of his day and largely remains currently in force in its most general
instances in which circumstances alter cases or in which there appears to be a conflict of
duties.”
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terms. Yet what is of particular importance here, as noted earlier, is that Aquinas identified the
tension between the particularity of syneidesis and the generality of synderesis as the location
of the role of the primacy of conscience. Aquinas framed primacy of conscience as moral
possibility and responsibility in the application of the known first principles of natural law
(synderesis) to the particularities of one’s conduct (syneidesis). In that framing he advanced the
debate which explicitly examined the question of authority, both of the Church teaching and the
individual as one created in the image and likeness of God. In essence, Aquinas was exploring
the question of agency between the individual and the Church in their relationship with God.
The debate regarding where authority and agency reside within the doctrine of conscience,
although far from settled then or even now, was not seen as particularly problematic for several
hundred years, even if ultimately very important. Then on October 31, 1517, its importance
became extremely clear, as an Augustinian priest put the issue of primacy of conscience front
and center in the Church’s life in the form of 95 theses nailed to a Wittenberg door.
Reformation and Trent
Martin Luther basically drew upon Aquinas’ doctrine of primacy of conscience as he
exercised it in his own life and context, both as he drove the original nail into the door to post
his beliefs and throughout the remainder of his life as he steadfastly hammered home his
position.165 In words that resound to this day, as Luther was pressed to retract his writings, he
faithfully and adamantly claimed at the Diet of Worms in 1521:
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Unless I am convinced by the testimony of Scriptures or by clear
reason (for I do not trust either in the Pope or in councils alone, since it
is well known that they have often erred and contradicted themselves),
I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is
captive to the word of God. I cannot and I will not retract anything,
since it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience. I cannot do
otherwise, here I stand, may God help me. Amen166
“Neither safe nor right to go against conscience” is nothing short of a doctrinal distillation of
primacy of conscience.
Religious freedom and conscience were indisputably placed at the forefront of the
Reformation. Ernest Zedeen goes so far as to claim that with Luther “…a new era in the
history of freedom, that of religious freedom of the individual conscience”167 was inaugurated
that was bound by the Word of God present in the scriptures—not Popes or councils. The
Church’s response to Luther, from strict doctrinal positions articulated during the Council of
Trent to disciplinary actions to the extreme point of violence, testifies to the hierarchy’s
recognition that a vital and volatile issue was at play.168 Clearly the Church was conscious of
the specific challenges Luther presented in the 95 theses themselves and their potential fallout.
But probably more importantly, the Church realized the under-girding power and potential
threat the exercise of primacy of conscience could and, in this instance did, present. The
assumption that the two moral theological strands in the tradition—one strand suggesting that
the moral response is to obey the Church’s teaching rooted in natural law and the other strand
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suggesting that the moral response is to follow your conscience as it interprets and applies that
teaching—would conveniently and coincidently coincide was shattered as Luther exercised
primacy of conscience. Below the surface of the 95 thesis, therefore, was the question, if not
challenge, of agency.
In response to the explicit and implicit challenges born of Luther exercising primacy of
conscience, not only as a Catholic but also as a priest, the Church’s hierarchy, vis-à-vis the
decisions and declarations of the Council of Trent, systematically initiated a comprehensive
attempt to stabilize Catholic doctrinal definitions and corresponding boundaries with
commensurate disciplinary actions. In short, the Council of Trent created the equivalent of
litmus tests to determine Catholic, or conversely, Protestant identity and, as such, exercised
enormous agency. The purpose of this research is not the specific doctrinal or ecclesial
statements themselves, but rather how through these various proclamations the Church was
simultaneously heightening its agency and suppressing primacy of conscience. Therefore,
examining one canon from the Council of Trent will serve to illuminate the degree of agency
being exercised, as disagreeing with Church teaching was cast in the gravest of terms—comply
or be cast out.
Although the content of the Council of Trent was broad and diverse, the fundamental
structure of it was simple, uniform, and unequivocal. Canons were formulaic in their structure;
that is, if a person holds a given doctrinal tenet that has been identified as incorrect, they are
considered anathema and summarily excommunicated.169 For example, Canon 14 states:
If any one saith, that man is truly absolved from his sins and justified,
because that he assuredly believed himself absolved and justified; or, that
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no one is truly justified but he who believes himself justified; and that, by
this faith alone, absolution and justification are effected; let him be
anathema.170
At the time, certainly Lutherans, not to mention other reformers, are in the crosshairs of
this canon and the recipients of its anathema. Anathema essentially means a curse from
God (see Galatians 1: 8-9) and, by extension, those who are anathema are also
excommunicated from the Church. Excommunication, by definition, means not being in
communion with the Church. Further, being in communion with the Church was
understood, at that time, as the only means of salvation. In short, the array of canons
from the Council of Trent, like Canon 14, became the measuring stick by which salvation
was assessed, or from the alternative perspective, damnation was identified.
At the surface justification is the explicit theological issue at hand in this canon,
yet again it needs to be emphasized that the point being demonstrated here is the extreme
degree of agency that under girds the theological statement itself and the consequences it
has if a person exercises primacy of conscience. Claiming that disagreement with Church
teaching, or basically the exercise of primacy of conscience, results in excommunication
(i.e., damnation) is nothing short of the Church’s most extreme expression of agency with
dire consequences for the doctrine.
The overall result of the Council of Trent was that primacy of conscience and with it a
certain understanding of agency quickly found itself being submerged or worse within the
tradition. Clearly it was not lost by happenstance, but rather was consciously and intentionally
reinterpreted and/or avoided precisely because of the perceived and/or real threat it presented
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regarding the hierarchy’s agency. A plethora of issues were inevitably at play within the
Church during the Reformation and beyond, yet for the purposes of this research the
relationship between the agency of the Church and the individual is the focus. In short, the
Church had a tradition of accepting conscience and its primacy, though it was not very well
developed and not very central, even in Aquinas’ works, but under the press of the
Reformation’s emphasis upon individual choice and conscience, the Church shifted and lost or
subordinated the doctrine altogether.
Understandably the Church and its hierarchy historically made claims to authority
and consequently agency, all the while without denying that individuals exercised agency
as well. After all, what is the long standing doctrine of free will other than, among other
things, a fundamental and profound expression of individual human agency within the
context of the social group?171 Nevertheless, there was never a clear articulation as to the
relationship between the agency of the Church and that of the individual. It is the
question of Graham’s bi-polar power or Bandura’s bi-directionality in which agency
functions interactively for the individual and the social system that still lacked a
sufficient articulation. This lack of clarity regarding how authority and agency are shared
was manifest in the earlier debates regarding primacy of conscience. Yet after the
Council of Trent, at least from the hierarchy’s perspective, the confusion had come to an
end as it basically became not a question of how, but if agency was shared. Agency was
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at the fore, and the hierarchy had received, not surprisingly at their own hand, the lion’s
share or more.
Certainly there were any number of pre-Trent and Augustinian teachings that the
Council of Trent explicitly tried to defend and stabilize, yet the principal point in this
historical review is to recognize two outcomes distinct from the theological and/or
ecclesiological specifics addressed. First, the doctrine of primacy of conscience became
submerged or lost after, what might be considered, one of its most public expressions in
the person of Luther. Second, the Council of Trent ushered in what was to become the
foundational paradigm of agency for the Church’s teaching for roughly the next four
hundred years, with the scale radically tipping to the Church’s side. McCormick
summarizes this paradigm of teaching and agency that had it roots in the Council of
Trent’s reaction to the Reformation and became enhanced across time until the Second
Vatican Council. Principally there were the following three characteristics:
… (1) an undue distinction between the teaching and learning function in
the Church, with a consequent unique emphasis on the right to teach—and
relatively little on the duty to learn and the sources of learning in the
Church; (2) an undue identification of the teaching function with a single
group in the Church, the hierarchy; (3) an undue isolation of a single
aspect of teaching, the judgmental, the decisive, the ‘final word.’ Thus it
was taken for granted by many that on any moral problem, however
complex, Roma locuta causa finita. The term ‘Magisterium’ came to
mean the hierarchical issuance of authoritative decrees.172
This modus operandi of the Church regarding teaching was highly juridical,
whether pertaining to issues of faith or morality, and resulted in consolidating an
imbalance in agency between the individual and the Church precisely in terms of the
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dynamics Graham and Bandura identify as initiation and reception. Recall from Chapter
2 that most broadly understood, power is “…the capacity to influence and to be
influenced by the environment”173 and, more specifically, power is a manifestation and
expression of the relationality of agency, both by way of initiation and reception. More
often than not rather than speak of power as such, Catholic theology generally uses the
term “authority” which implicitly incorporates the concept of power as it relates to the
Magisterium.174 Basically, the Church had become the dominant initiator and the
individual the submissive receiver. Although the individual theoretically retained the
possibility of differing from Church teaching given the doctrine of primacy of conscience
was still in the record of the tradition, its exercise came at quite a cost, as such difference
was judged as sinful and wrong with the consequence being identified in eternal terms.
Although the concept of social persuasion was not operative at the time, it does not mean
the dynamic itself was not functioning. Chapter 4 will address the dynamic of social
persuasion, both in terms of its positive and negative affects.
The pastoral theological question of whether or not something has been “lost” in
the tradition is particularly apropos for this project, as this historical review already
reveals that critical theological dimensions of conscience have been demonstrably lost or
insufficiently emphasized, at least in terms of their accessibility and prevalence within
173
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the thought of laity and clergy alike. Further, and very much to the point of this research,
this historical dynamic arising from pastoral practice, writ large in the Council of Trent’s
response to the Reformation, surfaced and heightened the theological problem regarding
primacy of conscience—the role and understanding of agency between the individual and
the Church’s teaching or tradition.
Modernism
The 19th and early 20th centuries also serve as an illuminating, even a powerfully
reinforcing period, regarding the submergence or even rejection of the doctrine of primacy of
conscience and its implicit connection to agency between the Church and individual. For over
three hundred years the Council of Trent’s definitions and boundaries continued to be tested by
way of the differing theological and religious perspectives emerging from the variety of
Reformation Churches (e.g., Lutheran, Presbyterian, Calvinist, Anabaptist), yet this was far
from the Church’s only challenge to its authority and agency as related to individuals as well as
social groups. The Church’s claim to be the sole, or at least primary, voice of knowledge and
truth was also called into question by philosophers and intellectuals. In a sense, Descartes’
philosophical “cogito ergo sum” paralleled Luther’s religious “Here I stand, I can do no other,”
as yet another profound anthropological expression of the individual and agency.
Without attempting to review the array of philosophies over that period of time or
trying to pinpoint what might be considered the beginning of modernism, suffice it say that the
collective impact of the burgeoning philosophical and intellectual investigations into the
questions of epistemology, human experience, reality, and God radically challenged the
Church. Unlike bygone eras, at this moment in history the teaching of the Church was often
seen as anything but the source of privileged authority and insight. Rather than being sought to
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shed light upon the matters at hand, the Church was regularly identified by many of these
philosophers and intellectuals as casting a shadow that was stifling or even strangling human
development and progress.
For the purposes of this historical review, the 19th century will be the point of
entry for modernism and the Church’s subsequent response to it, including one of its
most recent explicit and forceful attempts to suppress primacy of conscience. 175 Whether
or not 19th century progressive thinkers like Darwin, Freud, Marx, Hegel and Nietzsche
as well as the implications of their theories served as “the straw that broke the camel’s
back,” modernism clearly was perceived as a threat by the Church to its authority and
agency, not unlike the Reformation. As an expression of the perceived collective
possibilities for human progress, modernism focused on the capacity of individuals and
societies to create and advance their environments and experience, especially by
employing reason and its by-products of the sciences and technology.

From biology and

psychology to economics and philosophy, modernism thrived upon a critical analysis of
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the human experience through a variety of lenses with the goal of furthering human
progress and weeding out whatever seemed to hobble its achievement.
Not surprisingly, the Church was seen as responsible for impeding progress in a
variety of ways, yet the claim to divine revelation and its inherent natural-supernatural
dualism probably stands head and shoulders over the rest. Modernism considered the
Church’s teaching to be simply human products that, as such, may change over time in
light of new and more sophisticated understandings. The concept of an objective
unchanging truth that the Church was exclusively, or at least particularly, privy to know
and teach authoritatively was ironically, if you will, anathema to the modernists.176 The
Church, for its part, responded not unlike it did with the Reformation. As in the review
of the Council of Trent, the reason for examining the Church’s response to modernism is not
the specific doctrinal or ecclesial statements themselves, but rather to show how through these
various proclamations the Church was simultaneously heightening its agency (specifically
initiation) and suppressing primacy of conscience. Therefore, exploring three related principal
documents from this period will serve to demonstrate the Church’s on-going, if not explicitly
enhancing, suppression and/or rejection of the doctrine of primacy of conscience.
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In 1864 Pope Pius IX issued the encyclical “Condemning Certain Errors” that
addressed the issue of modernism by, as its title notes, “condemning certain errors.”177
Attached to this encyclical was the decree “The Syllabus of Errors: Condemning the
Errors of the Modernists.” This encyclical and decree were Pius IX’s attempt to retain
dominant authority and agency in teaching not only within the Church itself, but also in
relationship to all individuals and society at large. He denounces modernism’s
challenging tenets:
… they chiefly tend to this, that that salutary influence be impeded and
(even) removed, which the Catholic Church, according to the institution
and command of her Divine Author, should freely exercise even to the end
of the world -- not only over private individuals, but over nations, peoples,
and their sovereign princes; and (tend also) to take away that mutual
fellowship and concord of counsels between Church and State which has
ever proved itself propitious and salutary, both for religious and civil
interests.178
Exercising influence “not only over [emphasis added] private individuals, but over
nations, peoples, and their sovereign princes” is inherently a claim to agency (i.e.,
initiation) that is dominant, if not grandiose. “Over” implies, if not demands, a
hierarchical order such that all opinions and perspectives are not afforded equal weight or
agency.
In “The Syllabus of Errors,” Pius IX enumerated 65 specific errors of modernism
that were officially condemned and, therefore, carried with them penalties comparable to
the canons of the Council of Trent. For example, as it most specifically relates to the
doctrine of primacy of conscience, error number 7 states: “In proscribing errors, the
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Church cannot demand any internal assent from the faithful by which the judgments she
issues are to be embraced.”179 Or in other words, the Church’s teaching can and, by
virtue of authoritative documents such as “The Syllabus of Errors,” does demand internal
assent from the faithful regarding what the Church judges as erroneous. Given the
inherently confusing structure of the document itself, that is, the double-negative quality
of the text, it is worth making a point of clarification. Lest it be misunderstood due to the
style of writing in the document, anything said in the text is an error as it falls under the
overall umbrella of “The Syllabus of Errors.” So the above example is ultimately
proclaiming that in proscribing errors, the Church can demand any internal assent from
the faithful by which the judgments she issues are to be embraced. It parallels the
confusion of using the words like non-infallible, yet it was the medium of expression of
that day within the Church.
In addition to Pius IX’s assertion of the Church’s right to exercise influence over
social groups and their leaders, “Condemning Certain Errors” in 1864 quotes, and thereby
reasserts, Gregory XVI’s extreme rejection of the notion of liberty of conscience
specifically as related to the individual. In 1832 Gregory XVI condemned liberty of
conscience and stated that it was “insanity” to suggest that:
…liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, which
ought to be legally proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted
society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which
should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil,
whereby they may be able openly and publicly to manifest and declare any
of their ideas whatever, either by word of mouth, by the press, or in any
other way.180
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Again, although the statement at large seems to support conscience, it is a radical
repudiation of it inasmuch as such thinking is considered insanity by Gregory XVI.
Following the French Revolution in particular, but inclusive of the American
Revolution as well, democracy was interpreted as in opposition to the Church in both its
emphasis of individual liberty and distinction between Church and State. At present in
the United States, the separation between Church and State is, by and large, a given that
is uncontested, even if differently interpreted. Roughly a century ago though,
Americanism was identified and condemned as a form of modernism with separation of
Church and state as one particular manifestation. As R. Scott Appleby notes, “Both
Americanism and modernism were condemned in broad strokes….The two heresies were
seen by their opponents as inextricably linked, with Americanism being the cultural,
political, and ecclesio-political expression of modernism’s theological and philosophical
project.”181
The Church’s battle against modernism came to a head in 1907 with Pius X
issuing the encyclical “Doctrine of the Modernists (Pascendi Dominici Gregis).” In this
document Pius X went as far as to declare that modernism is “the synthesis of all
heresies”182 inasmuch as it denies the existence of unchanging truth and consequently the
Church’s role and right to authoritatively teach it. In short, it was heresy to reject the
Church’s claim to privileged objective and eternal knowledge through revelation and, to
181

R. Scott Appleby, “The Triumph of Americanism: Common Ground for U.S.
Catholics in the Twentieth Century,” in Being Right: Conservative Catholics in America,
eds. Mary Jo Weaver and R. Scott Appleby (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1995), 44-45.
182

Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals, vol. 3, 89.
106

the point of this research, the corresponding agency inherent in claiming to teach with
this level of authority to all levels of society.
The intellectuals and philosophers exploring the insights of modernism were not
simply external threats the Church had to hold at bay, but were also within the ranks of
the Church itself, including the clergy. These were individuals who believed the Church
needed to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by modernity.
Consequently, the encyclical “Doctrine of the Modernists” culminates with Pius X
obliging Bishops to exercise regular and vigilant internal scrutiny for any signs of
modernism within the clergy.
Lest what We have laid down thus far should pass into oblivion, We will
and ordain that the Bishops of all dioceses, a year after the publication of
these letters and every three years thenceforward, furnish the Holy See
with a diligent and sworn report on the things which have been decreed in
this Our Letter, and on the doctrines that find currency among the clergy,
and especially in the seminaries and other Catholic institutions, those not
excepted which are not subject to the Ordinary, and We impose the like
obligation on the Generals of religious orders with regard to those who are
under them.183
A number of clergy were identified and disciplined during this period, but
possibly most prominent of them all was John Henry Newman.184 Newman was a
renowned Anglican priest and professor at Oriel College in Oxford University as well as
the founder of the Oxford Movement directed toward the reform of the Anglican Church.
Among other things, the Oxford Movement visioned a “High Church” that integrated
ancient Christian doctrine and practice in contrast to what was the prevalent "Low
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Church" Protestantism of the day. After spending the first half of his life as an Anglican,
in 1845 Newman converted to Catholicism and became, among others things, the voice
for the recovery and appreciation of the doctrine of primacy of conscience.
Although welcomed into the Roman communion with favor for a variety of
reasons, not the least of which was his giftedness as an intellectual and theologian, that
very talent ultimately complicated his life, as Pius IX proclaimed the doctrine of papal
infallibility in 1870. Newman opposed the formal definition of papal infallibility and, as
would be expected, quickly found himself the object of the hierarchy’s disdain. As
interesting as his rationale was regarding the doctrine of papal infallibility, the issue of
relevance here is how he justified this dissenting opinion. As noted earlier, the Oxford
movement attempted to recover earlier Christian doctrines and practices. Therefore,
Newman’s theological method regarding the understanding of tradition afforded him
access to Aquinas’ articulation of primacy of conscience. Similar to Luther with the 95
theses, at least in terms of process although not by way of scale, Newman exercised his
primacy of conscience as he differed with the hierarchy of the Church over the doctrine
of papal infallibility.
Without examining Newman’s theological nuance regarding conscience as he
develops it through his exploration of Scripture and the Catholic tradition in order to
make his case before the hierarchy of the Church, a summary expression of primacy of
conscience is present as he addresses a Catholic’s relationship and responsibility to both
conscience and the Pope. Although Newman clearly had his own understanding and
expression of primacy of conscience, it differed more in subtlety rather than substance

108

from that of Aquinas. Newman employed a historical method that both moored his work
in the tradition and limited his vulnerability to accusation.
In his letter to the Duke of Norfolk in the fifth section addressing the issue of
conscience, Newman writes:
It seems, then, that there are extreme cases in which Conscience may
come into collision with the word of a Pope, and is to be followed in spite
of that word. Now I wish to place this proposition on a broader basis,
acknowledged by all Catholics, and, in order to do this satisfactorily, as I
began with the prophecies of Scripture and the primitive Church, when I
spoke of the Pope's prerogatives, so now I must begin with the Creator and
His creature, when I would draw out the prerogatives and the supreme
authority of Conscience.185
In contrast to the domineering agency expressed by Pius IX which heavily
weighted the Church’s teaching over both individuals and societies, Newman argues for a
much greater degree of agency within the person as an expression of primacy of
conscience. Newman closes out his famous letter to the Duke of Norfolk, somewhat
tongue in cheek and colloquially, stating:
Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, (which
indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink—to the Pope, if you
please—still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards.186
At the time Newman’s work reflected anything but the position of the hierarchy in its
rejection of primacy of conscience, yet like many prescient thinkers who did not receive
support in their lifetimes, it was only a matter of time until his insights regarding primacy
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of conscience and religious liberty would be recognized. The Second Vatican Council,
which opened on October 11, 1962, was just that time.
The Second Vatican Council
This section of Chapter 3 will go into more detail than the two brief historical reviews
of the Reformation and modernism, given it holds a contemporary status that sets the current
stage and understanding of the debate on primacy of conscience. After almost four hundred
years of the Church suppressing and/or rejecting the doctrine of primacy of conscience, the
Second Vatican Council marks the Church’s first hierarchical and official movement toward
recovering its tradition regarding conscience. In examining this recovery, three broad points
will be reviewed. First, the need for reclaiming conscience within the tradition will be
established through the call of the Second Vatican Council to update moral theology. This
process will be examined specifically through the manualist tradition which had come to
symbolize the Church’s control over moral theology and, consequently, the teachings it obliged
its membership to follow, whether lay or cleric. Second, as the updating of moral theology
emerges from the Council’s call and diverse moral theological perspectives contribute to the
conversation of updating moral theology, and specifically an understanding of conscience, two
contemporary schools of Catholic moral theology emerge—the Traditionalist and the
Revisionist. The similarities and differences of these schools will be reviewed, including how
they are presently represented in the legalistic and personalist perspectives regarding
conscience. Finally, a summary of Hogan’s historical theological understanding of ambiguity
within the Catholic tradition of conscience will be reviewed, given the two current schools of
Traditionalist and Revisionist with their corresponding legalistic and personalist perspectives
do, in fact, differ and stand in tension , thus embodying the very ambiguity being identified.
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As John XXIII opened the Second Vatican Council with his address in St. Peter’s
Basilica, he identified the task at hand for the Church as that of bringing herself up to date
where required. The breadth of this overall process was extensive and remains in process to
this day, yet for the purposes of this research the focus will be limited to the arena of moral
theology. Further, within the domain of moral theology, the doctrine of primacy of conscience
and role of agency are the place of examination. Given what previously has been reviewed
historically and attitudinally regarding the Church’s response to the Reformation and
modernism and the corresponding suppression and/or rejection of primacy of conscience, this
“updating” of moral theology would require more than simply a veneer, especially in the arena
of understanding the relationship of agency between the Church and the individual.
The Second Vatican Council simply and blatantly stated that, “…special attention
needs to be given to the development of moral theology.”187 That “special attention,” as
McCormick interprets it, was specifically addressing the limitations of the manual tradition—a
tradition steeped in an imbalance of agency.188 The manual tradition of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries within moral theology is a predictable by-product of a Church that since the
Reformation had been attempting to stabilize Catholic doctrinal definitions and corresponding
boundaries by unilateral decrees that deprived individuals, including priests and theologians, of
agency when it came to understanding moral decision-making. In a sense, the manual tradition
was a micro expression of the Church’s macro trajectory as related to the understanding of the
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relationship of agency between the Church and individuals, both lay and cleric. Hogan
summarizes the manuals themselves thus:
Most of the manuals of this period exhibited identical philosophical and
theological presuppositions. They also followed a common structure and
discussed moral problems in a uniform manner. They each began with a
section on “general moral theology,” involving a consideration of human
acts, the nature of morality, conscience, law and sin. The second section
of each manual involved an exposition of particular sins, identifying the
nature, species and seriousness of particular sins. They focused on the
acts themselves rather than on any other features of the situation….The
third and final section of the manuals presented the canon law of the
sacraments, thus framing morality entirely in a penitential context.189
The manual tradition was principally applied within the pastoral context, in
particular, in order to control the priests’ responses in the confessional. Recall that even
priests were suspected and accused of being Modernists. The manuals themselves,
developed by a closed group of theologians, were focused on practical application rather
than methodological consideration or theoretical reflection. In short, the manuals set the
terms of morally acceptable behavior as defined by the Church’s canons and was
communicated through its representatives, more often than not, in the sacramental forum
of confession. What is of particular note here in terms of agency is that even priests and
many theologians were not afforded a role in discerning Catholic moral decision-making.
Given that priests literally had the manuals in hand with moral answers anticipating
certain circumstances, the exercise of primacy of conscience was simply out of the
equation. Basically, priests were instructed to apply moral answers without even
necessarily knowing the moral theological method and assumptions that gave rise to the
very moral directives they applied.
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The manual tradition was symbolic of how Catholic moral theology, especially its
closed and controlling character, required an updating—an updating that would
necessarily explore the assumptions and positions that gave rise to the very manuals
themselves. From the vantage point of twenty-five years after the Second Vatican
Council, McCormick’s hindsight identifies seven areas in moral theology that have
undergone major reexamination: the rejection of legalism, the depth of moral life, the
social character of moral life, the centrality of the person in moral thought, the
tentativeness of moral formulations, the nature of the moral Magisterium, and the
rejection of paternalism in moral pedagogy for a pedagogy of personal responsibility.190
Ultimately, whether it be these seven areas articulated by McCormick or others that
might be highlighted by different moral theologians, the updating of Catholic moral
theology broadly required the development of precisely what the manual tradition lacked
and symbolized—an explicit normative method accessible to individuals other than only
the authors of the manuals (e.g., theologians, clergy in parish ministry, and parishioners).
This is not to suggest that the manual tradition was devoid of a normative method
for moral theology in the development of the manuals themselves, as their very
uniformity attested to a high level of normative method being at play. Whether it was
remnants of Thomism or dominant strains of Neo-Scholasticism, the manuals relied
heavily upon normative method in their construction. Thomism is the theological
framework developed by Aquinas in the thirteenth century and predominantly articulated
in the Summa Theologica. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, NeoScholasticism is the attempt to recover and develop the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages
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which was largely founded upon the work of Aquinas. Although there is a clear and
strong intersection between Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism, the systems are clearly
distinct and differ in a variety of ways, yet those nuances are not necessary for the current
discussion.
Nevertheless, the principal point at hand is that the normative method for moral
theology operative was implicit and not incorporated explicitly in the manuals
themselves. The application of the normative method for moral theology remained
exclusively with the ecclesiastical authors of the manuals, thus hobbling, if not
eliminating others from doing and applying moral theology. Manuals essentially gave
the moral conclusions to most theologians, priests and laity, but neither the normative
method for moral theology by which these conclusions were determined nor, therefore,
the purview to engage that normative method was afforded to anyone other than the
select authors themselves. Ultimately the manualist tradition is undergirded with an
understanding of agency inasmuch as few were afforded access to the normative method
for moral theology and most were simply expected to accept the conclusions it produced.
Basically, the Second Vatican Council’s updating of moral theology called for a
normative method to be made explicit, that is, more broadly shared and understood, thus
overturning the narrow and controlled status it had previously labored under. This
direction clearly had implications for understanding the relationship of agency between
the Church and its members when addressing the Catholic moral decision-making.
Although the scope of the development of an explicit normative method in
Catholic moral theology with respect to issues of moral guidance and matters of
conscience is enormous, rife with nuance, and beyond the scope of this research, it is
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accurate to claim that this moral theological project launched at the Second Vatican
Council has predominantly consolidated into two principal schools after the inclusion of a
variety of theological voices that had previously been excluded—the Traditionalist and
the Revisionist. These two schools will be respectively represented by Grisez’s work
with Basic Goods Theory as well as by McCormick and Curran’s work with
Proportionate Reason Theory. Further, Basic Goods Theory represents the legalistic
perspective while Proportionate Reason Theory represents the personalist perspective in
terms of understanding primacy of conscience. As Todd Salzman notes:
Much of the focus in the renewal movement has been to formulate a
coherent normative method and draw out its logical implications for
Christian ethics. [The Traditionalists and Revisionists]…are the two main
schools undertaking this methodological reconstruction. Method,
especially with regard to the foundation and formulation of norms, is
frequently considered the area of renewal in Catholic moral theology;
however, method itself is rarely defined.191
Traditionalist and Revisionist Schools
Given the dynamics already reviewed in the historical backdrop preceding the
Second Vatican Council, it is not surprising that the theological latitude present in the
updating of moral theology that followed the Council’s directive in “The Decree on the
Training of Priests” was still fairly circumscribed.192 Consequently, any updated Catholic
moral theology and method, be it from the Traditionalist or Revisionist school, inevitably
addresses natural law theory due to both its prominent historical and continuing
contemporary role. Therefore, a summary theoretical background for understanding the
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foundation that both the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools incorporate will be
helpful. Both are built upon the theory of natural law which, in turn, is related to and
located within the broader arena of contemporary moral and ethical discourse (i.e., moral
judgments, normative ethics, and meta-ethics). Finally, it should be recalled, this is
simply a review of the moral theological context within and by which this pastoral
theology is located and informed, but is not an attempt to engage or further this
discussion along the philosophical lines of moral theology. The advance and contribution
of this research will emerge within Chapters 4 and 5.
Consistent with what many philosophical ethicists distinguish as three levels of
ethical discourse, natural law theory also addresses moral judgments, normative ethics,
and meta-ethics. The three dimensions of ethical discourse identified here are very broad
theoretical categories that are understood in very diverse manners. This general
framework is sufficient to understand the general framing of natural law theory as well as
its continuing theoretical mooring.193 Rooted in the human capacity to reason and
choose, moral judgments are made as attempts to accomplish what is considered right,
obligatory, or good. Moral decision-making is the fare of this arena and is basically what
Aquinas called syneidesis or the judgment of conscience by which some particular thing or
action is judged good or evil. Moral judgments ultimately influence or determine the
particularities of one’s conduct and are the focus of this research inasmuch as they are an
expression of agency and potentially an exercise of primacy of conscience.
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Within the realm of moral judgments, an array of philosophical distinctions are
present depending upon the given theorist, but their review is not essential for the topic at
hand.194 Yet given this research focuses upon primacy of conscience within the arena of
syneidesis, it is vital to address what both philosophical ethicists and natural law theory
distinguish as “possible” and “actual” moral judgments. The portion of Curran’s definition of
conscience that speaks of “an act to be done or already done” reveals the presence of both
possible and actual moral judgments. Curran notes that conscience relates to “…the
judgment about the morality of an act to be done or omitted or already done or omitted by the
person.” 195 The moral judgments in this definition are possible and actual respectively.
Although both inherently fall under the umbrella of agency in that they ultimately relate to
action or deliberation about it, they function differently both in terms of their relationship
to normative and meta-ethics as well as primacy of conscience.
From the perspective of philosophical ethicists and natural law theory, moral judgments
relate to normative and meta-ethics. Possible rather than actual moral judgments provide the
grist for developing the norms and/or generalizations that correspond to normative and metaethics. Actual moral judgments, although informing normative and meta-ethics, have a degree
of uniqueness and particularity that, given the diversity of individuals and contexts, is ill suited
for the type of reflection required for the development and articulation of normative and metaethics. In contrast, possible moral judgments serve this task well, given they “…suspend the
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particularity of actual moral judgments and seek to formulate norms that can extrapolate
common aspects of human experience in the form of generalizations.”196 As summarized by
Salzman:
The synopsis and synthesis of possible moral judgments into such a theory
is the area of normative ethics and meta-ethics. Normative ethics attempts
to answer questions about what is good, right, or obligatory and to
formulate laws, rules, norms, or guidelines for the attainment of values
designated within that definition. Normative ethics proposes norms that
prohibit or prescribe: (1) actions (e.g., “do not kill”); (2) dispositions,
motivations, or types of character (e.g., “respect life”); and (3) actions that
entail descriptions of both the act and the motive (e.g., “do not
murder”).197
Basically meta-ethics, as it relates to normative ethics, is yet another level of
reflection and analysis that addresses both the understanding of the ethical terms
themselves (e.g., “right,” or “good”) and how claims to moral knowledge may actually be
known. The former is essentially a question of semantics, that is, what does this word
mean and how is the term used, whereas the latter is an epistemic question, that is, how
can we claim to know this to be so. Both normative and meta-ethics are considered and
questioned from a variety of perspectives, not the least of which is insights gained from
postmodernism. As William Frankena describes meta-ethics, it focuses its deliberation
toward the meaning of ethical terms as well as how ethical and value judgments are
justified.198
Although some would question whether or not differentiating meta-ethics from
normative ethics is even a meaningful or fruitful distinction, it is worth identifying given
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the role of natural law theory within Catholic moral theology, from either the
Traditionalist or Revisionist school. These kinds of thought about ethics (e.g., metaethics and normative ethics) have essentially been operative and a matter of debate since
the time of Aquinas and remain even to this day. As stated earlier, Aquinas identified the
difference between the judgment of conscience by which some particular thing or action is
judged good or evil (syneidesis) and the “…habit of practical reason by which one knows the
first principles of the natural law—do good and avoid evil, act according to right reason”
(synderesis).199 Synderesis is basically a natural law theory term that attempts to address the
epistemic dimension of meta-ethics. In short, we can apply these general ethical constructs of
moral judgments, normative and meta-ethics to natural law theory and see a long-standing
parallel dating back to Aquinas and beyond. Recall that Aquinas understood conscience as the
application of the known first principles of natural law (synderesis) or normative and metaethics to the particularities of one’s conduct (syneidesis) or moral judgments. Further, it is
within this tension between the particularity of syneidesis and the generality of synderesis that
Aquinas articulates the role of the primacy of conscience.
In order to be clear regarding the focus of this research within the broad context
of Catholic moral theology in particular and ethics in general, a summary is in order at
this point. It is from the basic mooring of ethical method just reviewed, including its
relationship to a natural law framework, that the updating of Catholic moral theology as
called for by the Second Vatican Council has proceeded. Further, the principal sticking
point or difference between the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools lies in the arena of
normative and meta-ethics—specifically how objective truth is understood. Clearly this
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has implication for moral judgments, but the principal difference is not located there.
Although normative and meta-ethics are clearly a part of the overall development of
moral theology, this dissertation relates specifically to the arena of moral judgments. It is
within this context that primacy of conscience and its inherent agency is being examined.
Nevertheless, a general understanding of the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools is in
order, especially in order to identify the principal difference that has profound
implications for how the relationship of agency between the Church and an individual is
framed.
The conversation of normative and meta-ethics which, in the Catholic context
includes the theory of natural law, is predominantly philosophical and, as such, extremely
theoretical and abstract. In addition to the broad ethical framework of moral judgments,
normative ethics, and meta-ethics that both the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools
share, further commonalities deserve attention Although far from exhausting the
common moral theological ground, let alone the philosophical, shared by the
Traditionalist and Revisionist schools, four prominent and vital similarities are clearly
present. Consistent with the Catholic moral theological tradition, both approaches:
1) accept an objectivist meta-ethical theory (i.e., natural law theory), even if
nuanced differently
2) define good or right as that which facilitates authentic personhood as
understood through a natural law lens
3) recognize reason, experience, scripture and Tradition as significant sources of
moral knowledge in the development of normative method
4) respond to the Second Vatican Council’s call for a renewal of moral theology,
especially the limits manifest in the manualist tradition.
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Each of these similarities merits further development to better appreciate how their
common ground is understood and shared.
First, each position supports natural law for humans as an expression of an
objectivist meta-ethical theory such that they acknowledge the existence of a universal
moral truth that can be justified through both reason and revelation. Reason and faith are
both required and are not seen in opposition to one another in the process of articulating
normative claims for what contributes to the realization of authentic personhood. Jacques
Maritain succinctly distills this ontological foundation of natural law for the human
person.
There is by the virtue of human nature, an order or a disposition which
human reason can discover and according to which the human will must
act in order to attune itself to the essential ends of the human being. The
unwritten law, or natural law, is nothing more than that.200
Second, flowing from the preceding objectivist anthropological assumption, both
positions broadly define right or good as that which contributes to the accomplishment of
authentic personhood, or corollary terms like “integral human fulfillment” and “human
flourishing.”201 The first principle of practical reason is employed in order to realize the
“essential ends of the human being” toward which humans are naturally inclined or
oriented. In other words, to the extent that the first principal of natural law, which states
that “good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided,” is followed, authentic
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personhood is realized. This first principle is the basis of every other precept of the
natural law and is foundational in the theoretical framing of conscience.202
Third, whether one be a Traditionalist or a Revisionist, four sources of moral
knowledge are recognized—reason, experience, scripture and tradition. The
identification and application of these sources in the development of normative method is
consistent with Catholic moral theology. Nevertheless, how these sources are interpreted
as well as how they are weighed and leveraged definitely differs between the two
approaches, especially in terms of understanding objective moral absolutes. This will be
explored in more detail as the legalistic and personalist perspectives are broadly reviewed
and illustrated through the examples of Basic Goods Theory and Proportionate Reason
Theory.
Fourth, even with this substantial common mooring in natural law theory, both
positions recognize certain pitfalls and limitations within Catholic natural law theory,
especially as articulated by the manualist tradition. Consequently both seek its
remediation, albeit in differing manners. It must be remembered that the critique of the
manualist tradition did not begin with the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools, but
rather emerged at the Second Vatican Council and its charge to address this problem. In
short, both positions are responses to that unique call of the Second Vatican Council for
renewal within moral theology. Specifically, the principal shortcoming was the lack of
an explicit normative methodology which excluded broader participation in the
development and/or application of moral theology.

202

Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae, 94, 2.
122

The Legalistic and Personalist Perspectives
As previously noted, within the two broader moral theological schools (i.e.,
Traditionalist and Revisionist), the legalistic and personalist monikers have emerged as
specific expressions and applications of these two schools’ foundational thought.
Further, within the Catholic debate regarding conscience, Basic Goods Theory is one
particular, if not the principal, expression of the Traditionalist school, whereas
Proportionate Reason Theory is one particular, if not the principal, expression of the
Revisionist school. Having touched upon the common ground of the Traditionalist and
Revisionist schools, these two specific theories (i.e., Basic Goods Theory and
Proportionate Reason Theory) will be reviewed in order to illuminate how they ultimately
differ in their framing of agency and, therefore, primacy of conscience. Common
parlance might simply and somewhat accurately label the legalistic and personalist
perspectives as the conservative and liberal views respectively. Yet there is a bit more
nuance that is worth noting in order to understand the principal difference between them
that ultimately has implications for agency and primacy of conscience.
The current Catholic discourse following the Second Vatican Council regarding
conscience, its primacy, and any ensuing problems and tension is predominantly within moral
theology and is framed philosophically as expressed in the normative ethical method previously
reviewed and its positioning within natural law theory. Contemporary Catholic moral
theological debate on conscience reflects the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools that,
as noted, broadly coalesce into these two divergent perspectives (i.e., the legalistic and
the personalist). Nonetheless, both perspectives address the question regarding moral
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responsibility and authority, which inherently incorporates both individual and communal
agency.203
The legalistic perspective places an emphasis on Church teaching as the primary or
central means for knowing the objective dimensions of morality. Consequently it considers the
Magisterium i.e., Church teaching) as the principal vehicle for moral truth. Additionally, this
moral truth is considered to have absolute and universal moral principles that Church teaching
is able to uniquely and authoritatively articulate. In contrast, the personalist perspective
ultimately prioritizes the personal autonomy and responsibility of individuals in moral matters.
Nevertheless, this prioritization presumes a relationship with Church teaching such that moral
matters are necessarily informed, but not controlled and predetermined by it. An informed
conscience is the mediator and final arbiter of the divine moral law taught by the Church.
Consequently, it rejects any account of morality that relies on absolutist principles.204
The legalistic and personalist perspectives function differently. The legalistic
position implicitly reinforces a perspective that suggests that individuals are, in fact,
inadequate or incompetent to make or facilitate responsible moral decisions that differ
from the Church teaching. From this approach, the dissonance is ultimately suppressed
by conformity to the truth as communicated through the Church teaching. Primacy of
conscience is conflated to a wholesale acceptance of the Church’s interpretation of
“absolute and universal moral principles,” often articulated as natural laws.205 Although
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differing from the manualist tradition in a variety of ways, not the least of which is an
explicit normative method, the legalistic perspective remains similar since there are
occasions where the final outcome is a given (e.g., intentional contraception is never
morally justified).
In contrast, the personalist position affirms a Catholic’s capacity to be competent
and responsible in making or facilitating moral decisions that differ from the Church
teaching without denying natural law. Using this approach, the dissonance is finally
suppressed by faithfully following the doctrine of primacy of conscience that “prioritizes
the personal autonomy and responsibility of individuals in moral matters” and recognizes
the legitimacy of occasional differing from Church teaching. From the personalist
perspective, primacy of conscience becomes the manifestation of loyalty to conscience in
the search for truth and right solutions. For example, although the normative Church
teaching regarding intentional contraception is considered, an individual may knowingly
and responsibly differ from this teaching by exercising primacy of conscience. Such an
act does not refute the potential or inherent value of the normative teaching, but rather
denies its universal and absolute application. Natural law remains a normative basis to
inform moral decision-making, but also affords the possibility of difference in the arena
of specific moral judgments through primacy of conscience
To further an understanding of how these two perspectives are currently manifest
and operative in Catholic moral theology, I will review Basic Goods Theory and
Proportionate Reason Theory. Both theories are the most prominent representations of
the legalistic and personalist perspectives and, therefore, the Traditionalist and
Revisionist schools respectively. Clearly quite a number of theologians fall within these
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categories of the legalistic and personalist perspectives as well and are party to these
conversations. Nevertheless, for the purposes present in this research the major
trajectories are sufficiently illuminated through the three principal theorists I have
identified. What is of particular importance here is that these theories clearly
acknowledge the question of individual and communal agency, albeit with differing
configurations and conclusions as to how this relationship of agency is understood and
distributed. By virtue of that very difference being present and current, the reality of
ambiguity in the tradition is identified as a challenge, if not an obstacle, that needs to be
addressed.
Germain Grisez, along with John Finnis and Joseph Boyle, from the Traditionalist
school manifest the legalistic perspective inherent within the Basic Goods Theory for
moral decision-making. The claim that “the good is to be done and evil is to be avoided,”
articulated by Aquinas and referred to previously, was, for him, the first principle of
practical reasoning or synderesis. Practical reason first identifies what might be done,
prior to indicating what should be done. As such and in both capacities, it serves as a
foundation for human choice and behavior. Similarly, according to Grisez and Basic
Goods Theory, the first principle of practical reason, “…articulates the intrinsic,
necessary relationship between human goods and appropriate actions bearing upon
them.”206 In short, the first principle of practical reason does not direct what is to be done
(i.e., a given specific act), but rather simply identifies what is to be incorporated in doing
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any permissible act (i.e., doing good and avoiding evil). It addresses the values operative
in the process, but not the content to which it applies.
This principle is considered self-evident and does not, according to the theory,
emerge from engagement with the natural world nor one’s awareness of human nature.207
As such, it is very consistent with the natural-supernatural dualism of Thomism and
reflects an objectivist meta-ethical theory. It essentially appeals to and retains revelation
as one component in the process of knowing. Curiously, if not ironically, one of natural
law theory’s foundational assumptions is the existence of the supernatural as well as the
ability to know it.208 Clearly this claim and those like it stand under the critique of
modern philosophy as briefly reviewed, and yet its accuracy is, in this instance, beside
the point inasmuch as it remains a claim, rightly or wrongly, still being asserted.209
Therefore, Catholics, at least those attending to the Church’s teaching, must take it into
consideration.
In order to engage the content to which the first principal of practical reason
applies, Basic Goods Theory introduces the concept of basic goods. Basic goods are
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“aspects of our personhood, elements of the blueprint which tells us what human persons
are capable of being, whether as individuals or joined together in community.”210 There
are eight basic goods, which are divided into two categories. The first category is “nonreflexive” goods—human life, knowledge and aesthetic appreciation, and skilled
performances of all kinds. The second category is “reflexive” goods—self-integration,
authenticity, justice and friendship, religion or holiness, and marriage.211 In broad terms,
the distinction between non-reflexive and reflexive goods is that the former are reasons
for choosing undefined by the choice itself while the latter are both reasons for choosing
and partially defined by the choice itself.212
The first principle of practical reason and the basic goods identified are not
sufficient in and of themselves. With only these two components, there is no structure in
place to make moral choices when a multiplicity of goods is in play or, even in conflict.
Basic goods provide a reason for choosing to act, but do not facilitate prioritization
among the basic goods themselves. In order to fill this void, Basic Goods Theory
introduces the first principle of morality which states: “In voluntarily acting for human
goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will
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those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral
human fulfillment.”213
Finally, the generality of the first principle of morality is countered or balanced by
the provision of intermediate principles which are located in eight modes of responsibility
(e.g., “one should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible
good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other instance of an
intelligible good….”).214 These intermediate principles are not prescriptive or prohibitive
regarding specific acts (e.g., theft), but are intended to facilitate recognizing choices that
may or may not violate the first moral principal. It is from these eight modes of
responsibility that specific norms for behavior are derived and identified as good, wrong,
obligatory, or permissible.215
Although even this summary presentation of Basic Goods Theory begs the
question as to its practicality and viability for most Catholics, given the fairly
complicated structure for moral decision-making it offers, that is neither the purpose of
this review nor this dissertation. What is relevant to this research and important to note is
one critical end result or conclusion of the theory, as it determines an understanding of
agency between Church teaching and an individual. Beginning with the first principal of
practical reason and ending with specific norms derived from the eight modes of
responsibilities, Basic Goods Theory concludes, in part, with the establishment of
absolute negative norms. Absolute norms relate to those acts in which the willingness
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itself to perform them comprises a will that is inherently incompatible with an open
disposition to integral human fulfillment.216 These norms are negative in determining
inherent incompatibility and absolute in their definitive status allowing no exception. In
short, Basic Goods Theory states that some acts are never morally justified, or in the
classical terminology of Church teaching, are always intrinsically evil.
At first blush this may seem not only reasonable, but also possibly necessary.
Few, if any, would want to argue that genocide is not intrinsically evil. Yet by
establishing the theoretical construct of absolute negative norms, Basic Goods Theory
opens the door for any, or at least many, particular examples to be presented as potential
candidates. Not surprisingly, an array of Church teaching regarding intrinsically evil acts
is immediately presented for review. The specific example of Sue is a case in point.
Deliberate contraception is defined by Church teaching as intrinsically evil and,
therefore, never morally justified, either by the Church itself or by theologians applying
Basic Goods Theory. Nothing more need be said.
There are ample dimensions of Basic Goods Theory that have the possibility of
diverse conclusions or outcomes, especially as competing basic goods are assessed
through the first principal of morality. Nevertheless, the legalistic quality emerges at this
point of absolute negative norms inasmuch as there is little or no place for discussion or
initiating agency if something is absolutely defined by Church teaching. It is clear in the
establishment of absolute negative norms that Basic Goods Theory represents:
…the legalistic model [that] is characterized by an emphasis on Church
teaching as the central way by which the objective dimensions of morality are
known. It regards the Magisterium as the primary vehicle of moral truth.
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Furthermore, it argues for the existence of absolute and universal moral
principles…217
It is worth noting that when Basic Goods Theory is applied to the Church’s teaching of
intrinsically evil acts, those teachings are affirmed.
Given the focus on agency in this research, what is particularly important to
recognize is how this understanding and distribution of agency is extremely skewed in
the direction of Church teaching being the initiator and the individual being the receiver.
Given that “experience” and “reason” represent two of the four primary sources of moral
knowledge, it is curious at best and radically distorted at worst, that lay persons who have
received the vocation of marriage and potentially the privilege and responsibility of child
rearing are not afforded more agency in this arena, especially in terms of being
significant initiators rather than exclusively receivers. This final product of absolute
negative norms is, in fact, the most profound rub between Basic Goods Theory and
Proportionate Reason Theory, including how it distorts the understanding of agency.
Given the common mooring of Proportionate Reason Theory with Basic Goods
Theory in natural law theory, it is not surprising that the two theories resonate in a variety
of domains. Proportionate Reason Theory “…has never denied the validity of any norm
in se taught by the Magisterium and the premoral values that those norms seek to
promote and protect.”218 Therefore, Proportionate Reason Theory does not disagree with
Basic Goods Theory’s general reiteration of those terms flowing from natural law theory.
Both Proportionate Reason Theory and Basic Goods Theory agree with and work from
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long standing foundational values and norms that are very general and operative in
natural law theory. This is not to suggest that the specific Basic Goods Theory’s
articulation of eight basic goods, eight modes of responsibility as intermediate principles,
et cetera is also present within Proportionate Reason Theory. Both theories’ general
constructs of principles, values, and norms are basically compatible and, by and large,
express what is predominantly a similar method flowing from natural law theory. That
being the case, the review of Proportionate Reason Theory focuses on the difference
between the theories.
Proportionate Reason Theory arrives at a differing conclusion regarding the
possibility of absolute negative norms and this is the crux of the difference between the
two theories. Proportionate reason “is the moral principle used …to determine concretely
and objectively the rightness or wrongness of acts and the various exceptions to
behavioral norms.”219 The term reason is technically understood as “a premoral value,
i.e., a conditioned, and thus not absolute, value which is at stake in a total act.”220
Therefore the term reason is neither to be misinterpreted as an individual having a
“serious reason” nor a “good intention.” Reason, as understood in Proportionate Reason
Theory, is related to “ratio in the act…the premoral [value] the agent seeks to
promote.”221
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The term “proportionate” can readily conjure the image of weighing in or adding
up the values and disvalues present in any given moral consideration. This is a
misinterpretation of the term, inasmuch as that approach basically results in
consequentialism’s understanding of “total net good.” Proportionate, in this theory, is to
be understood as predominantly relational rather than mathematical. As Walter states:
‘Proportionate’ refers to a proper relation (debita proportio) that must
exist between the premoral disvalue(s) contained in or caused by the
means and the end (ratio) or between the end and the premoral disvalue(s)
contained in the further ends (consequences) of the act taken as a whole.222
This is not to suggest that weighing consequences does not come into play in
considering whether or not a proportionate reason exists. It is simply to say that
consequences are only one aspect of the entire act to be considered and must be done in
relationship to premoral values and disvalues. In summary, proportionate reason
basically can be understood as the proper relation between premoral values/disvalues of
the means and the end or consequences.
Proportionate reason parallels the function of Basic Goods Theory’s first principle
of morality, as it too considers the competing values and disvalues of any given act
and/or norm. Not unlike how Basic Goods Theory’s eight modes of responsibility serve
as intermediate principles to nuance the generic or abstract character of the first principle
of morality, Proportionate Reason Theory has criteria that accomplish essentially the
same end with the generic or abstract character of proportionate reason. Those criteria
themselves need not be specifically reviewed in this context, yet suffice it to say that they
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function so as to assess whether or not proportionate reason or proper relation exists in
any given moral consideration.223
What is distinct is how proportionate reason methodologically frames assessing
the morality as related to the whole act through examining how premoral values/disvalues
stand in relationship to the end or consequences. Although Basic Goods Theory does this
as well in many or most instances, in certain cases Basic Goods Theory establishes
absolute negative norms that stand independently, regardless of whatever relationship
might be operative with various ends or consequences. The outcome or consequence
never enters the consideration in those instances because intrinsically evil acts can never
be morally engaged. Proportionate reason does not methodologically or structurally
afford norms an independent status, therefore all acts are considered as a whole (i.e.,
inclusive of means and end).
Similar to the summary presentation of Basic Goods Theory, Proportionate
Reason Theory also begs the question as to its practicality and viability for most
Catholics, given the fairly complicated structure for moral decision-making it also offers,
yet again that is not the question at hand. What is pertinent to this project and important
to note is how agency is framed in this theory. The personalist quality emerges at the
point of denying the establishment of absolute negative norms inasmuch as there is
always a place for discussion and decision as an individual engages proportionate reason.
It is obvious in the rejection of absolute negative norms that Proportionate Reason
Theory represents:
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[The personalist model that] prioritizes the personal autonomy and
responsibility of individuals in moral matters. It also focuses on conscience as
the mediator of the divine moral law. Furthermore, it rejects any account of
ethics that relies on absolutist principles.224
It is worth noting that when Proportionate Reason Theory is applied to the
Church’s teaching of intrinsically evil acts, many of those teachings are affirmed, even if
the conclusion is arrived at through a differing process (i.e., proportionate reason) than
that of Basic Goods Theory. The example of contraception being intrinsically evil, and
therefore never morally justified, is not among them though.
Seen through the lens of agency, Proportionate Reason Theory affords the
possibility of ameliorating the imbalance in the distribution of agency that occurs with
Basic Goods Theory when engaging absolute negative norms. Instead of being extremely
skewed in the direction of Church teaching as the initiator and the individual as the
receiver, the individual also may function as the initiator and the Church teaching is the
receiver. Without overthrowing the Church’s teaching role in initiating agency, the
individual informed by Church teaching is supported by the possibility of exercising
agency in the form of initiation as well. In fact, this is precisely the point where primacy
of conscience potentially comes into play when difficult and important moral decisions
are made in the face of ambiguous traditions.
Ultimately the fundamental difference regarding absolute negative norms is a
critical and key difference at the normative and meta-ethic level for the Traditionalist and
Revisionists schools. Consequently, any particular systems of moral theology that flow
from these schools (i.e., the legalistic perspective with Basic Goods Theory and the
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personalist perspective with Proportionate Reason Theory) are necessarily limited to and
stymied by this sticking point when it comes to achieving a consensual position for the
Church at large. Ambiguity in the tradition regarding primacy of conscience remains
largely due to the inherently elusive and indefinite dimension of the normative and metaethics conversation. This is the perennial question that has plagued these discussions
since the Enlightenment and the rise of modernism. It is the question of synderesis (i.e.,
the first principles of natural law) that has yet to be resolved and, therefore, continues to
complicate the question of syneidesis (i.e., the particularities of one’s conduct). Our focus
is moral judgments and agency as understood and manifest in primacy of conscience.
Catholic moral theology and its inherently philosophical methodology have
responded to the Second Vatican Council’s call for updating, especially in terms of
overcoming certain limitations inherent in the manualist tradition. Nevertheless, the
debate regarding primacy of conscience remains far from resolved and is unlikely to find
consensual ground soon given the nature of the conversation regarding the understanding of
absolute negative norms. However, consensus between the Traditionalist and Revisionist
schools as well as the legalistic and personalist perspectives is present in terms of identifying
the question of agency as central in the doctrine of primacy of conscience.
After more than four decades, the personalist perspective has sound, even if
contested, footing within the Catholic tradition. Hogan provides a succinct summary of
the personalist perspective which serves as the basis for her historical theological
contribution.
[The personalist perspective]…operates on the basis that ethical values
derive their authority, not from some static and abstract notion of human
nature but from their promotion of the good of the person ‘integrally and
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adequately considered.’ This is the ethical model proposed in both
“Gaudium et Spes” and in “Dignitatis Humanae”…[It includes] (1) a
greater recognition of the role of history and change in ethics; (2) a focus
on the moral significance of intentions and circumstances in addition to
the act itself; (3) a greater degree of sophistication in categorizing the
different kinds of moral norms and the kinds of claims they make; and (4)
a rethinking of the relationship between the individual and Magisterium on
the basis of the relocation of moral authority.225
One may wonder whether or not moral theology may have reached the point of
diminishing returns as it attempts to address the question regarding moral responsibility and
authority, which inherently incorporates the question of agency, both individual and
communal. Neither school contests whether or not this question includes primacy of
conscience, yet it is questionable as to whether or not one more philosophical slant will resolve
the fundamental difference between them. Conscious of this limit, Hogan’s research engages
the very same question of primacy of conscience from a historical theological vantage point in
order to bolster the personalist perspective.
Understanding Ambiguity within the Tradition
At the opening of this chapter, ambiguity in the tradition over time was identified
as contributing to the theological problem regarding primacy of conscience that has
arisen from pastoral practice. The role and understanding of agency between the
individual and the Church’s teaching or tradition presents itself as one possible path for
ameliorating the pastoral problem of how to theologically address the two strands in the
Church’s tradition regarding being a moral Catholic. As the Church seems to offer
contradictory advice regarding moral decision-making, ambiguity becomes apparent and
agency becomes requisite. In order to affirm and bolster the personalist perspective, it is
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helpful to examine Hogan’s historical theological study on conscience in the Catholic
tradition as it presents the ambiguity and commensurate difficulty flowing from the
Church’s tradition.
Not only does Hogan’s research deepen the dimensionality of the history and
debate regarding primacy of conscience, but also more importantly, it profoundly reveals
the ambiguity that significantly contributes to the pastoral problem being addressed.
Further, her historical examination of conscience implicitly calls forth the need for an
enhanced understanding of agency, as is evident from her research that Catholics cannot
simply apply an answer that is so apparent and given. Often the expression of having an
informed conscience is misinterpreted as knowing “the answer,” rather than being in
authentic engagement with the tradition. Theological or moral “forks in the road” require
choices that necessitate agency and Hogan has found a drawerful. By amply presenting
the ambiguity within the doctrine’s various trajectories, the call for and necessity of better
understanding agency is blatant and paramount, given the practice of morality presumes
both judgment and behavior.
In a sense, the detail of the material covered by Hogan is less significant in and of
itself than what she accomplishes by reviewing it at large. Her goal—one she aptly
achieves—is to argue “…that any reading that glosses over the inherent contradictions in
the theology and politics of conscience is inadequate.”226 This is not to suggest that she
disregards the material because of the contradictions, rather it is to highlight her recovery
of critical theological dimensions of conscience that have been lost or insufficiently
emphasized—the diversity and plurality (i.e., contradictions) that has always existed has
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been found. This recovery is key to relieving the complications caused by the
misconception of theological uniformity.
The method employed by Hogan is basically a hermeneutics of suspicion, used
for constructive purposes in historical theology. Contrary to presuming consensus, and
sensitive to many Catholics’ misperception that such a consensus actually exists, her
method consciously and effectively explores the breadth of the tradition. In writing of
her methodology, Hogan claims:
A central purpose of this study is to problematize the history of conscience
and to suggest that a hermeneutics of suspicion is necessary when looking
at the story of conscience as implied in current theological debates.
Therefore, in examining the history of conscience in the Catholic tradition
I intend to confront rather than to neglect the many confusions and
contradictions.227
Without reviewing the array of material in her historical research, Hogan confronts a
multitude of “confusions and contradictions.”
Given the historical review within this chapter and other examples throughout the
dissertation that partially reflect or parallel Hogan’s historical work, one example will be
explored. This example of her method will be limited to a single contemporary
authoritative text from the Second Vatican Council that in and of itself captures our
discussion of the legalistic and personalist tradition and discloses an inherent ambiguity
in the tradition. In her words, “the truth is that many of the key theological texts on
conscience, including very recent ones, can be used either to promote or to curtail
personal autonomy. The texts pull in both directions.”228 This manifestation of
ambiguity is somewhat distinct from that which is revealed through a comparative
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historical analysis that highlights differing claims over time. A passage from the Second
Vatican Council that seldom, if ever, achieves a consensual understanding serves to
illustrate her method and point:
Deep within their consciences men and women discover a law which they
have not laid upon themselves and which they must obey. Its voice ever
calling them to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells them
inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For they have in their
hearts a law inscribed by God. Their dignity rests on observing this law,
and by it they will be judged. Their conscience is people’s most secret
core, and their sanctuary. There they are alone with God, whose voice
echoes in their depths…. Through loyalty to conscience, Christians are
joined to others in the search for truth and for the right solution to so many
moral problems….229
Hogan analyzes the ambiguity of this Vatican II excerpt as follows:
In the early part of the passage the work of conscience is described simply
as obedience to the objective moral law. The task of conscience is to
obey. Yet, in the later sentences the idiom changes substantially. The
paradigm of law is abandoned. Instead, it is the voice of God echoing in
one’s depths that orients the person to seek the good in each situation.230
Although she does not explicitly appeal to the legalistic and personalist schools in
this portion of her analysis, essentially ambiguity within the text lies, in part, in its
incorporation of both voices, with the former being the legalistic and the latter being the
personalist.231 This intentional dynamic, as these theological texts are the product of
extended conversations, or maybe better said negotiations, begs the question as to how a
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Catholic is to understand tradition as reflected in Church teachings, especially in the face
of ambiguity.
When Sue and many Catholics like herself, who know the Church’s teaching, or
at least something of it, and want to do the right thing, seek to talk it over with a priest
and get counsel, ambiguity plays a key role in the conversation, both on the part of the
layperson and the priest. Some individuals seeking guidance may have the hope, or even
expectation, that the experience of ambiguity exclusively resides within themselves and
that by being better informed of the tradition by “one who knows,” they will achieve
resolution. Alternatively, other individuals may be well aware of the ambiguity within
Church teaching that exists outside of themselves and are actually desiring counsel as to
how to manage it—a potential invitation to explore primacy of conscience. From the
priest’s perspective, the ambiguity within the tradition may be anything from
complication that is avoided or denied to a resource that is employed in a variety of ways,
not the least of which is engaging primacy of conscience. In short, the pastoral setting
and those occupying it are truly and significantly affected by the presence of ambiguity
within the tradition and, therefore, it necessitates attention and understanding.
Returning to the Second Vatican Council text analyzed by Hogan as an example
of her method, it is critical to recognize that even though this ambiguity in the tradition of
conscience is unresolved, it is anything but unconscious. Commenting upon this
theological text that, as previously stated, is at least a product of extended conversations
if not negotiations, Cardinal Ratzinger claimed, “the fathers of Vatican II were anxious
not to allow an ethics of conscience to be transformed into the domination of
subjectivism, and they were not willing to canonize a limitless situation ethics under the
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guise of conscience.”232 This negotiated compromise of a “text that pulls in both
directions” reflects the Church consciously developing its doctrine in the midst of tension
between differing theological perspectives, yet it does not resolve the type of ambiguity it
produces nor the consequences that flow from it for Catholics like Sue. In fact, it
contributes to it, especially in any attempt to avoid or deny the ambiguity’s existence.
In addressing the presence of ambiguity within the Church’s teaching, Hogan’s
identification of her task as “clarifying unresolved matters in the tradition” holds a
nuance worth profiling. Her claim is to clarify unresolved matters— clarity is the goal,
not resolution.233 Confronting the illusion of theological homogeneity within the
Catholic tradition is a primary objective in accomplishing her goal. In this instance,
clarification enhances ambiguity, given it highlights confusion and contradiction and, as
such, may exacerbate the lack of resolution, or at least one restricted by singularity of
thought, belief, and practice.
Some Catholics assess themselves and others on the basis of conformity with an
assumed homogenous Catholic tradition. From this perspective, Catholic tradition is
considered monolithic and fixed; therefore, the only real question is whether or not one’s
beliefs and practices rightly conform. The tradition is considered devoid of any
multiplicity that would lead to contradictions or confusion. In short, any real
interpretation of tradition is unnecessary because of an assumed theological harmony and
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unity. Hogan’s clarification (i.e., deconstruction) of this theological worldview of
uniformity within the arena of conscience is, in fact, representative of a broader
theological methodology (i.e., historicism) that extends well beyond the topic of
conscience and even Catholicism itself, but merits a summary inclusion given its role and
relevance.
Rooted in the advances of postmodernism, the historical dimension of human
experience has come to the fore as a vital, if not central, component in any critical study.
The historicist perspective actually undergirds Hogan’s work and operates out of the
“assumptions of human situatedness, particularity, and plurality that have come to
characterize Western thought.”234 The analysis of conscience provided by Hogan clearly
reveals that
…our current context is the product of the vagaries of complex and varied
historical processes that have preceded our era and of our own
contemporary responses to and transformations of these processes.235
This historicist understanding of and appreciation for the complexity and development of
context is better elaborated and astutely articulated in Sheila Davaney’s pragmatic
historicism, George Lindbeck’s post-liberalism, and David Tracy’s revisionist
theology.236
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Operating from a historicist perspective, the concept of a homogenous tradition is
rejected, as the diversity, plurality, and permeability of contexts exist across both time
and topic. This historicist theological methodology understands tradition as follows:
Traditions of meaning, value, and practice are, thus, always specific and
concrete, developing in localized, not general or abstract ways, intertwined
with other social and cultural factors. They are, therefore, internally
pluralistic. Every tradition is in reality many traditions, conglomerations
of distinctive and even heterogeneous interpretations, sets of meanings and
practices that cannot be assimilated to or reduced to any universally
present factor.237
Ultimately Hogan’s work demonstrates this type of plurality within the Catholic tradition
regarding conscience and reflects a historicist sensibility and analysis, even if not
overt.238
Lest these theological sources be undercut or underappreciated as viable and vital
contributors to the discussion because they are not directly situated within Catholicism,
the work of Catholic theologian Terrance Tilley merits attention. Not only does Tilley
engage Lindbeck and Tracy as theological conversation partners, he competently
demonstrates within the Catholic tradition the type of plurality identified by historicism.
In his Inventing Catholic Tradition, Tilley juxtaposes Pius IX’s famous papal “Syllabus
of Errors” (1864) with the Second Vatican Council’s “Declaration on Religious
Freedom” (1965). The former stated that it was an error to believe that “every person is
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free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, that person
shall consider true.”239 Whereas the latter authoritatively proclaimed that “the human
person has a right to religious freedom…. In matters religious no one is to be forced to
act in a manner contrary to one’s own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting
in accordance with one’s own beliefs, whether privately or publicly.”240 The
contradiction is obvious and the subsequent confusion predictable.241
Tilley not only concretely manifests the internally pluralistic character of the
Catholic tradition, but also presses the matter by questioning the Catholic understanding
of the development of doctrine that posits continuity as an essential element in its
operation. Confronted with the blatant contradiction of these two documents, in his
introduction to the “Declaration on Religious Freedom,” eminent Catholic theologian
John Courtney Murray, S.J. stated:
The notion of development, not the notion of religious freedom, was the
real sticking point for those who opposed the Declaration even to the end.
The course of development between the “Syllabus of Errors” (1864) and
“Dignitatis Humanae” (1965) still remains to be explained by
theologians.242
By dislodging this one fundamental assumption of continuity regarding the
development of doctrine and tradition, Tilley demonstrates the validity and importance of
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the historicist perspective. He claims that “nearly thirty-five years later, no convincing
theory of development has accounted for the ‘course of development’ that allows a clear
contradiction in 1965 of what the highest magisterial authority in the Church taught in
1864.”243 Further, by locating this challenge within the Church’s highest-level
discussions regarding the development of doctrine, Tilley implicitly lays claim to a
similar analysis of the entire spectrum of doctrines. The development of doctrine is more
complexly understood than simply the question of continuity, yet deconstructing this one
dimension radically reframes its understanding.244
Regardless of the final outcome, or more likely even if there is one, in the debate
over the Catholic theological construct of continuity within the development of doctrine
and tradition, the very fact that Tilley and others245 can make this an arguable case is, in
and of itself, extremely relevant to the pastoral problem at hand that is caught up in the
tradition’s ambiguity, all the while necessitating real and practical judgment and action.
In the face of undeniable diversity and multiplicity within the Catholic tradition, however
interpreted and managed barring outright denial, agency must be operative, from the
generation and transmission of the teaching to its reception and application.
Summary
It is neither the intent nor the capacity of this research to resolve the tension and
ambiguity in the tradition between the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools and their
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corresponding expressions, inasmuch as to do so would be the equivalent of achieving
theological homogeneity. The debate between the legalistic and personalist perspectives
will continue well beyond this work as “the texts pull in both directions” and the two
corresponding perspectives prioritize differing values and configurations. Just as
Hogan’s work bolsters the personalist perspective without resolving the debate or
difference, similarly my goal is not to clear the balance of the debate, but just to further
tip the scale in the direction of the personalist perspective.
Given the absence of a pastoral theological perspective and the relevance of
Bandura’s insights and empirical research in these debates, I believe an important
contribution is possible in the ongoing engagement of this pastoral theological
conundrum. I intentionally locate the problem as pastoral theological rather than moral,
ethical, or philosophical in order to broaden the base of the conversation. Further, it is
my contention that the debate’s impasse will not achieve significant progress by the
simple turn of yet another screw (i.e., just one more text interpreted in just the right light
after the fashion that so many other texts have already been considered). In other words,
the current direction of the conversation tends to be yielding diminishing returns. Rather,
approaching the issue from another legitimate theological discipline that has not found a
voice in the conversation may truly contribute to loosening the logjam. This is an
example of how “pastoral theology, like practical theology, contributes not only to the
formulation of theory and practice relevant to the ministry of care, but also recovers,
corrects, and expands viewpoints in other branches of theology and ministry.”246 As a
pastoral theologian, I press the discussion for theoretical coherence and practical
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applicability. In this respect, the pastoral theological task, informed by the priestly work
of providing moral guidance to conscience-driven parishioners, tilts toward the
personalist interpretation. When so tilted, not only is ambiguity in the tradition more
fully recognized, but so also do matters of personal agency come into prominence.
The principal thrust of this dissertation’s examination of primacy of conscience is
that agency is a critical element in understanding the meaning and function of primacy of
conscience within the relationship between the social group (as reflected in the terms
tradition and authority) and the individual (as reflected in the term primacy of
conscience)—an agency that is interdependent and at times in conflict. One of the
unstated assumptions and/or insufficiently developed concepts within the primacy of
conscience debate between obedience to tradition and following individual conscience is the
status of agency as it relates to primacy. This turn to agency brings several questions about
primacy of conscience into the foreground. Does the concept of “primacy” within the
tradition of conscience hint at or even push toward a certain interpretation of agency?
How is agency predominantly understood within the current debate regarding conscience
and what other ways might be understood? Is there something beneficial within the
concept of primacy of conscience that has either been “lost” or not yet discovered within
the tradition? How can we further understand primacy in light of Bandura contemporary
insights regarding agency?
The next chapter will explore these questions regarding agency. Clearly the
personalist view of primacy of conscience has been well articulated by moral and
historical scholars like McCormick, Curran, and Hogan, yet a constructive pastoral
theological appropriation and interpretation of the personalist view of primacy of
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conscience in the Catholic tradition, when primacy is amplified with the implications
drawn from a SCT view of agency, is another critical resource lacking in the conversation
and understanding.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE LENS OF AGENCY
In these agentic transactions, people are producers as well as products of social systems.
Personal agency and social structure operate interdependently.247
Graham’s pastoral theology in Care of Persons, Care of Worlds examines the
pastoral and theological context in systemic terms and clearly considers agency to be an
important dimension of power. As discussed in Chapter 2, his work and Bandura’s
resonate well with one another and are broadly compatible in that they share a systemic
perspective on relationality, and they emphasize the importance of agency. Yet from the
outset of this chapter it is critical to state that the character of their theories and
commensurate contributions differ substantially. Graham considers agency as an
important dimension of power, and looks at the pastoral and theological situation in
systemic terms. Bandura’s research with Social Cognitive Theory (SCT) gives social
scientific grounding for a systemic perspective, and offers resources Graham does not for
relating this perspective to the personalist view of primacy of conscience. Graham’s
pastoral theology locates Bandura and this project regarding primacy of conscience in a
pastoral, theological, and systemic context. From that location, Bandura offers more
disciplined behavioral science research and theory on the social-personal interfaces
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involved in decision-making about moral concerns. In short, the pastoral theological
method sets the context and SCT norms the claims.
From the discipline of social psychology and its corresponding methods of
research, SCT examines the interaction of social structures and individuals (e.g., the
Church and its members) through Bandura’s idea of reciprocal determinism. The
problem of either the Church or the individual having moral agency can be better
addressed from this systemic perspective. Within the structure of what he calls
“reciprocal determinism,” Bandura speaks of agency and human intentionality in ways
that some social psychologies do not. Consequently, his work compared to other
perspectives can better amplify moral theology that requires agency and rejects
deterministic explanations of moral lives. Bandura’s theorizing about agency includes
discussion of self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion. All of
these are important for illuminating agency in primacy of conscience and are not present
in Graham’s pastoral theology.
By drawing upon SCT, as one distinct and well established social cognitive theory, this
chapter intends to offer support for the personalist view of conscience when primacy is
amplified with the implications drawn from an SCT understanding of agency. Catholic moral
theologians recognize and accept agency as a factor in the question of primacy of conscience;
nevertheless its understanding and articulation is still capable of further development.
Generally, in Catholic moral theology and in the debate regarding conscience in particular,
agency is understood and articulated philosophically and is a common notion with varying
interpretations. Hence, Catholic moral theology and the particular question of conscience can
benefit from the array of resources available within the scientific field that may illuminate the
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conversation. As I will show, SCT is once such resource. SCT both aligns with and amplifies
the important concept of agency within the doctrine of primacy of conscience and illuminates
the corresponding theological conversation on a variety of levels.
This chapter will first address how science, and more specifically social science, is
understood and employed by pastoral theology. An historical study of empirical psychologies
and the Catholic notion of conscience will provide a contemporary mooring for and example of
the intersection between theology and psychology as related to the question and understanding
of conscience. The second portion of this chapter will provide the background of SCT as well
as a summary orientation to the theory, especially as it addresses the systemic and relational
character of the human experience as related to agency and decision-making. As the SCT
understanding of agency is further examined, additional dimensions of the theory will be
considered that are relevant for better understanding agency within the exercise of primacy
of conscience. This will include what SCT considers the normative cognitive dynamics of
self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion. But before this
dissertation engages any of the specific details of the scientific theories and/or studies
being considered, it is vital to be clear about the possibilities and limits of this crossdisciplinary venture.
Science as a Resource in Pastoral Theology
One need not be an historical theologian to readily recognize that Catholicism’s
historical relationship with science has been not only ambiguous, but even conflicted at times.
On the one hand Aquinas’ theological application of science through the integration of
Aristotelian philosophy stands to this day as a remarkable, if not revered, cross-disciplinary
venture within Catholic theology. On the other hand, questions, thoughts, and theories flowing
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from intellectuals, be they philosophers or scientists, have not always been so well received, as
the Church’s response to modernism clearly reflects as a case in point. Given the muddied
waters of this historical relationship between the Church and its use science, it is important to
begin this chapter by clearly stating what is and is not intended as an outcome through an
appeal to the field of science in order to amplify an understanding of agency, and what
implications scientific resources might bring to bear upon interpreting the meaning of primacy
of conscience.
First and foremost, a scientific perspective is not included here in order to function as
the final arbiter regarding how agency is to be correctly understood. That is, it does not provide
proof of both the existence and intricacy of agency, let alone that the legalistic perspective is
wrong whereas the personalist perspective is right. Although the existence of agency is a given
within Catholic moral theological circles, that is not actually the case within the scientific field.
In this particular debate regarding conscience, Catholic theologians primarily question where
moral agency resides. Yet some scientists question not where, but whether agency even exists
(at least agency as it is framed within these theological conversations).248 Within the scientific
field itself, the jury is still out on this question. Cases from many positions are researched,
made, and argued; consequently, science cannot and does not prove, disprove, or resolve any
and all questions about the existence of agency and any corresponding agential dynamics.
Even if relatively committed to certain similar methodological moorings, the theories and
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practices of science are not homogenous and scientific disciplines indisputably carry content
and conclusions that stand in tension and remain in question, not unlike the discipline of
theology. In short, science informs this theological research as one among a number of
authoritative, but not determinative, resources.
Second, given the indeterminate quality of the scientific debate regarding agency, it is
critical to identify that neither this chapter nor this dissertation is a study on agency. Therefore,
the array of scientific views regarding agency will not be considered, although it is important to
note the range of the continuum. On one end, some theories call into question the very
existence of agency, all the while being labeled reductionistic and deterministic by others,
including the Church.249 On the other end of the continuum, reputable scientific voices (e.g.,
Bandura) are making a claim for an understanding of agency that resonates with that of
Catholic theology as regards human society and individuals. These claims, even if not
definitive, certainly are among a body of credible provisional knowledge that has emerged
from science and social science. As such, scientific attempts to shed light upon the question of
agency, not the least of which is social cognitive theory, merit the attention of pastoral
theology. In sum, SCT is the location on the continuum regarding the scientific research that
will be explored.
Yet just as science broadly understood does not provide a sole position on the question
of agency, neither does social cognitive theory. Bandura’s SCT is actually but one expression
within a number of social cognitive theories and, in certain dimensions, the differences between
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them are not merely nominal.250 Although any number of differences are operative
between SCT and the broader circle of more “traditional” social cognitive theories, it is
most important to note in light of the focus of this dissertations that the latter take a less
agentic or intentional view of human conduct. For example, more “traditional” social
cognitive theories significantly attend to automatic and unintentional processes that do
not conjure the concept of agency, let alone intentionality, while SCT integrates these
automatic and unintentional processes as in relationship on some level to both agency and
intentionality. Other social cognitive theories may, to a degree, integrate these automatic
and unintentional processes as in relationship to both agency and intentionality in the
same way that Bandura does, but their belief in the possibility of agency may be quite
different from that of SCT. Therefore, similar to this chapter not being a study on agency, it
is also not intended to be a study on social cognitive theory at large. SCT is the principal social
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cognitive theory being explored as one voice among social cognitive theories. Further, SCT
has unique dimensions that are not operative in every social cognitive theory and would even
be contested by some.
In accord with the methodology of this pastoral theology, cognate sources like social
psychology or, more specifically in this instance, SCT are engaged in order to potentially offer
insight and perspective into whatever question or problem the theological project is addressing.
Yet, as noted above, the scientific resources themselves often stand in tension with differing
positions within their respective fields. It is neither the role nor the capacity of pastoral
theology to resolve those differences, yet it is the responsibility of pastoral theology to appeal to
those resources in accurate and credible ways. In this instance, therefore, both the possibilities
and limits of the contribution of SCT need to be identified.
The possibility of SCT amplifying an understanding of agency and the implications it
may bear for understanding primacy of conscience deserve attention given SCT’s legitimate
status within the field of social psychology and its relevance to the topic at hand. The
contribution of this specific scientific trajectory may be waning in the face of new
neuroscientific research, yet at present it is neither considered antiquated nor irrelevant. The
limits of SCT also need to be identified, even if not explored. SCT does not represent the
perspective of all social cognitive theories regarding the concept of agency, let alone that of the
scientific field at large. In short, SCT offers a limited and provisional scientific contribution to
the theological question and conversation regarding agency, but does not include the extremely
diverse and contrary scientific perspectives that also exist. Finally, in terms of the broad limits
and possibilities of pastoral theology engaging the sciences, it is vital to recognize that the end
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product, at least in this particular project, is a conversation informed and illuminated by a
scientific perspective, but is not a scientific conversation as such.
Therefore, as summarized in Chapter 2, SCT will be employed in this dissertation in
order to expand and explicate some of the agential dimensions involved in an act of claiming
primacy of conscience. One dimension of conscience, given its engagement of judgment and
action, is that it is an expression of agency. Not only does the ambiguity inherent within the
Catholic tradition, as noted in the previous chapter, necessitate an understanding and
exercise of agency, but also the very term “primacy” within the doctrine itself suggests, if
not demands, an appreciation for the role of agency in moral decision-making when
choices differ from the normative teaching of the tradition. An enhanced understanding of
agency will not eliminate ambiguity within the tradition, yet it can better facilitate, both for the
individual and the Church, an ability to manage the challenges and opportunities present within
the tradition’s ambiguity.
Bandura’s systemic insight into agency and its implications can help recover, if not
amplify and further, the initial understanding and role of primacy within the doctrine of
conscience. At the core and most critically, SCT examines the reciprocal and interactive
agential framework within which personal and social dynamics emerge and are operative
such that one cannot be fully understood in isolation from the other.251 This framing of
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agency facilitates understanding and integrating individual and communal agential
dynamics that must be present if the Catholic view of primacy of conscience is to better
assist Catholics and become more fully intelligible to the tradition itself, especially given
its ambiguity about various levels of responsibility for moral decisions.
Rather than an “either-or” approach that pits the individual and the Church against
one another, Bandura’s systemic conceptualization of agency presents a “both-and”
framework that affords both parties unique expressions of agency. The general terms of
initiating and receiving introduced by Graham when discussing agency are explored in
greater detail through the SCT framing of reciprocal determinism. As Bandura presents
behavioral scientific research and theory on the social-personal interfaces involved in
decision-making about moral concerns, SCT’s view of agency examines cognition,
behavior, the environment, and their reciprocal interaction in a fashion that enhances an
understanding of primacy of conscience. Specifically, Bandura’s research examines
cognitive and behavioral dimensions of agency (i.e., the role of self-reflectiveness,252
perceived self-efficacy,253 and social persuasion254) that potentially engage and amplify
unexplored dimensions of the function of primacy of conscience. These will be explored
in greater detail when this chapter enters its major section on SCT and addresses its
background, provides an overview of its systemic perspective of reciprocal determinism, and
its understanding of agency.
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With that framing in mind before going into the major SCT portion of this chapter, a
relatively recent historical mooring will be helpful in understanding the contemporary
intersection between psychology and Catholic moral theology regarding the concept of
conscience. In order to accomplish this end, the research of Thomas Srampickal will be drawn
upon.255 This research represents what was, at the time, a moderately progressive crossdisciplinary study regarding empirical psychology and a Catholic understanding of conscience.
First, his research and conclusions regarding the concept of conscience in empirical psychology
will be reviewed. From that point, his examination of the use of the concept of conscience in
the documents of the Second Vatican Council will be sketched. Finally, Srampickal’s
synthesis and conclusion of how these empirical psychologies influential at the time of the
Second Vatican Council intersect with the understanding of conscience operative in the
documents of the Second Vatican Council will be provided. The era of Srampickal’s research
coincides with the emergence of the legalistic and personalist perspectives regarding
conscience that have consolidated in the ensuing decades and remain to this day.
In addition to providing a historical platform for entering the conversation between
psychology and Catholic theology regarding primacy of conscience, Srampickal’s research
identifies two conclusions particularly relevant to this dissertation. The two principal points
that will be drawn from Srampickal’s work are as follows. First, there is a need in the
documents of the Second Vatican Council for an improved understanding and articulation of
the social nature of the person. Srampickal’s critique of the Second Vatican Council’s
documents remains relevant to this day and stands on its own. Second, psychology is a
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unique and important scientific resource for understanding the dynamics related to the
formation and development of conscience. Although this dissertation does not intend to further
the exploration of conscience along the lines of the particular empirical psychologies
Srampickal employed, it does agree with dimensions of his conclusions and will explore them
through SCT.
A Catholic Study on Conscience in the 1970’s
Slightly more than a decade after the close of the Second Vatican Council,
Srampickal’s The Concept of Conscience in Today’s Empirical Psychology and in the
Documents of the Second Vatican Council became the principal resource that identified
and elaborated both the resonance and dissonance present between Catholic theological
and select modern psychological perspectives on the concept of conscience.
Srampickal’s comparative analysis of conscience serves as one expression of the broader
context of the day in its exploration of the intersection between both theological and
psychological interpretations and critiques of the concept of conscience.256 Although his
research on the concept of conscience in the documents of the Second Vatican Council
and empirical psychology is principally limited to the Catholic arena, substantial overlap
exists across Christian denominations.
The study and understanding of conscience, like so many other dimensions of the
person and society, underwent substantial, if not radical, reformulation in the modern era.
This dissertation does not provide an extensive review of that history as it emerged and
developed. Nevertheless, Srampickal’s research affords a sufficient summary entry point
256
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into this reformulation regarding conscience by virtue of his comparative analysis of the
empirical psychology of the time and what were the recently drafted documents of the
Second Vatican Council. Although other disciplines, especially philosophy and its
impact on theology through the emergence of existentialism and phenomenology, played
significant roles in this modern reformulation, Srampickal’s focus, like that of this
dissertation, is the impact and contribution of psychology for the understanding of
conscience in relationship to the Catholic tradition.
Conscience and Empirical Psychology
The three main psychological theories integrated into Srampickal’s research are
cognitive-developmental, identification, and learning theories. From approximately
1950, “…empirical psychology began to show a great interest in and concern for the
study of conscience. This resulted in a more systematic study—both in theoretical
formulation and in empirical investigations—of conscience.”257 The investigation into
conscience through these various theoretical orientations and corresponding empirical
explorations provides insight into the dimensions and development of conscience.258
Nevertheless, the contribution of psychology toward the reformulation of the concept of
conscience in the modern era began well before the 1950’s, as Sigmund Freud’s
introduction of psychoanalytic psychology profoundly altered the conversation and
understanding at the turn of the century. As Srampickal notes: “From the psychological
point of view, the theory that had been influencing the ‘concept of conscience’ up to a
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quarter of a century ago was the ‘superego’ concept of the Freudian depth
psychology.”259
Although the influence of Freud will be implicitly addressed in the section on
identification theory, it is worth noting, in the very broadest of strokes, Freud’s
understanding of conscience as it relates to the super-ego. In the context of the basic
elements of the psychic apparatus coined by Freud—the id, the ego, and the super-ego—
the phenomena of conscience principally reside in the super-ego. The super-ego, initially
formed by authorities’ external demands, principally parental, on the child’s ego,
eventually displaces these authorities and serves as its own locus of power as it reflects
an internalized manifestation of those primal external authorities and their demands.260
In Freud’s words, “The super-ego takes the place of the parental function, and
thenceforward observes, guides and threatens the ego in just the same way as the parents
acted to the child before.”261
Certainly one cannot limit Freud’s insight into conscience simply to its
relationship to the super-ego, as his forays into that question were both broad and deep,
nevertheless the function of the super-ego stands front and center in the conversation as it
relates to the psychic structure.262 According to Paul Lehmann, “…for Freud, the neurotic
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and the societal aspects of the phenomena of conscience meet in the super-ego and its
operation. In a word, conscience is the super-ego.”263 This claim alone gives a sense of
the historic impact Freud’s theory and practice had on the substantial and radical
reformulation of the concept of conscience in the modern era. In this dissertation,
Freud’s influence will be implicitly referred to and covered by Srampickal’s review of
identification theory. Therefore, a brief review of the empirical psychology employed by
Srampickal is in order.
The first of the empirical psychological theories to be addressed is cognitivedevelopmental theory. These approaches into the investigation of the phenomena of
conscience are well represented through the renowned work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence
Kohlberg. Although of historical import and influential at the time of Srampickal’s
research, it is important to note that these theories, or at least dimensions of them, are
both dated and fairly controversial (e.g., the concept of stages, at least strictly defined).
Therefore, the material is reviewed here inasmuch as it is part of the historical
conversation between psychology and Catholic theology that Srampickal addresses.
What is of note from these theories though, inasmuch as it relates to this dissertation and
is not strongly contested or controversial, is the claim that moral development includes
and is influenced by the interaction between the person and the environment.
Cognitive-developmental theories principally attend to the cognitive dimensions
of moral responses. Further, these moral responses are understood as moving through
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developmental changes that correspond to shifts within the cognitive structure.264
Cognitive-developmental research predominantly focused on the variables that affect and
alter a child’s moral thinking and judgment. Without going into the detail of the theories
of Piaget or Kohlberg as they reflect cognitive-developmental approaches into the
investigation of the phenomena of conscience, there are points of agreement or
intersection between these theorists that reflect the general thrust of the cognitivedevelopmental perspective.
At the time of Srampickal’s research, empirical psychology accepted the
theoretical structure of stages. Both Piaget and Kohlberg identified stages that posit a
‘natural,’ if not universal, pattern of moral development that correlates to maturationgrowth. Although there is currently substantial critique of both theories, it is worth
noting their stages at least as an historical context of cognitive-developmental theories.
For example, Piaget claimed a child’s moral development occurs in basically two stages
that are qualitatively different.265 The first stage (heteronomous) is located at
approximately age 7 and the second stage (autonomous) is placed around the age of 9.
Adult constraint and egocentricity are principal factors in the development of the first
phase. Maturation, intellectual development and social experiences are the principal
casual factors in the development of the second phase. Kohlberg, building upon the work
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of Piaget, posited three levels that consisted of six stages.266 The first level of
Preconventional Morality consisted of Stage 1 (Obedience and Punishment Orientation)
and Stage 2 (Individualism and Exchange). The second level of Conventional Morality
consisted of Stage 3 (Good Interpersonal Relationships) and Stage 4 (Maintaining the
Social Order). The third level of Postconventional Morality consisted of Stage 5 (Social
Contract and Individual Rights) and Stage 6 (Universal Principles).
Certainly there are additional points of resonance as well as dissonance between
the theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, not to mention early cognitive-developmental
theorists like J. Mark Baldwin,267 George Herbert Mead,268 or their predecessors, but
those are not necessary here, given the brief nature of this review. What remains relevant
for this research from the cognitive-developmental approach is the claim that moral
development is interactional inasmuch as maturational factors that are internal interact
with environmental factors that are external.269 As will be seen later, this final point is
central to the systemic insight of SCT.
In addition to cognitive-developmental theories, identification theory is examined
in Srampickal’s research. Identification approaches into the investigation of the
phenomena of conscience are represented by Srampickal through a variety of theorists.
As examples he recognizes, R. R. Sears, E. Maccoby, H. Levin, W. Allinsmith, R.
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Grinder, R. Burton, J. M. Whiting, and I. L. Child as important contributors to the
empirical study of conscience from the perspective of identification theory.
Nevertheless, these expressions of identification theory clearly harken to and are built
upon the renowned work of Freud. Certainly psychoanalytic psychology itself does not
directly fit within the usual understanding of empirical psychology, yet the impact of
Freud and psychoanalysis looms so large in relationship to this theory that Srampickal
finds it necessary to delineate the research he draws upon. Specifically he notes:
Here we are not interested in the clinically-based psychoanalytical theory
of identification and conscience, but in a more empirically-oriented theory
of identification and conscience development. This latter has of course
drawn its major inspiration from the psychoanalytical and the stimulusresponse theories.270
Identification theory approaches the question of conscience from the perspective
of inner control integrated through identification with the parents whereby the child
internalizes the values espoused by the parents, whether verbal or behavioral. According
to this theory, normally conscience is established in childhood around the age of six. The
child’s dependency upon the parent, expressed as anxiety over the potential loss of love
and/or necessary material resources for survival, is the basic motive for identification.
Ultimately, the early parent-child relationship and corresponding care or training serve as
the principal factors that contribute to identification which, in turn, also fosters the
development of conscience.271
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Whereas cognitive-developmental theories principally attend to the cognitive
dimensions of moral responses, identification theories predominantly focus upon a
variety of relational factors that contribute to the development of conscience. In short,
According to identification theory, a chain of interrelated factors are
involved in the development of conscience: conscience develops as a
result of the child’s internalization of parental values through a special
form of learning. This learning has its motives, and the strength of these
motives varies according to certain factors in the early parent-child
interaction.272
Ultimately the development of conscience is interpreted as a unique type of self
control.273 Specifically it is considered the child’s inner control as distinguished from
both external control of the child and the child’s self-control based upon punishment and
reward. The distinguishing factor of this inner control, as interpreted by identification
theory, is the dynamic of the early parent-child identification.274
The third and final of the empirical psychological theories to be addressed is
learning theory. Srampickal presents three types of learning theory relevant for
interpreting conscience: classical conditioning theory,275 instrumental learning theory,276
and observational learning theory.277 These theories, as Klaus Foppa states,
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…are not concerned exclusively with the explanation and systematic
representation of the learning processes, but are more or less general
theories of behavior, which merely happen to start from the common
assumption that the environmental influences operative in learning
processes are of major importance for our understanding of the ways in
which the individual adapts to his environment.278
Deeply rooted in experimental models, learning theories and their corresponding research
focus on the acquisition and modification of behavior which, in turn, give rise to
principles that frame an understanding of the development and function of conscience.
Bandura’s initial research began in the arena of learning theories, specifically
observational learning theory. In hindsight, it is clear that observational learning theory
was the harbinger of Bandura’s later development of SCT. Whereas classical
conditioning and instrumental learning assume direct reinforcements (i.e., the subject’s
direct experience of rewards and punishments), observational learning posits, while not
denying the role of direct reinforcements, that the subject’s observation of models also
contributes to the learning process. What is of particular interest in this distinction
between observational learning and both classical conditioning and instrumental learning
is the function and affect of the observation itself. For example, from an observational
learning perspective, if a parent models certain behavior in a given situation, whether that
behavior is reinforced or punished, the child can learn from that observation. In short,
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learning as part of the formation and development of conscience is affected by social
interaction, either through direct or observed experience.
These three categories of empirical psychology—cognitive-developmental,
identification, and learning theories—contributed in unique ways to the understanding of
the dimensions and development of conscience. Certainly differences in understanding
the dimensionality and development of conscience exist not only between the three broad
theoretical categories identified, but also within those categories themselves.
Nevertheless, Srampickal gleans several claims about the nature, dimensionality, and
development of conscience that surface from these various approaches and their
corresponding research. And while other psychologies than those he cites may given
better explanations for these processes, he lays the groundwork for interpreting the
relationship between conscience understood psychologically and primacy of conscience
understood theologically.
First, in very general terms regarding its nature, conscience relates to subjective
interiorization, however that is understood to be realized or accomplished. That is to say,
conscience relates to a person’s response from within and does not solely rely upon
external sanctions, whether actual or imagined. These various theories recognize, each in
its own manner, that this interior response neither develops nor exists in isolation or a
vacuum, given the social and environmental character of experience. Finally, according
to these theories, a person’s internal response is centered or located in the domain of
moral values, regardless of how they are understood to be constructed, such that there is a
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sense of obligation as to how individuals think and feel they should act in any given
circumstance.279
Second, the internal response rooted in morals and values is understood as having
three basic dimensions—thinking, acting, and feeling.280 These dimensions, although
interrelated, have unique functions as related to a person’s internal response. Srampickal
gives a succinct summary as follows:
The cognitive dimension judges and evaluates one’s intentions, actions,
conflict situations, etc., in light of one’s values. The behavioral dimension
urges one to behave in accordance with these evaluations. The emotional
dimension mobilizes ‘aversive’ feelings—fear (anxiety), shame, and
guilt—and ‘pleasant’ feelings—satisfaction, joy, etc.—and motivates the
individual to restore (or maintain) the integrity of his values.281
Third, in terms of the development of conscience, there are a variety of ways to
interpret the learning process—cognitive learning, identification, and learning theories
(i.e., classical conditioning, instrumental learning, and observational learning). Further,
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the learning process, understood differently according to each given theory, incorporates
a variety of dimensions in the development of conscience. For example, the learning
process includes a person’s maturation, intellectual development, empathy potential, and
temperament as well as aspects of familial relationships (i.e., love and nurturance,
discipline and training, parental values and example) and extra-familial relationships (i.e.,
peer-groups, society at large).282
Not surprisingly after reviewing the array of data and conclusions related to and
emerging from these various theories in their investigation into the phenomena of
conscience, Srampickal states that one clear definition does not clearly emerge.
Nevertheless, given the empirical character of the psychology reviewed, Srampickal does
claim to be able to make an empirical description of conscience. As he states, “we may
describe conscience as patterns of moral-value-centered response which constitute a
rather consistent, stable, and identifiable dimension of the individual’s psychic
organization.”283 With this description, Srampickal begins his exploration of conscience
within the documents of the Second Vatican Council.
Conscience and the Second Vatican Council
Srampickal’s research regarding the concept of conscience in the documents of
the Second Vatican Council remains stable within Catholic moral theology and, as such,
is relevant to understanding primacy of conscience. Further, although this dissertation is
not employing the empirical psychologies that Srampickal did, his cross-disciplinary
research connecting empirical psychologies to the moral and ontological views of
282
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conscience in the documents of the Second Vatican Council reflect a certain theological
precedent and provide a type of grounding for the research at hand. In addressing the
documents of the Second Vatican Council related to conscience, Srampickal states the
intent and limits of his research as follows: “…our purpose is not to trace the historical
development of the doctrine of conscience contained in the documents, nor to elaborate
upon that doctrine, but to draw out the idea of conscience contained in them.”284 Toward
that end he identifies three goals. First, his research cites all the instances and documents
where the term conscientia is operative. Second, building upon those citations, he
analyzes the concept of conscience present in those texts. Third and finally, given the
term conscientia has diverse functions within the various documents, he presents a
critical synthesis of the concept of conscience after reviewing all the relevant texts.
The Latin term conscientia (as well as its various Latin cases) appears seventy
two times in the original Latin versions.285 These occurrences of the term conscientia
span six documents, several of which are major works of the Second Vatican Council, as
their very titles testify—“Decree on the Instruments of Social Communication (Inter
Mirifica)”; “Dogmatic Constitution on the Church; Pastoral Constitution on the Church in
the Modern World”; “Declaration on Religious Liberty; Declaration on Christian
Education (Gravissimum Educationis)”; and “Decree on the Training of Priests.” From
reviewing these texts, Srampickal’s broadest summary is that “this all goes to show that
the term conscientia as found in the council documents has different shades of meaning
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in different contexts.” 286 Nevertheless, his critical synthesis predominantly attempts to
“reconcile” and minimize the theological and textual differences rather than explore
them.
The overall result of Srampickal’s synthesis of the concept of conscience
consolidates into two dimensions—the ontologico-religious dimension and the moral
dimension.287 The ontologico-religious dimension is the transcendent location where the
human encounters God and, as such, is principally a theological, if not mystical, claim.
The moral dimension, however, is further differentiated by Srampickal as having both
fundamental moral and expressive moral dimensionality. According to Srampickal, the
fundamental moral dimension is defined as “…man’s basic moral orientation: the call to love
and do good, and to avoid evil.”288 Recall from Chapter 3 that the “…the first principles of
the natural law (i.e., do good and avoid evil, act according to right reason) is synderesis.” The
fundamental moral dimension, therefore, is an extension of the ontologico-religious dimension,
as it relates to the role of God manifesting the concept of the natural law within the person. His
research neither attempts to deny or affirm the theological claims inherent in the
ontologico-religious dimension or the fundamental moral dimension (synderesis), but rather
works largely from the position that this is a point where theology and psychology do not
readily intersect.289 Srampickal’s research differentiated these dimensions of conscience
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and limited his research almost exclusively to the expressive moral dimension. This
dissertation aligns with that delimitation.
The expressive moral dimension identified by Srampickal i.e., the judgment of
conscience by which some particular thing or action is judged good or evil) is the point where
Srampickal identifies the intersection of theology and psychology, even if without a
simple overlay. As developed in Chapter 3 and identified as focal in this research, the
judgment of conscience by which some particular thing or action is judged good or evil is
syneidesis. Srampickal’s work is predominantly located in the expressive moral dimension
of conscience or syneidesis, as it corresponds to and is illuminated by empirical
psychology. He concludes that the actualization of conscience “…is effected through the
expressive dimension: in thinking, acting, and feeling. Therefore, the various moral
responses like moral judgment, self control, altruistic behavior, guilt feelings, etc., (which
empirical psychology has investigated in detail) are not mere superficial responses.”290
Ultimately the development and formation of conscience “…develops with the human
personality; and hence its development is subject to the processes and vicissitudes of the
development of the individual.”291 In short, Srampickal’s research lays claim to the
contributions empirical psychologies—cognitive development, identification, and
learning theories—offer to the understanding of the development and formation of
conscience.292 This claim holds true for the contribution of SCT as well.
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In addition to the nuance of the moral and expressive dimensions in the formation
and development of conscience, Srampickal’s research also offers an important insight
into what is lacking in the Second Vatican Council’s documents. In his examination of
the concept of conscience, Srampickal’s research explicitly concludes that the theological
anthropology operative in the Second Vatican Council’s documents is deficient in its
understanding and articulation of the social character of the human person. In no
uncertain terms, Srampickal states:
…it should be remarked that the council texts—especially article 16 of
“Gaudium et Spes”—do not sufficiently emphasize the social nature and
social awareness of man in his basic experience of the fundamental law of
conscience. Man experiences not only the relationship and dependence on
God, but also his interrelationship and interdependence on his fellowmen,
and this latter experience is an essential substratum of man’s experience
and awareness of the fundamental law.293
Consistent with the language of his time, Srampickal speaks of this deficiency as related
to the social nature and awareness of a person. Although systemic theory was gaining a
foothold in a variety of ways at the time of his research, not the least of which was the
clinical practice of family therapy, Srampickal did not explicitly label this deficiency as
systemic. Nevertheless, clearly what he termed social by way of “interrelationship and
interdependence” is a profound dimension of what is currently understood as systemic.
In identifying that the Council’s documents “do not sufficiently emphasize the
social nature and social awareness of man,” Srampickal’s research further claims that this
is particularly evident and relevant in the arena of the formation and development of
conscience—the very area to which empirical psychology adds insight. To his point
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regarding the intersection and relevance of the social nature and awareness of a person as
conscience is formed and developed, he argues:
[In the formation and development of conscience] …one’s education,
social experience, cultural milieu, etc., as the council indicates, comes to
play their role. However, except for mentioning the importance of
conscience formation and for referring to certain factors related to this
formation, the council does not treat this aspect of the phenomena of
conscience.294
Ultimately, Srampickal concludes that empirical psychology substantially enhances the
understanding and articulation of the expressive moral dimension of conscience,
specifically in terms of its development and formation. Further, empirical psychology
also offers a preliminary resource for engaging the Second Vatican Council’s deficiency
regarding the social dimension of the formation and development of conscience.295
Although the empirical psychologies considered by Srampickal do, to a minor
degree, contribute to understanding the social dynamic within the development and
formation of conscience in the expressive moral dimension, nevertheless they still come
up against the inherent limits operative within the theories themselves. The dominant
psychologies that Srampickal drew upon for his research did not include a systemic
perspective and remained largely individualistic, even with accounting for the social
variables operative in the various theories. In short, Srampickal’s research and
conclusion point to the possibility that social psychology may provide a fuller
understanding of the social dynamic in the formation and development of conscience,
especially in terms of its expressive moral dimension. His work both foreshadows and
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points toward the value of exploring a systemic psychological perspective such as the one
SCT provides.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the pastoral theology method is this dissertation draws
upon a theological anthropology that seeks to integrate the sciences and their vital
contribution to the discussion and understanding of religion and theology. Srampickal’s
research contributes to the development of a more informed and sophisticated theological
anthropology vis-à-vis the empirical psychologies of his day, as they inform the question
of the phenomena and concept of conscience.296 Nevertheless, his contribution is
currently dated and did not sufficiently address the underdeveloped social dimension of
the human person in the Second Vatican Council documents. This supports the case for
exploring the possible contributions of SCT’s systemic perspective.
Before examining what SCT has to offer, one final point regarding Srampickal’s
research is worth noting. As Chapter 2 states, sometimes recovering and discovering a
dimension of theology that has been “lost” can be both illuminating and vital. This final
point regarding Srampickal’s research serves as an example as to one methodological
way relevant theological material in the tradition can be lost. A clear example in
Srampickal’s research of how important material may be lost in the theological analysis
is the choice to principally focus on one document, even though multiple texts and
applications of the term conscientia have been identified.
According to Srampickal’s review of the citations in these various documents,
only the “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” formally addresses
the concept of conscience in article 16. Therefore, as he states, “…our study consists in
296

Ibid., 371.
177

primarily analyzing article 16 of “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World.”297 Srampickal’s decision to focus his research primarily on article 16 by virtue
of assessing it as “formally” addressing the concept of conscience narrows the possibility
of benefiting from the wealth of diverse material in the whole body of texts. It should be
noted that article 16 is the example reviewed in Chapter 3 where Hogan’s method
intentionally explores the internal tension and ambiguity present within even one article.
It seems apparent that Srampickal’s critical synthesis and work, although identifying real
differences in the texts of the Second Vatican Council regarding the use and meaning of
the term conscientia, leans toward articulating a relatively unified expression of the
material. This direction of his synthesis results in limitations in the final outcome and
conclusion. It is worth noting that his analysis of empirical psychology did not lean as
readily toward “reconciling” the differences in the various psychological theories and
approaches examined.
Social Cognitive Theory Background and Overview
Over the course of a career spanning almost six decades, Bandura has been a
prolific writer both in terms of theory and research.298 In order to both understand SCT
and distinguish it from other more “traditional” social cognitive theories, a brief review
of the historical emergence of social learning theory is beneficial. Miller and Dollard’s
publication of Social Learning and Imitation in 1941 is generally acknowledged as a
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significant historical marker of the emergence of social learning theory. 299 Influenced
by, yet moving beyond the prevalent behaviorism of the era that was championed by
theorists like B. F. Skinner, Miller and Dollard introduced a theory of social learning and
imitation that shifted from the behaviorist notions of associationism in favor of drive
reduction principles.300 Behavior was still a major focus of their theory and work, yet it
was from the position that people model observed behaviors which are either reinforced
or extinguished through environmental reinforcement and that human behavior is
motivated by internal drives. In short, Miller and Dollard claimed that if humans were
motivated to learn a particular behavior, that particular behavior could be learned by clear
observations. Further, through imitation of an observed action an individual could
establish that behavior and be rewarded (i.e., positive reinforcement).
Social learning theories of this era that worked with and built upon Miller and
Dollard’s seminal work basically share three common tenets: 1) humans learn through
experience and observation (i.e., vicarious learning); 2) humans model behavior based on
identification (i.e., similarity and emotional attachment); and 3) consequences influence
whether or not an individual will repeat a behavior (i.e., reward vs. punishment
contingencies). It is from this context that Bandura’s SCT was to emerge. The
publication of Social Learning and Personality Development in 1963 marked his initial
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studies on the acquisition of self-evaluative standards for self-directedness and reflects
the beginning of his SCT trajectory.301
After slightly more than a decade, Bandura made a significant contribution to his
theory as he introduced the element of self-beliefs into social learning with his 1977
article “Self-efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavioral Change.”302 This
modification of a predominantly behavioral model by the inclusion of a cognitive
variable gave birth to what was to become SCT. Finally, in 1986 Bandura articulated and
established his SCT in depth and detail with the publication of Social Foundations of
Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory.303
Very broadly, SCT posited a perspective of human functioning that affords a
primary role to cognitive, vicarious, self-regulatory, and self-reflective processes in
human adaptation and change. The human person is understood as self-organizing,
proactive, self-reflecting and self-regulating rather than as a reactive organism formed
and led by environmental factors or driven by hidden inner impulses. In her book
Educational Psychology: Developing Learners, scholar Jeanne Ormrod outlines SCT’s
main principles as: 1) individuals learn through the observation of others; 2) learning is
an internal process that may or may not change behavior; 3) behavior is self-directed (as
opposed to the behaviorist perspective that behavior is determined by the environment);
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4) individuals behave in specific ways in order to achieve goals; and 5) reinforcement and
punishment have unpredictable and indirect effects on both behavior and learning.304 In
short, SCT presents human functioning as the result of a dynamic interplay of personal,
behavioral, and environmental influences. In doing so, it both explains how an individual
acquires and maintains certain behavioral patterns, while also providing the basis for
developing, implementing, and evaluating intervention strategies and programs.305
More specifically, the concept of reciprocal determinism serves as the central
theoretical construct within SCT that frames the human functioning resulting from the
interaction of personal, behavioral, and environmental factors.306 Individuals are both
influenced by and influencing the contexts within which they find themselves; that is,
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agency is determined by and determinate of the array of relationships that constitute
reality. As Pajares summarizes:
The foundation of Bandura’s conception of reciprocal determinism [is] the
view that (a) personal factors in the form of cognition, affect, and
biological events, (b) behavior, and (c) environmental influences create
interactions that result in a triadic reciprocality.307
It should be noted that the deterministic dimension of the theory relates to the process of
reciprocity between and among the various factors and is in no way suggestive of a
purely behavioral or material understanding of human functioning.308
SCT by its very structure incorporates an individual’s cognitions, behaviors, and
the social factors or environment, as well as the interplay among them. This dynamic
interplay of reciprocal determinism functions such that “…internal personal factors in the form
of cognitive, affective, and biological events, behavioral patterns, and environmental influences
all operate as interacting determinants that influence one another bidirectionally.”309 It is
neither entirely individualistic nor purely social in its frame of reference. In other words,
the individual may be one particular locus of the pastoral “data” that surfaces or bears
some unresolved or lost theological issue, yet interaction with an array of influences
necessarily makes the process inherently communal and contextual.
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, Bandura’s research with SCT gives a
social scientific grounding for a systemic view of agency as well as its dimensionality
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(i.e., self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion) through the
theoretical construct of reciprocal determinism. The body of SCT research by Bandura
and others is extensive and incorporates substantial empirical behavioral measures.310 A
significant portion of SCT research is located within the arena of education, learning, and
it relationship to a person’s aspirations and achievements in life. For example, a 2001
study with a sample of 272 individuals tested a structural model of the network of
sociocognitive influences that shape children's career aspirations and trajectories.311 In
addition to individual studies, a number of meta-analyses related to SCT are also
available.312
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Dualism within the Pastoral Situation
First and foremost, SCT facilitates an enhanced reflection upon, if not the
theoretical elimination of, a form of dualism when understanding the relationality of
agency (i.e., social group vs. individual). Agency is a critical element in considering and
understanding the relationship and/or balance between the social group (i.e., tradition and
authority) and the individual (i.e., primacy of conscience)—an agency that is
interdependent and at times in tension. SCT recognizes the complications and concerns
about dualism when understanding the agency of both the social group and the individual.
Theorizing about human agency and collectivities is replete with
contentious dualisms that Social Cognitive Theory rejects. These dualities
include personal agency versus social structure, self-centered agency
versus communality, and individualism versus collectivism….Therefore,
personal agency operates within a broad network of sociostructural
influences.313
As this conversation moves to specific considerations regarding agency (i.e., selfreflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion), it is vital to not let any
particular focus obscure the overall systemic perspective operative. The systemic
perspective of SCT remains the foundational backdrop regardless of any specific
dimension of agency being examined that may conjure an individualistic perspective (i.e.,
the term “self”).
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As SCT has developed over the years, the concept of human agency has become
increasingly nuanced, especially in understanding perceived self-efficacy. Bandura
“…distinguishes among three modes of agency: direct personal agency; proxy agency
that relies on others to act on one’s behest to secure desired outcomes; and collective
agency exercised through group action.”314 Although each of these modes sheds light on
the question of agency and potentially the understanding of primacy of conscience, the
focus of this research is within the arena of direct personal agency. Of course, given the
fundamental platform of SCT, direct personal agency is always social and systemic
inasmuch as it is situated within the social system and is both informed by and informing
of the social group.
Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will explore dimensions of agency
beneficial for interpreting the meaning and function of primacy of conscience from a
personalist Catholic viewpoint. It will focus upon specific dimensions and factors operative in
the exercise of agency itself (i.e., self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social
persuasion). Ultimately, this contribution from SCT helps interprets agency in a way that
supports and amplifies the personalist interpretation of primacy of conscience and its
prioritization of the personal autonomy and responsibility of individuals in moral matters while
taking seriously the communal agency of the tradition. As self-reflectiveness, perceived selfefficacy, and social persuasion are reviewed, each dimension will include a brief
connection to the broader question of primacy of conscience and agency which will be
addressed in depth in Chapter 5.
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Social Cognitive Theory and Self-reflectiveness
In his article “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective,” Bandura argues
that “the capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of one’s life is the
essence of humanness.”315 According to SCT, several core features mark the capacity of
human agency: intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness.316
Of these four core features, I will focus on self-reflectiveness. Self-reflectiveness is
particularly relevant for the discussion of agency and perceived self-efficacy and,
consequently, for the understanding of conscience as well. Individuals have the capacity
and proclivity to reflect upon their actions as well as any corresponding thoughts and
feelings those actions may engender.317 In the process of examining or reflecting upon
one’s own functioning within the social group, or of being self-conscious if you will,
individuals may explore a range of issues—mixed motivations, conflicting values,
diverse perspectives, and even the meaning attributed to this or that experience.
According to Bandura:
In this metacognitive activity, people judge the correctness of their
predictive and operative thinking against the outcomes of their actions, the

315

Bandura, “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective,” 1.

316

Ibid., 6-10.

317

As noted earlier, differing psychological perspectives yield different insights.
Although SCT illuminates this discussion of conscience in a variety of ways, clearly it
lacks when attempting to interpret the persistent elusiveness of the “unconscious.” The
scope of this project prevents integrating psychodynamic models, yet Eric D'Arcy’s The
Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (New York:
Scribner, 1996) specifically sheds light from a perspective that incorporates the
unconscious dimension of the human psyche. Also see, Don S. Browning and Terry D.
Cooper, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 2004).
186

effects that other people’s actions produce, what others believe,
deductions from established knowledge and what necessarily follows from
it.318
Self-reflection is a normative cognitive dynamic, one that Bandura believes to be
“distinctly human.”319 Some evidence would call into question the claim that selfreflection is distinctly human, inasmuch as dolphins, chimps, and elephants exhibit selfreflection, even if quantitatively different from that of humans.320 Nevertheless, few, if
any, would deny that normatively humans exercise this cognitive function. “Hence [selfreflection] is an important feature of SCT’s understanding of agency. Through selfreflection people make sense of their experiences, explore their own cognitions and selfbeliefs, engage in self evaluation, and alter their thinking and behavior accordingly.”321
Clearly there are any number of factors that could contribute to the quality, or
lack thereof, of a person’s self-reflection (e.g., intelligence, education, and time devoted
to the process) and how one makes sense of experience. Yet the principal purpose here is
simply to identify self-reflection as a dimension of agency that has implications for
primacy of conscience. More specifically, self-reflectiveness as a normative cognitive
process and an expression of agency illuminates how the term “primacy” within the
doctrine of primacy of conscience can be better understood. Self-reflection inherently
suggests an open quality to the process of a person engaging the world; that is, there are a
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variety of ways for an individual to make sense of experiences in order to direct one’s
thinking and behavior.
Therefore, by implication and application, the results of the self-reflective process
could contribute to whether or not a Catholic is inclined to exercise primacy of
conscience when making a moral decision. According to SCT’s framing of reciprocal
determinism, inevitably self-reflection is socially situated and influenced; hence, selfreflection is anything but an isolated or independent act. Consequently, Catholics making
moral decisions from an informed conscience engage in self-reflection that is necessarily
informed by the tradition of the Church. Self-reflection, not unlike primacy of
conscience, is a systemic act located within a particular person, inasmuch as dimensions
of the content and experience being reflected upon arose from the social context that
influenced the person.
The doctrine of primacy of conscience, as previously noted, carries with it the
expectation that a Catholic have an informed conscience. Historically in the pastoral
setting, more often than not, a Catholic having an informed conscience was considered
synonymous with the person knowing the normative teaching of the Church on whatever
might be the relevant topic involved in the moral decision-making process. Certainly an
informed conscience includes the teaching of the Church, but with the implications of
SCT it is clear that it involves much more. The process of a person arriving at an
informed conscience involves self-reflection (i.e., a metacognitive activity by which
people judge the correctness of their predictive and operative thinking against the
outcomes of their actions, the effects that other people’s actions produce, what others
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believe, deductions from established knowledge and what necessarily follows from it).322
Further, it is within the context of reciprocal determinism (i.e., internal personal factors in
the form of cognitive, affective, and biological events, behavioral patterns, and environmental
influences all operate as interacting determinants that influence one another bidirectionally)323
that self-reflection occurs. Hence, an informed conscience does not equate with a Catholic
simply knowing the Catechism, but is a complex social psychological dynamic process that
begins with self-reflection. This is not to suggest that Catholics are or should be conscious of
this complexity, but recognizing its presence is key to better understanding how, if not why, the
term “primacy” functions and is present within the doctrine.
Social Cognitive Theory and Perceived Self-Efficacy
Perceived self-efficacy is one of the most important dimensions of personal
agency arising from self-reflectiveness.
Among the mechanisms of personal agency, none is more central or
pervasive than people’s beliefs in their capacity to exercise some measure
of control over their own functioning and over environmental events.
Efficacy beliefs are the foundation of human agency.324
Whether or not individuals can have an impact or effect upon reality radically influences
their readiness or reluctance to engage a situation.325 A number of meta-analyses support
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the significant role self-efficacy beliefs play in human functioning.326 Bandura’s
definition of perceived self-efficacy states:
Perceived self-efficacy is defined as people’s beliefs about their
capabilities to produce levels of performance that exercise influence over
events that affect their lives. Self-efficacy beliefs determine how people
feel, think, motivate themselves and behave.327
Self-efficacy beliefs influence fundamental orientations in thinking such as being
pessimistic or optimistic as well as whether thinking or acting is inclined to be selfhindering or self-enhancing.328
Perceived self-efficacy broadly relates to a person’s sense of agency;
consequently, it relates to a sense of moral agency as well. Morality necessarily and
ultimately incorporates action or behavior—“avoid evil and do good.” Perceived selfefficacy beliefs influence a person’s behavior which, in turn, inevitably contributes to
how a person lives a moral life. Morality is not simply what one thinks, believes, or
feels, but also is what one does or how one acts in light of all that has informed that
behavior. Therefore, moral decision-making is an expression of agency that is influenced
by a person’s perceived self-efficacy.
It should be noted that even though self-efficacy beliefs can influence relatively
global claims such as a person being pessimistic or optimistic, specificity regarding
326
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perceived self-efficacy is vital. As Pajares summarizes Bandura’s precaution to
researchers seeking to predict academic outcomes from students’ self-efficacy beliefs, he
urges that readers would:
…be well advised to follow theoretical guidelines regarding specificity of
self-efficacy assessment and correspondence with criterial tasks. This
caution has often gone unheeded in educational research, resulting in selfefficacy assessments that reflect global or generalized self-perceptions of
competence and that bear slight resemblance to the criterial task with
which they are compared….The result is often confounded relationships
and ambiguous findings that obfuscate the potential contribution of selfefficacy beliefs to the understanding of academic performances.329
In addition to acknowledging the importance of not muddling or overextending
claims of perceived self-efficacy, it is also important to note that perceived self-efficacy
can apply in many directions. A person’s perception or assessment of agency within the
social group does not, in and of itself, have a trajectory related to traditions or positions
espoused by the social group. A person could have an accurate perception of selfefficacy that acknowledges a very limited ability to determine if a behavior is “good or
evil” in a certain instance. For example, a complicated and technical medical ethical
issue may exceed the understanding of a person who is very conscious of how that
complexity may limit the ability to assess the moral issues in play. Yet at the same time,
that person could have an accurate perception of self-efficacy that acknowledges a very
strong personal capacity to follow or conform to teachings from an authoritative body
that is perceived as capable of such determinations. In short, perceived self-efficacy is
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about a person’s perception of personal agency and is neither over and against the social
group nor oriented in any specific direction in terms of content.
As this relates to the Catholic context, the focused, yet open quality of the
personalist perspective can support individuals in their belief that they can make a
difference and may foster a readiness to engage a situation. Inasmuch as the personalist
perspective ultimately places responsibility on the person for moral decision-making, this
inherent assumption supports the possibility of self-efficacy. Primacy of conscience is an
exceptional and particularly powerful expression of the degree to which self-efficacy may
be operative for an individual within the Church.
The social group, in this instance the Church, is one major factor that can either
foster or frustrate the development of self-efficacy beliefs. Bandura has identified four
main sources of influence in the development of people’s beliefs in their efficacy,
including “…mastery experiences, seeing people similar to oneself manage task demands
successfully, social persuasion that one has the capabilities to succeed in given activities,
and inferences from somatic and emotional states indicative of personal strengths and
vulnerabilities.”330 Although all four sources are relevant to the development of
perceived self-efficacy, given the discussion at hand regarding primacy of conscience, I
will focus on the influence of social persuasion as it may relate to perceived self-efficacy.
Social Cognitive Theory and Social Persuasion
Social persuasion can have a significant influence on a person’s perceived selfefficacy. The principal point regarding social persuasion for this dissertation, similar to
that of self-efficacy, is to identify social persuasion as a relevant factor in understanding
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agency and, therefore, primacy of conscience. According to SCT, social persuasion is
expressed by the social group in a variety of ways that can both positively and negatively
influence a person’s sense of perceived self-efficacy. On the positive side of the ledger,
“social persuasion is a…way of strengthening people’s beliefs that they have what it
takes to succeed.”331 Bandura’s research claims that social persuasion influences
perceived self-efficacy and can contribute to the following positive effect.
People who are persuaded verbally that they possess the capabilities to
master given activities are likely to mobilize greater effort and sustain it
than if they harbor self-doubts and dwell on personal deficiencies when
problems arise. To the extent that persuasive boosts in perceived selfefficacy lead people to try hard enough to succeed, they promote the
development of skills and a sense of personal agency.332
On the other hand, social persuasion can undermine perceived self-efficacy much more
readily than it can enhance it.333 Internalized negative social persuasion regarding
perceived self-efficacy can result in avoidance of possibilities for fear of failure or lack of
perseverance in the presence of complications. In short:
…people who have been persuaded that they lack capabilities tend to
avoid challenging activities that cultivate potentialities and give up
quickly in the face of difficulties. By constricting activities and
undermining motivation, disbelief in one’s capabilities creates its own
behavioral validation.334
It is important to make the distinction that internalized negative social persuasion
that compromises perceived self-efficacy is not the same as negative social persuasion
that functions morally as a prohibitive social norm. The former is about the negative
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impact of social persuasion upon a person’s belief in the capacity to accomplish a task
(e.g., everyone says a three minute mile is impossible, so I must not be able to achieve it),
while the latter is about social persuasion that contributes to enforcing social norms by
way of prohibition (e.g., an employer cannot exclude a candidate on the basis of race
because it runs counter to our social value of all persons being created equal). In this
dissertation, when discussing negative internalized social persuasion, the focus is
exclusively related to the negative impact of the social persuasion upon a person’s
perceived self-efficacy and is not about the impact of specific social moral values or
content.
Social persuasion can enhance people’s belief in their capacity to succeed or, in
this pastoral context, competently make moral choices. Even if it is cliché within the
United States, the proverbial “you can grow up to be whatever you want to be, even
President,” captures the sentiment of a positive social influence that is open to and
supportive of an individual’s achievement. The research of Holden, Moncher, Schinke,
and Barker led them to conclude that “…to the extent that persuasive boosts in perceived
self-efficacy lead people to try hard enough to succeed, they promote development of
skills and a sense of personal efficacy.”335
Social persuasion is expressed in many forms, but given the pastoral issue being
addressed, I will limit it to the context of the message communicated regarding a person’s
ability and competency to make moral choices in relationship to the Catholic tradition.
Not unlike the complexity of perceived self-efficacy, it is important to acknowledge that
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social persuasion can apply in a multitude of ways as well. It is vital to not simplify the
concept of social persuasion or the experience of Catholics making moral decisions by
readily and simplistically applying a negative or positive label. Pastoral experience
suggests that many Catholics have, to some degree, lost a sense of not only how, but also
even if, they can manage their own religious and moral questions. Nevertheless, it would
be presumptuous and beyond the scope of this research to claim clarity as to what has or
has not functioned as positive and negative social persuasion in this situation.
Social Persuasion and Moral Norms
Even though primacy of conscience supports a sense of perceived self-efficacy,
the social assessment and determination of what is considered right or wrong for society
remains principally within the social group. Neither primacy of conscience nor perceived
self-efficacy is a veiled expression of moral individualism, nor the rejection of the
legitimacy and necessity of socially based moral values and norms. The inherently
holistic quality of a systemic perspective does not dilute, let alone dissolve, moral values
and norms for the social group. SCT reframes and enhances an understanding of the
interactional or self-society dynamic of experience and reality in an attempt to lessen
limitations and complications operative within a dualistic perspective. Nevertheless,
moral values and norms (e.g., “avoid evil and do good”), however structured and
interpreted, remain in force within a systemic perspective such as SCT.
Summary
Overcoming, or at least diminishing, the type of dualism addressed in this dissertation
within the relationship between the individual and a social group is a vital contribution to
constructive and productive relationality, whatever the context. This contribution is present in
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the SCT systemic perspective and its interpretation of agency where “…people are producers
as well as products of social systems. Personal agency and social structure operate
interdependently.”336 With this systemic perspective as the theoretical construct from which
the relationship between the individual and the social group is understood, primacy of
conscience neither ignores nor displaces normative Church teaching, just as normative teaching
neither ignores nor displaces it. This systemic perspective resonates and aligns readily and
profoundly with the personalist perspective. Authoritative moral agency arises within the
context of social and personal interactions and is expressed in the primacy of conscience of the
acting moral agent. Primacy of conscience becomes the moral voice of the individual
expressing agency emerging through self-reflection and expressed on behalf of the Church
community.
In addition to the value of understanding the concept of agency systemically, SCT
examines and articulates specific dimensions and factors operative in the exercise of agency
(i.e., self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion). Self-reflection is a
basic and inherent cognitive process for a person that is part and parcel of the process by which
a person develops an informed conscience. From a Catholic perspective, self-reflection
amplifies an understanding of primacy of conscience through normative cognitive and
behavioral dynamics. By more fully understanding the complexity of an informed conscience,
the term “primacy” takes on clearer and deeper meaning within the doctrine. Further, this selfreflection relates to the development of self-efficacy beliefs that inevitably affect what a person
may or may not achieve in one’s life and for the Church. Finally, social persuasion also has a
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profound role in the process, as it comes full circle and lays a foundation that supports and
affects a person’s self-reflection and perceived self-efficacy.
SCT explores and expands unarticulated and/or underdeveloped assumptions
about accountability in relation to acts of conscience. Self-reflection is inclined to
surface these assumptions both for the individual and the social group. Similarly,
Bandura’s view of perceived self-efficacy and social persuasion illuminate unarticulated
and/or underdeveloped assumptions in the doctrine of conscience regarding a person’s
capacity to act morally and the inevitable interactions with social influences. Given the
insights of SCT, the doctrine of primacy of conscience may be amplified by
understanding it as a systemic process by which the individual and social group construct
one another through the exercise of agency which is inclusive of the dynamics of selfreflection, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion.
The personalist perspective on conscience is consistent with and supported by this
more comprehensive understanding of the meaning and function of primacy with respect
to the exercise of conscience. Further, I contend that the personalist position is enhanced
by the identification of agency as a central systemic construct inherent within the concept
of primacy and can be a vital resource for supporting Catholics in making moral decisions that
are informed but not controlled by the established tradition of the Church. The final chapter
of this research will begin to articulate how both the Church and the Catholics that
comprise it might benefit from a pastoral theological articulation of the doctrine of
primacy of conscience from a personalist perspective, when primacy is amplified with the
implications drawn a social cognitive view of agency.
.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A PASTORAL THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF PRIMANCY OF
CONSCIENCE
Above the Pope as an expression of the binding claim of Church authority stands one’s
own conscience, which has to be obeyed first of all, if need be, against the demands of
Church authority.337
Primacy of Conscience: Distillation for Dissemination
As this chapter engages the final phase of this dissertation’s constructive pastoral
theological appropriation and interpretation of the personalist view of primacy of conscience in
the Catholic tradition, it will naturally draw upon the breadth and depth of research present in
the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, given the pragmatic quality of pastoral theology as it
informs and is informed by pastoral care and ministry, this chapter will shift the expression and
style of writing that has been present up to this point in order to strive toward maximizing the
accessibility of its content. The academic quality and character will not be compromised, but
references in footnotes will be kept to a minimum and the anecdotal aspect of the content will
be heightened. Therefore, it will not make further explicit reference to the detail previously
developed unless required by quotation. It presumes the foundation of research operative
throughout this dissertation, yet will turn toward a more conversational tone that is consistent
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with actual pastoral care encounters. This shift will be especially evident in the section that
presents a hypothetical pastoral conversation for the purpose of illustration.
I am convinced of and committed to the value of this research for the local Catholic
community I pastor, the Ecumenical Catholic Communion of which our community is
affiliated, and the array of Catholics of whatever stripe that might benefit from this pastoral
theology of primacy of conscience. I recognize and prioritize my primary responsibility of
having this chapter bear a caliber of academic pastoral theology consistent with the preceding
chapters. At the same time, as a pastoral theologian I can state that our discipline is not only
oriented toward advances in pastoral theology alone, pastoral theology also intends to inform
and enhance pastoral care and ministry as it strives for the well being of individuals,
communities, and society.
The relational and pragmatic character of the discipline of pastoral theology
presses for a medium of expression that is as inclusive as possible in order to maximize
its potential benefits. In a sense, if a “run of the mill” Catholic on the street or in the pew
cannot make general sense of what is being claimed in this chapter as the implications
and conclusions of this research, then the mark has been somewhat missed. In order to
moor this conversation in a manner that strives toward being both accessible and
applicable to as many Catholics as possible, the overall contribution of this chapter will
be clearly divided into three general sections—synthesis, illustration, and future research.
The first section will present a synthesis of the research in the preceding chapters
and its constructive pastoral theological appropriation and interpretation of the personalist view
of primacy of conscience, when primacy is amplified with the implications drawn from a
Social Cognitive Theory’s view of agency. Consequently, the section will still lean toward
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the genre of writing (i.e., theoretical) that has been operative in this dissertation thus far.
The synthesis section will begin with a brief a summary of the personalist view of primacy
of conscience, but the major contribution of the section, if not the dissertation, consists of an
enhanced articulation of primacy of conscience. The second section will explore potential
expressions of this pastoral theology of primacy of conscience ameliorating and/or
resolving dimensions of the pastoral problem identified throughout the dissertation. This
exploration will be illuminated vis-à-vis an example of a hypothetical conversation in
pastoral practice. The genre of writing will substantially shift in this section toward one
that is more conversational in tone and much less abstract. The illustration section will
reflect how the contribution of this research might manifest itself through what a
potential conversation regarding primacy of conscience that incorporates a pastoral
theological construction of agency might sound like. Finally, the third section will give a
summary of possible directions for further research.
Synthesis and Primary Conclusions
A Personalist View of Primacy of Conscience
This synthesis will principally engage and amplify the personalist view of primacy of
conscience in the Catholic tradition and will not explicitly examine the legalistic perspective.
A brief summary of the personalist view of primacy of conscience will be helpful before
examining how the insights of SCT regarding agency contribute to a fuller interpretation
of the term “primacy” within the doctrine. The personalist perspective, just like the
legalistic, emerged from the Second Vatican Council’s call for a renewal of moral
theology. Consequently, both share a common historical and theoretical background with
differences emerging in limited arenas. As documented in this research, the Church, dating
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back to Aquinas, understands conscience to be the application of the first principles of natural
law (i.e., synderesis) to the particularities of one’s conduct (i.e., syneidesis). Within the tension
between the particularity of syneidesis and the generality of synderesis, Aquinas located the
role of the primacy of conscience. In short, the doctrine of primacy of conscience, even if not
fully developed or articulated, has always raised and addressed the question of agency or moral
authority and the term “primacy” has been pivotal in engaging that question.
The personalist perspective engages this tension by identifying and prioritizing the role
of personal autonomy for socially situated and informed individuals in the exercise of primacy
of conscience. In an attempt to examine and potentially bolster the personalist perspective, the
focus of this research regarding primacy of conscience has been within the arena of the
particularities of individual conduct (i.e., syneidesis). Consequently, human cognition and
behavior have understandably come to the fore as avenues for potential insight. Psychology, in
turn, naturally presents itself as a prime candidate for consideration as a relevant resource.
Further, social psychology stands as particularly well suited to illuminate understanding how an
individual functions within a social system such as the Church.
Although not intentionally attempting to address a personalist perspective of
conscience, Srampickal’s research on conscience waded into waters that flow well with the
personalist perspective. Through a comparative analysis of empirical psychologies with the
documents of the Second Vatican Council regarding conscience, Srampickal further nuanced
the arena of what has historically been understood as addressing the particularities of one’s
conduct. His fuller articulation includes an understanding of the expressive moral dimension of
conscience. Further, and more importantly, his research identified the expressive moral
dimension of conscience as a unique domain for the formation and development of conscience.
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The dynamics of the formation and development of conscience resonate with the insights
offered by psychology and are themselves manifestations of agency within the person and
Church.
A number of insights from psychology tend to support a personalist view of
primacy of conscience which espouses that a dimension of moral value and authority
emerges from a socially situated individual pursuing the good for the person and society.
Psychologically, moral values are not understood as absolutely determined by a static
view of either the person or society, but rather moral values emerge and develop through
a variety of individual and social processes across history and context. Broadly
understood, the personalist view of primacy of conscience recognizes this complexity and
identifies four dimensions that factor into understanding and applying moral values in
one’s life within the Church and world. Hogan summarizes the four dimensions as
follows:
These include (1) a greater recognition of the role of history and change in
ethics; (2) a focus on the moral significance of intentions and
circumstances in addition to the act itself; (3) a greater degree of
sophistication in categorizing the different kinds of moral norms and the
kinds of claims they make; and (4) a rethinking of the relationship
between the individual and Magisterium on the basis of relocating moral
authority.338
Although this research has touched upon all four dimensions in varying degrees, the
principal and explicit focus has been and remains the fourth point of “relocating moral
authority,” that is, reframing the understanding of the relationality of agency through
primacy of conscience.
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Primacy of Conscience: Reframing the Relationship of Agency
Within the demographic identified for this research (i.e., post-Vatican II
Catholicism in the U. S.), if not for the current population of the United States at large,
the moral charge to “follow your conscience” seems ubiquitous. Yet the broad presence
of a concept does not necessarily correlate to the depth of its understanding. This moral
charge provides an extremely basic framework for conscience and the broad strokes of
the Catechism of the Church, as important as they are for Catholics, are not sufficient for
fully understanding conscience, let alone exceptional circumstances when an individual’s
choice is prioritized for the person over the normative teaching of the Church (i.e.,
primacy of conscience). An enhanced understanding of the meaning and function of
primacy and its inherent agency provides a fuller and better basis for interpreting and
appropriating the personalist understanding of conscience for guiding contemporary U.S.
Catholics and their spiritual guides in making moral decisions that are informed but not
controlled by the established tradition of the Church.
The integration of a systemic perspective moves toward improving the pastoral
problem regarding understanding the exercise of primacy of conscience as an expression of
agency. When the relationality of agency or power is predominantly framed dualistically,
underlying dynamics of dominance and submission may be engendered and can become
problematic. In contrast, when the relationality of agency or power is principally framed
systemically, whether one considers it bi-directional, multidirectional, or reciprocal, underlying
dynamics of mutuality and interdependence are fostered, and the pastoral relationship may be
less vulnerable to complications that may be conjured from a dualistic perspective.
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As stated in Chapter 2, an adequate theological anthropology is vital for a viable
pastoral theology that informs and is informed by pastoral care and ministry. The
theoretical advance operative in a systemic perspective readily translates into an enhanced
theological anthropology. Recall that the theological problem that is at the heart of this
dissertation, arising from pastoral practice, is how to theologically address two strands in the
Church’s tradition regarding being a moral Catholic. This dissertation’s examination of the
theological question at the base of that problem, explored through the doctrine of primacy of
conscience, identifies agency as a key and critical component for better understanding the
meaning and function of the term “primacy.” Theologically reflecting upon the pastoral
experience as a context for the critical development of a theological understanding of the
Catholic tradition of primacy of conscience, both through its recovery and enhancement,
points to an understanding of agency as vital—agency which inescapably has
implications for one’s theological anthropology.
A theological anthropology integrating SCT presents the agency of a socially situated
person in a way that supports and amplifies the personalist interpretation of primacy of
conscience and its prioritization of the personal autonomy and responsibility of individuals
engaging moral issues while also integrating the communal agency of the tradition. The term
“primacy” reflects a systemic perspective of both strands of the Church’s tradition as expressed
by an individual’s moral decision-making. Theologically, a systemic perspective of agency
acknowledges that individuals are both influential of and influenced by the tradition, just as
they are both producers and products of the Church’s teaching. Conversely, the same
interactive creative dynamic applies to the Church as well. In short, a systemic view of agency
incorporates the relationality and interaction of both the influence of Church teaching and
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the influence of a person’s conscience in moral and religious decision-making, as they
co-create one another.
When the fundamental question is framed as to whether moral authority is
ultimately located with the individual or with Church teaching, the assumption is that the
answer is either one or the other. A systemic theological anthropology alters the question
by exploring the array of interwoven and interdependent relationships that collectively
contribute to any final outcome or moral decision. Consequently, the entirety of moral
authority ultimately resides within the overall system and cannot be located exclusively
and ultimately with either the individual or the Church’s teaching. Morality and moral
decisions are a collaborative social venture and product emerging from the Church
through the individual with all parties bearing unique dimensions of responsibility for its
development and realization regarding any given moral issue. In short, the exercise of
primacy of conscience is a manifestation of a systemic theological anthropology that
recognizes and supports an underlying understanding of agency that necessarily
incorporates all parties as both initiators and receivers.
Although a systemic theological anthropology and its framing of agency are
couched in relatively contemporary terms, it is actually far from a foreign concept within
Catholicism. The long standing theological concept of the priesthood of all believers
readily resonates with a systemic theological anthropology and an interactive
understanding of agency. Without going into the history or nuance of the concept of the
priesthood of all believers, especially in terms of the differences between Catholicism
and Protestantism during the Reformation, the Council of Trent and beyond, it has been
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and remains a foundational theological construct rooted in baptism for Christians of all
stripes.
The Second Vatican Council states in the “Dogmatic Constitution of the Church”
that “…the common priesthood of the faithful and the ministerial or hierarchical
priesthood are none the less ordered one to another, each in its own proper way shares in
the one priesthood of Christ.”339 As for most Christians, the sacrament of Baptism is the
foundational initiation rite for Catholics and constitutes entrance into the priesthood of
Christ. For Catholics and many other Christians, it is also the first of the three
sacraments of initiation and is followed by Eucharist and Confirmation. All Catholics
during their baptisms are anointed with sacred chrism as priests, prophets, and leaders.340
Each of these baptismal roles is a manifestation of agency afforded to the Church’s entire
membership by virtue of baptism, even if ordained ministers have unique expressions and
responsibilities regarding those roles.
Certainly the theological construct of the priesthood of all believers is tangential
to the principal doctrine of primacy of conscience that is being examined in this
dissertation. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the doctrine of the priesthood of all
believers, as it is a foundational religious tenet that is also compatible with, the
application of a systemic theological anthropology and corresponding understanding of
agency. In a very broad sense, it is important that what is being claimed here for the
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The normative ritual celebration of Baptism includes this anointing, though in
emergencies or for other pastoral reasons this portion of the sacrament may be omitted.
In that sense, every baptized Catholic has not literally received this anointing;
nevertheless, the intent and understanding is extended to all Catholics.
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doctrine of primacy of conscience also work with other important theological doctrines,
such as the priesthood of all believers being co-creating agents with God. A similar
example of theological compatibility in the arena of systemic agency could be made with
the vital Pauline metaphor of the body of Christ (e.g., Romans 12; 1 Corinthians 12). Not
that compatibility is a theological litmus test, but it bodes well if enhancing one
theological construct also could potentially contribute to other theological constructs.
Fundamental Pastoral Shifts
Moored in a systemic theological anthropology, this pastoral theological
interpretation of primacy of conscience accomplishes three fundamental practical pastoral
shifts. Two of the shifts can be noted as focus is placed upon an individual (i.e., the pastoral
care receiver or the pastoral care provider) and the third shift relates to the relational dynamic
between individuals and the Church as a whole. One shift is for the pastoral care seeker
experiencing dissonance with a certain Church teaching. This shift highlights the possibility of
differing from the Church through an understanding of primacy of conscience without that
difference necessarily being considered synonymous with disloyalty, infidelity, or even sin,
either by the hierarchy or by other Catholics. Concretely, this implies that the Church can
affirm and support occasions when a Catholic differs from Church teaching on a specific
topic and invokes primacy of conscience. This affirmation and support addresses the
core pastoral issue at hand (i.e., agency), as it reinforces the possibility that Catholics are
adequate and competent to responsibly make a moral decision that differs from the
Church teaching without necessarily incurring a compromised status within the Church.
The implications of this change should not be underestimated.
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To permit differing from Church teaching by individual Catholics as an
embodiment of agency and an exercise of primacy of conscience, even if not normative,
radically alters the moral decision-making landscape and removes in principal the
possibility of any commensurate negative social persuasion and judgment by the Church
hierarchy or its membership. Indeed, understanding primacy of conscience in this way
may function as positive social persuasion that does not negate the value of normative
teaching, but rather offers the possibility of the normative teaching developing in light of
the difference that is expressed.
In addition to primacy of conscience affording the possibility of differing from
normative teaching without necessarily compromising a member’s status or calling into
question one’s competency, this shift may also mitigate any misperception that there are
no real options for a person experiencing dissonance with a certain Church teaching. Granted
there are limited options as to what is considered the normative teaching of the Church, but
primacy of conscience clearly states that there are real options as to how a person relates to that
teaching. The possible elimination of the perception that obligatory foregone conclusions exist
alters the pastoral conversation and care from its very outset.
The second shift relates to the pastoral care giver or the person ministering to the
Catholic who experiences differences from Church teaching: it may ameliorate the potentially
complicated situation for the priest or pastoral care provider as representatives of the Church.
At times the pastoral problem may manifest itself within the pastoral relationship itself.
The pastoral care provider, often the priest, may be implicitly or explicitly positioned as
“the judge” or the one who knows the answers and, consequently, will adjudicate the
moral question at hand (e.g., the manualist tradition). The other side of this coin is that
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the pastoral care seeker presenting the moral question may be implicitly or explicitly
positioned as the one who is ignorant and/or incapable of making the moral decision in
question. Basically, the starting place of the pastoral engagement may be vulnerable to or
fraught with a conscious and/or unconscious polarization that may reflect a relationship
of dominance and submission or, in other words, a distorted relationship of agency that
may compromise the quality of the pastoral care offered and received.
Rather than the pastoral situation being cast from the beginning as an “either—or”
proposition (i.e., the Catholic is either following Church teaching or is not, or that primacy of
conscience does not require serious engagement with Church teaching) that is assessed by the
pastoral care provider, engaging differences with Church teaching can become a “both—and”
proposition reflected upon in a collaborative pastoral conversation (i.e., the Catholic is both
differing from a specific Church teaching and adhering to the Church teaching of primacy of
conscience). The priest or pastoral care provider is thereby relieved of feeling caught in
irreconcilable contradictions when caring for the person and representing both the ministry and
governance of the Church. Rather than the minister being potentially positioned from the
outset of the pastoral conversation in a role of determining approval or disapproval, the
ambiguity within the tradition can be jointly engaged through an enhanced understanding of
primacy of conscience and agency that is supported by the Church. This can be a concrete
manifestation of the Second Vatican Council’s identification of the limits and roles of the
pastoral relationship.
Let the laity realize that their pastors will not always be so expert as to
have a ready answer to every problem, even every grave problem, that
arises; this is not the role of the clergy: it is rather the task of lay people to

209

shoulder their responsibilities under the guidance of Christian wisdom and
with careful attention to the teaching authority of the Church.341
The third shift can be understood by focusing not principally on the pastoral care seeker
or the pastoral care provider, but rather on the relationship between the two as they stand within
the tradition of the Church. As both parties responsibly engage the teaching of the Church in
order to discern from an informed conscience, two relational dynamics are operative. In broad
terms, we can speak of these two relational dynamics as teaching and learning. Both teaching
and learning are expressions of agency, with the former being initiating and the latter being
receiving. More often than not and for very good reason, given the breadth of its resources,
Church tradition is predominantly positioned in the role of teacher, while the individual is
positioned in the role of learner. This is a relatively normative structure when one looks at an
individual in relationship to the social group and the socialization process. Nevertheless,
clearly the cumulative teaching expressed by the social group (e.g. the Church) that is passed
on as tradition has been learned over the course of time and is the by-product of many
individuals’ insights and contributions. Even if somewhat veiled or given a low profile, the
Church is as much about learning as it is about teaching. There is little question here as to what
is the cart and what is the horse—one who teaches must have first learned.
Granted Copernicus and Galileo did not, at the time, receive the support of the Church
that their insights actually deserved; however, the Church did eventually learn from what they
had to offer. Countless examples could be given of how the Church has been and is a learner,
regardless of how well or poorly the learning process itself might be. Further, it is this very
learning that serves as the basis for the Church to function as a teacher. For the Church, a
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unique dimension of the learning process is considered to be by way of divine revelation, yet it
is by no means the only source of the Church’s learning venture. Whether or not one believes
in the theological concept of divine revelation or, if so, how it is to be understood, there is
ample learning that occurs within the Church that is not complicated by such a mysterious
concept.
The exercise of primacy of conscience may function as exceptional moments when
individual Catholics shift from what is generally the normative role as learners vis-à-vis Church
tradition, to functioning as potential teachers for the Church. Primacy of conscience does not
necessarily function as teaching, but it may and certainly has in the past. In such an instance,
the Church may be in the position to consider, if not learn, new possibilities. To recognize
through the doctrine of primacy of conscience that both Catholics individually and the Church
collectively are able to occupy either the role of teacher or learner may significantly transform
the pastoral relationship. Given the ambiguity within the tradition itself, a relational agency
where all parties may either be initiating as teachers or receiving as learners regarding any
given moral issue seems appropriate, if not necessary. Primacy of conscience reflects this type
of relational agency.
Even if obvious, it is important to explicitly note that the teaching and learning function
is by no means limited to the occasional and potential moments of the exercise of primacy of
conscience. In fact, given the exceptional quality of primacy of conscience, it is
understandably not the normative location of the teaching and learning functions within the
Church. Catholic theologians, be they lay or cleric, have long served in both of those capacities
as they have fulfilled their theological vocation. Yet even those bearing the title and function of
theologian have struggled with the balance and integration of the complementary dynamics of
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teaching and learning as related to the tradition of the Church. The Second Vatican Council
addressed this issue as it shifted the Church’s understanding regarding the tradition in order to
better appreciate and recover a balanced integration between the functions of teaching and
learning.
McCormick provides a clear summary of this shift beginning with three characteristics
of the mindset prior to the Second Vatican Council.
Church teaching has had “… (1) an undue distinction between the teaching and
learning function in the Church, with a consequent emphasis on the right to
teach—and relatively little on the duty to learn and the sources of learning in
the Church; (2) an undue identification of the teaching function with a single
group in the Church, the hierarchy; (3) an undue isolation of a single aspect of
teaching, the judgmental, the decisive, the ‘final word’.”342
From this position, following the Second Vatican Council, the Church has subsequently
developed a more balanced and integrated notion of the teaching function within the Church.
Three characteristics clearly reflect the identified shift.
From the perspective following the Second Vatican Council regarding Church
teaching, “…(1) the learning process is seen as essential to the teaching
process; (2) teaching is a multidimensional function, of which the judgmental
or decisive is only one aspect; (3) the teaching function involves the charisms
of many persons.”343
The Church tradition is comprised of both learning and teaching with theologians
performing these functions normatively and according to their unique charisms. Nevertheless,
primacy of conscience is a unique example as to how any Catholic may, in fact, function as a
teacher within the Church, even if it is not realized until well after the person’s life on earth has
ended (e.g., Copernicus and Galileo). Given not all of us are Copernicus or Galileo, of course
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the individual’s conscience, as it is informed by Church teaching, may be changed as well. In
short, teaching and learning (i.e., initiating and receptive agency) always comprise a two-way
street that is mutual and interactive.
Specific Social Cognitive Theory Amplification of Agency
SCT helps nuance an understanding of the term “primacy” within the doctrine as one
examines the dimensionality of agency. The systemic framing of agency by SCT examines
cognition, behavior, the environment, and their reciprocal interaction. From these
interactions, cognitive and behavioral dimensions of agency (i.e., self-reflectiveness,
perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion) potentially engage and amplify unexplored
dimensions of the function of primacy of conscience. An SCT understanding of agency
incorporates the mechanisms of self-reflection, perceived self-efficacy, and social
persuasion as potential human factors within the formation and development of
conscience. Hence, primacy of conscience can be amplified to be inclusive of, but not
exhausted by, a systemic understanding of agency that articulates these interrelated
dynamics operative for the individual and the social group.
From a SCT systemic perspective, primacy of conscience is an expression of agency on
behalf of the individual and the Church that includes the normative cognitive, behavioral, and
relational dimensions of self-reflection, self-efficacy, and social persuasion. Fundamentally
conscience is one’s personal and subjective discernment of good and evil in the context
of a relationship with God and creation that is influenced by, influential of, and located
within the Church. Although certainly personal and subjective, conscience is also
inherently and necessarily a relational dynamic in its formation and development as well
as its exercise. As such, conscience is a social dynamic that incorporates and relates to
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the array of domains that contribute to one’s experience of reality, not the least of which
is the Church’s teaching and the corresponding faith community. Conscience is
ultimately an individual expression of socially situated agency, as an individual attempts
to accomplish good and avoid evil in the context of any and all relationships.
In very simple terms, the exercise of primacy of conscience is a manifestation of
agency within a social system (i.e., the Church) which, from the perspective of SCT,
would incorporate self-reflection, self-efficacy, and social persuasion inasmuch as these are
normative human functions. Although it would take a researcher like Bandura to measure how
these three specific dimensions of agency might be operative within the exercise of primacy of
conscience, the implications of SCT suggest that primacy of conscience, as an expression of
agency, would manifest the dimensionality of self-reflection, self-efficacy, and social
persuasion. Therefore, each dimension will be briefly reviewed in order to explore the
implications SCT has for the exercise of primacy of conscience and to amplify its
understanding.
Self-reflection
Self-reflection is a dimension of agency that resonates profoundly with primacy of
conscience. As Bandura states, “people are not only agents of action but self-examiners of their
own functioning. The metacognitive capability to reflect upon oneself and the adequacy of
one’s thoughts and actions is another distinctly core human feature of agency.”344 This selfexamination ranges from judging one’s predictive thinking with the actual outcomes to the
effects that other people’s actions produce, what they believe, and established bodies of
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knowledge.345 Even at surface the very existence of self-reflection supports one dimension of a
personalist perspective of primacy of conscience. Self-reflection does not simply imply, but
rather obliges and demands, that reflection or consideration be incorporated into the act of
judgment as a dimension of agency. It claims that within the normative cognitive and
behavioral process, human agency has a reflective and constructive character.
An understanding of primacy of conscience which incorporates a self reflective quality
cannot simply be a process of informing and conforming to a set of pre-determined answers
without any alternative possibility. Self-reflection is anything but the self being programmed
according to prescribed dictates, although it presumes and requires a context with content from
which to reflect. Although certain responses may be anticipated, even preferred and expected
by the Church, regarding any number of moral questions, a variety of potential outcomes is the
sine qua non of authentic self-reflection and an understanding of the function of primacy. The
qualifying term “primacy” presumes something akin to the process of self-reflection. As
primacy of conscience includes self-reflection, a personal and autonomous quality must be
operative otherwise it would not authentically be self-reflection.
Nevertheless, self-reflectiveness is not principally about the presence of options
when it comes to decision-making. Rather it is from and with the existence of options
that the complex process of self-reflection emerges as a dimension of agency for
individuals in their unique and diverse contexts. Further, understanding this complex
process of self-reflection enhances an appreciation for how the term “primacy” operates
in relationship to the exercise of conscience, especially as Catholics’ consciences are
informed.
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A potential concern that may arise in the face of considering a term like selfreflectiveness within the exercise of primacy of conscience is that it conjures individualism or
extreme subjectivity that is unfettered by the tradition and the Church. In fact, by exploring
self-reflection with some specificity, that is anything but the case. Self-reflection is a
profoundly social construct, as it judges anything from the correctness of one’s thinking against
the outcomes of one’s behavior, to the effects of the other’s behaviors, beliefs, and established
knowledge upon one’s self. Self-reflection identifies a cognitive dynamic that ultimately
affects behavior, but it does not have a determined trajectory as related to specific content
proposed by or operative for the social group. That is, the outcome of self-reflection, in theory,
may reinforce or deviate from the normative teaching of the social group (e.g., the Church). In
practice, more often than not, self-reflection reinforces the social norm which, in turn,
contributes to the social norm being maintained. In the instance of primacy of conscience, the
self reflective process is the exception to the norm and deviates from Church teaching.
As pastoral theology recovers and/or enhances theology, self-reflection integrated into
an understanding of primacy of conscience offers much more than simply an argument for the
personalist perspective vis-à-vis an enhanced framing of agency. Primacy of conscience
presumes engagement with the tradition so that the individual can make moral decisions from
what has been historically termed “an informed conscience.” How does a Catholic arrive at the
point of having an informed conscience? In its most simplistic historical expression having an
informed conscience meant knowing and reflecting upon what the Church teaches, yet clearly
that is not sufficient as the ambiguity of the two strands within the tradition regarding being a
moral Catholic demonstrates. A more comprehensive understanding of the processes by which
a Catholic’s conscience becomes informed can be achieved by integrating the contemporary
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insights of psychology, in this case, social psychology. Self-reflectiveness as articulated by
SCT identifies a number of processes by which an informed conscience is realized.
The content of the Church’s normative moral teaching is a portion of what contributes
to a Catholic having an informed conscience, yet that content is but on factor in the process of
self-reflection. For example, Srampickal’s research models how psychology can offer insight
into the process of conscience formation and development. Inevitably these processes, whether
rooted in older empirical psychological expressions or more contemporary systemic theories,
can assist in better understanding that by which an informed conscience is achieved. The
psychological processes by which conscience is formed and developed are not principally
located in the specific content of any particular moral teaching. Rather, dimensions of the
formation and development of conscience are principally located within an array of
relationships with social groups that form and are formed by the person, not the least of which
is the Church. Further, the role and nuance that SCT offers regarding self-reflection as an
expression of agency can illuminate and enhance how an informed conscience is understood to
emerge and function. An informed conscience may be manifest, in part, by the normative
cognitive process of self-reflection and all that entails, not the least of which is how it relates to
perceived self-efficacy.
Perceived Self-efficacy
Perceived self-efficacy, as a dimension of agency, presents itself as an integral
dimension of the process to be considered as it stands in relationship to selfreflectiveness. Moral decision-making and primacy of conscience are about making a
difference in an individual’s life and world—achieving the good and avoiding evil. How
and to what degree individuals perceive themselves as capable of maximizing good and
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minimizing evil by virtue of their choices and corresponding behaviors can be a
manifestation of perceived self-efficacy. Individuals’ perceptions as to whether or not
they can have an impact upon reality can affect their willingness or hesitancy to engage a
situation. If people have a confident perception of their own efficacy, then they take on
tasks and continue to learn in ways that could help them avoid evil and do good. If they
doubt their own efficacy, they tend to sidestep challenging tasks or retreat from
opportunities and hence their development as skillful people stagnates. Stagnation is
likely to leave them less ready to confront challenges, including moral ones, even moral
ones that would help them comply with Church teachings that they accept. People’s
stagnation diminishes their agency. Consequently, perceived self-efficacy is foundational
to person’s agency.
Although perceived self-efficacy relates to people’s beliefs about their own
abilities to provide levels of performance that make a difference in events that affect their
lives, it is vital to underline that this dimension of agency is about the perceived capacity
to make a difference or have an effect, not necessarily about being different. For
example, a person can readily have a strong perceived self-efficacy that aligns with a
given Church teaching. As a case in point, I can personally attest to the fact that a person
can truly believe that putting Church teaching into practice can translate into making a
positive difference in one’s life, if not the world. Catholicism is replete with individuals
who would make this claim. Similarly though, the same could be said of the same person
who, in another given instance, differs from a specific normative Church teaching.
Again, I can readily identify this as true for myself as well as others I have encountered in
ministry.
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The point is that “perceived self-efficacy” refers to the consciousness internal to
an individual and that he or she has the self perception of being able to have an effect
upon that which is engaged. It does not relate directly to what concrete or strategic action
is perceived as possibly realizing the desired outcome. So when Bandura claims that
“self-efficacy beliefs may influence fundamental orientations in thinking such as being
pessimistic or optimistic as well as whether thinking is inclined to be self-hindering or
self-enhancing,”346 that does not translate into how these fundamental orientations may
be specifically expressed in terms of actual moral teachings.
Broadly, the doctrine of primacy of conscience may potentially and implicitly
reinforce perceived self-efficacy, inasmuch as it teaches that a member of the Church
inherently has the possibility, responsibility and, therefore, capability of making a moral
choice. Granted, the operative assumption of the Church is that a person with an
informed conscience will generally align with and act according to the normative
teaching within the tradition. Yet given that the doctrine of primacy of conscience is part
and parcel of that normative teaching, moral choices are never simply by default. An
informed Catholic responsibly making moral decisions within the tradition must ask the
question of conscience, all the while recognizing that the outcome may or may not, in this
instance and context, correspond to the normative teaching of the Church.
Although primacy of conscience may not directly foster self-efficacy beliefs as
such, implicitly the doctrine structures the relationship between the individual and the
Church in a manner that claims that a person’s moral decision-making can and does have
an effect and make a difference. The term “primacy,” as it relates to acting from an
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informed conscience, orders the relationship with the possibility of a unique expression
of self-efficacy—responsibly differing from the normative teaching according to one’s
conscience. Certainly, as stated earlier, self-efficacy can readily be operative when a
person aligns with and acts upon normative Church teaching. Yet for the Church itself to
teach that the individual, by virtue of the doctrine of primacy of conscience, can
responsibly differ from the normative teaching is a poignant expression of and
commitment to the possibility of an individual’s moral choice making a difference and
having an effect.
Within the Catholic tradition, primacy of conscience may implicitly nurture, for
both the individual and the Church, the development of self-efficacy beliefs that
influence how people feel, think, motivate themselves, and behave. Primacy of
conscience could be considered the Church’s summary expression within moral theology
that each individual can make a difference and have an effect when making moral
decisions in light of the Church’s normative teaching. When the doctrine of primacy of
conscience is amplified by the implications of self-efficacy, the exceptional moments of
its exercise can be powerful opportunities to enhance and make visible the presence of
perceived self-efficacy in the process of moral decision-making. In short, “primacy” is
understood as a statement about the possibility and responsibility of the Catholic making
a certain type of moral decision within the Church—one that may be different from the
normative teaching, yet respected and accepted for the individual exercising primacy of
conscience given the Church’s teaching.
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Social Persuasion
In the previous section on perceived self-efficacy it was stated that primacy of
conscience may implicitly reinforce perceived self-efficacy, inasmuch as it teaches that a
Catholic inherently has the possibility, responsibility and, therefore, capability of making
a personal moral choice that makes a difference. Similarly, primacy of conscience may
be seen as an expression of social persuasion regarding the Church’s understanding of the
role of the individual in the process of moral decision-making within the Church.
Bandura has identified social persuasion as one of the four main sources of influence in
the development of perceived self-efficacy.347 Specially, social persuasion is a source of
strengthening and/or weakening people's beliefs that they have what it takes to succeed.
In terms of primacy of conscience, perceived self-efficacy relates to the person’s self
perception about personal efficacy whereas social persuasion relates to the social group’s
(i.e., the Church) perception of the role of the person and any commensurate positive
and/or negative influence.
Positive social persuasion encourages confident perceptions of self-efficacy,
hence supports people in taking on growth experiences and encourages their development
of agency. The personalist view of conscience acts as positive persuasion and at least
implicitly helps Catholics to develop confidence in their individual efficacy. It supports
agency. Social persuasion can be negative, however, and negative social persuasion
tends to have a stronger effect on self-efficacy than does positive social persuasion. It
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easily undercuts a confident perception of a person’s efficacy. Primacy of conscience can
be a form of positive social persuasion simply by virtue of the fact that the Church as a
social group is both the author and teacher of the doctrine. It is one of the Church’s
principal statements to the individual about the understanding of how a Catholic relates to
the Church when it comes to moral decision-making, especially in terms of agency.
Primacy of conscience acknowledges and supports an individual’s capacity to
make an informed moral decision that differs from normative teaching and is unique to
that person regarding a particular moral decision; consequently, it can be argued that
primacy of conscience functions as a form of positive social persuasion. Given SCT
claims that social persuasion can undermine perceived self-efficacy much more readily
than it can enhance it, the Church does well when its social persuasion functions
positively to strengthen and enhance the perceived self-efficacy of its membership. The
term “primacy” within the doctrine implies that individuals have the capacity as well as
the responsibility to follow their conscience when making moral decisions. As SCT
research suggests, such positive social persuasion increases the likelihood for individuals
to make greater efforts as well as sustain them. Further, as positive social persuasion can
bolster perceived self-efficacy, such efforts may be more likely to succeed as well as
contribute to an increased sense of personal agency. In short, primacy of conscience, as
part of Church teaching, may function as positive social persuasion that can enhance
people’s belief in their capacity to succeed or, in this pastoral context, competently make
the moral choices they face.
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Similarly, the personalist perspective may also position the Church toward positive
Social persuasion by directly placing responsibility squarely on the shoulders of
individual Catholics, thus implicitly recognizing their capacity to take on the task.
Communicating that Catholics have the capacity to make an array of moral decisions,
including potentially those differing from Church teaching by invoking primacy of
conscience, truly expresses positive social persuasion that can benefit both individuals
and the Church at large. As Bandura states, “social persuasion is a …way of
strengthening people’s beliefs that they have what it takes to succeed.”348
In summary, as the question of agency or moral authority is addressed vis-à-vis
the doctrine of primacy of conscience, SCT’s research and theory on agency and the socialpersonal interfaces involved in decision-making affords a more fully developed and
articulated understanding of the question. Broadly SCT frames the question of agency
systemically and specifically it introduces the dynamics of self-reflectiveness, perceived
self-efficacy, and social persuasion as related to agency for both the individual and the
group. These insights help in better understanding how the term “primacy” functions
within the doctrine as well as the complex factors that contribute to the process of
informing one’s conscience. Ultimately the implications of SCT for an amplified
understanding of primacy of conscience support and deepen the personalist perspective
that identifies and prioritizes the role of personal autonomy for socially situated and informed
individuals making moral decisions and potentially exercising of primacy of conscience.
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Illustration of Primacy of Conscience
The implications that SCT provides for a fuller understanding of primacy of conscience
will be implicitly explored in some detail in this section. It will be in the form of a
hypothetical dialogue that might occur in an actual pastoral encounter and, as such, will
be conversational in tone. The conversation will contain expressions of the three
foundational shifts and the potential amplification SCT affords. Upon completion, it will
provide more of an anecdotal expression that reflects how current pastoral care and ministry
could be transformed by a pastoral theological interpretation of primacy of conscience and
agency. A summary reflection upon the conversation will identify some of the potential shifts
operative.
Primacy of conscience, as an expression of agency within Catholic moral
decision-making, applies to the range of moral issues and questions that a Catholic may
encounter. As stated earlier, this research is not oriented toward examining any particular
moral issue as such. Yet for the purpose of illustration, some moral issue is required so
that the hypothetical conversation has a concrete character and is not overly abstract or
disconnected from the experiences from which the problem of conscience arose in the
first place. Sexual behavior and, more specifically, contraception have been the constant
example used when a moral issue is required for the discussion to have some concrete
mooring in order to more readily make sense. This will continue to be the case in this
illustration and, even though not advancing the study of a given moral issue, the domain
of sexuality and the specific topic of contraception is not an arbitrary choice.
There are several reasons that sexuality and contraception have been chosen as the
illuminating example throughout this dissertation. There are two main reasons I have
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picked these topics. First and foremost, the laity are the principal members of the Church
that are called to the vocation of marriage.349 As such, these individuals have the
experience of being in on-going sexual relationships as well as possibly raising a family.
Conversely, celibate clergy who comprise the majority of the Church’s hierarchy that
promulgates Church teaching, presumably have a much more limited experiential basis
regarding sexual relationships upon which to reflect. From the Catholic theological
perspective that experience is an important source of insight and understanding, it would
follow that those who are called to the vocation of marriage and are sexually active
would have unique and significant input regarding sexuality and contraception. Of
course this is not to suggest that only those who have had or have a particular experience
are able to reflect and/or comment upon it, yet it would certainly seem that those who do
should not be left out of the equation. In short, given the focus on agency within this
dissertation, sexuality and the morality of contraception are prime candidates for
potential domains that lay Catholics should be able to express, at least in part, initiating
agency as teachers and not be exclusively located in the position of receptive agency as
learners.
Second, contraception among Catholics in the United States is among the most
demonstrable behavioral deviances from normative Church teaching regarding sexuality.
The Catholic Medical Association’s journal “The Linacre Quarterly” published an article
regarding the use of contraception by women that drew upon the data of the 2002
National Survey of Family Growth. There were 7,635 women in the sample, 2,250 of
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who were Catholic (29.5% of the sample) of which 48.8% practiced contraception and
only 0.4% practiced the natural family planning advocated by Roman Catholic
teaching.350 In their article “The Influence of Religiosity on Contraceptive Use among
Roman Catholic Women in the United States,” Jennifer Ohlendorf and Richard Fehring
conclude the following:
“The overall findings from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth
indicate that US RC women between the ages of 15-44 have patterns of
use of contraceptive methods similar to those of US women in general.
The current use of contraceptive methods by US women and US RC
women differ only by a percentage point. The 3 most frequently used
methods of family planning by both US women and RC US women are
the hormonal oral contraceptive pill, sterilization, and the condom.”351
To the best of my knowledge there is no research that attempts to directly
demonstrate a correlation between a Catholic’s choice to use contraception and an
understanding and/or exercise of primacy of conscience. Nevertheless, given my pastoral
experience and that of others as well, it is certainly a reasonable assumption that some
portion among this group makes this linkage. In the research of Ohlendorf and Fehring
cited above, when speculating as to possible rationales or framings by Catholics related to
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their data regarding use of contraception, the authors suggest the following as one among
a number of possibilities.
A possible reason is that, although RC couples know the Church’s
teachings on contraception and sterilization, they view themselves as
“autonomous” adults, and downplay or ignore the role of the Church’s
official teachings in forming their consciences on the issue of family
planning.352
The concept of primacy of conscience is not even introduced into the discussion
as a dimension of conscience formation as well as an “official teaching” of the Church.
Given the great disparity between the Church’s teaching and the practice of the laity in
the case of contraception that such a blatant lacuna would exist in research sponsored by
the institutional Church seems sadly negligent. This project sets a basis for addressing
this lack.
Generally a conscious behavioral deviation by a Catholic from Church teaching,
especially on an on-going basis, would be accompanied by a corresponding
understanding or framing. That is, from the perspective of the Catholic choosing
contraception, the act could minimally be framed or considered as at least one of two
possibilities—an on-going sin or an exercise of primacy of conscience, as both are
relatively common Catholic notions regardless of how well or poorly they are
understood. The hypothetical pastoral conversation integrating primacy of conscience,
therefore, will engage the issue of contraception in the overall context of sexuality as it is
a domain particularly well disposed to illuminate the topic of primacy of conscience and
agency.
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At this point the summary pastoral vignette from the beginning of Chapter 2 will
set the foundation for the extended pastoral conversation that is to follow. Recall from
Chapter 2 that Sue is struggling with her choice to use contraception while also being
aware of the Church’s general prohibition regarding artificial means of contraception.
Nevertheless, she feels she can explain and justify her choice as one that makes sense to
her given the overall context of her family. Sue considers herself to be a “good” Catholic
and had always been taught to follow her conscience and was unsure if that was, in fact,
what her choice regarding contraception reflected. Sue is a regularly attending member
of the Church, has served on the council of the Church, and the priest knows her fairly
well. She informed the priest of the purpose of their conversation when she set the
meeting time, so both were prepared for the conversation and needed little time to begin
to address the topic in earnest.
Pastoral Conversation353
Priest: When you called to ask if we could talk about primacy of conscience, I
mentioned that it might be helpful to also explore and possibly expand how we
understand the phrase “an informed conscience” as it relates to primacy of conscience. In
your questioning and struggle to understand what the Church means when it says we
should follow our conscience, you said your parents and teachers always taught you that
you must have an informed conscience. You said you weren’t clear about what that
actually means or how to get one. After all, it’s not like you can purchase it at a Catholic
bookstore? As we discuss primacy of conscience in our lives, we can certainly explore

353

This dialogue is an edited version of a transcribed recording of an actual pastoral
theological role play.
228

the meaning of an informed conscience and even use it as our entry point for today’s
conversation? How do you understand it?
Sue: I think my parents had a lot to do with how my conscience became
informed, both for good and bad I guess. Although I was taught from very early on by
my parents to follow my conscience, I didn’t get the nitty-gritty until later in my life. I
am sure the road my parents had to walk affected what they taught me, even if they never
spoke of it directly to us as kids. They had five of us in the family. Much later on as an
adult, I found out that my dad went to the priest and said if my mom had another child, he
would divorce her. So the priest said to my dad that the lesser of two evils is for him to
have a vasectomy. It was the exception to the rule. The priest said that if that's what my
dad intended to do, he would grant him the equivalent of a dispensation to seek a
vasectomy.
Priest: I agree with you that our parents play a significant role in the process of
developing an informed conscience, including the idea of following your conscience. In
fact, there are many factors that come into play as Catholics develop an informed
conscience. Our self-reflection includes anything from how we assess the outcome of our
decisions, resources like the Bible or Catechism, and what others think and do as well.
Are you wondering if what your dad did was exercise primacy of conscience?
Sue: No, not really. I wouldn’t think that involves dispensations. I do know it
put his conscience at ease though. I am more trying to express how my dad or maybe my
parents couldn't live up to the Church’s standard…and I haven't been able to live up to
the standard as well. I think my parents taught me, whether they intended to or not, that
the Church’s standards are unrealistic. An informed conscience meant you knew you
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were set up for failure. I recall my dad often muttering, “easy for him to say” after
leaving Church. I would joke with my sister that it was another common response to the
priest, but not as benevolent as when we say, “And also with you.”
Priest: Okay, I have a better sense of where you are going now. Do you
personally believe that the Church’s standards are unrealistic in general, or just certain
ones? Do you really think that an informed conscience means that you are set up for
failure?
Sue: No, not when you put it that way, but when it comes to birth control, the
Church has such a high standard that doesn’t seem to take a lot of people, a lot of life,
into consideration when it teaches about contraception. We are still surrounded by it. An
Italian woman was beatified about two years ago, who died rather than have treatment for
cancer. This was a modern woman who was a medical doctor with 3 or 4 children. She
was pregnant and the treatment for the cancer would have killed the fetus. She refused
treatment so that her child could be born. It was worth more for her to bring this life into
the world than save her own. She deprived her children of a mother and the community
of a doctor, yet the beatification speaks about what a saint she was. The model of
holiness presented to women is to sacrifice your own life to give birth to a child.
Whether it's your actual life like this woman, or your sanity and health, everything else is
secondary to child-bearing. This is still the message and standard that Catholic women
receive to this day—it is just so unrealistic and simplistic.
Priest: Well that circumstance and issue is a bit different than contraception, yet
clearly it captures the stakes and emotion that are in play here for you. It sounds like you
are saying two things here on a broad level, but correct me if I am wrong or missed
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something. One point is that you and your family experience the Church’s teaching
regarding contraception as an unrealistic standard. The other point is that not being able
to achieve that standard has been difficult on the life of your family, both for your parents
and yourself. A critical question is whether you consider a standard or moral teaching
wrong or simply beyond your ability or desire to achieve it. How you understand and
respond to that question may determine whether or not developing a different and lesser
standard may actually be finding a way to deal with a sense of guilt or failure for not
keeping the standard that you know is right, or exercising primacy of conscience by
differing from a normative Church teaching. Do you think your parents’ or your
experience contributes to an informed conscience beyond assessing, as you see it, that the
teaching regarding contraception is a set up for failure for some people?
Sue: Maybe that is what I hope you will tell me, but to be completely honest it
has always seemed like saying that Catholics are to have an informed conscience is just a
tricky way to say we have to do just what the Church says. It suggests we have a role in
the decision-making process, but not really. If what I eventually decide goes against or
stands in opposition to a moral teaching like contraception, then I am told that my
conscience must not be well informed. I am faulted and told that I need to go back and
pray about this some more. Or I am directed to study the Catechism on the topic because
supposedly it is very clear there. At the end of the day, it seems that the Church believes
that if my conscience is well formed it will inevitably be in line with what the Catechism
states.
Priest: I understand your experience thus far seems to suggest that an informed
conscience can be presented like there really is only one correct answer. Are you open
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to, or have you had the experience when, having an informed conscience aligns with
Church teaching, even if you have fallen short of practicing it fully in your life?
Basically it is important to sort out whether or not you have a blanket rejection of any
Church teaching you do not realize in your life as too high a standard. Can you see in
your life where falling short doesn’t translate into saying the Church is just unrealistic?
Sue: I have not thought of it in that sense, but I can readily say that is not the
case. I don’t simply say the Church is wrong because I haven’t achieved its standards or
followed its teachings. You know of some of my struggles with fidelity in my marriage,
but I have never come to the conclusion that the Church’s teaching against adultery is
wrong.
Priest: Hold onto that thought for a moment. This is an important distinction
because following one’s conscience is about doing what we think is right or good.
Falling short of the Church’s standards does not necessarily mean the standards are
wrong, as you stated when you mentioned the seventh commandment banning adultery.
An informed conscience may lead us to recognize how we have failed or sinned, or it
may lead us to consider that the teaching is off or wrong rather than ourselves. Does that
make sense?
Sue: Absolutely! I think sometimes I find it so frustrating that I just lump it all
together and it may seem a bit exaggerated. So you are telling me that an informed
conscience isn’t one that always agrees with the Church, though it does at times, and that
primacy of conscience isn’t really a ruse to suggest we can actually differ with the
Church’s teaching and still be considered part of the faithful? So how come I think this
way? I am an intelligent woman who has really taken this stuff seriously.
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Priest: Whether or not it might be a bit of a characterization, certainly there are
some Catholics who would argue that an informed conscience will always align with the
Church teaching. It is not like you made all this stuff up in your head. It is one
interpretation of natural law, but it is not the only one. Exploring interpretations of
natural law probably won’t be helpful for us at the moment. I can certainly point you to
some articles if you would like to read more about it later. For the time being, let’s look
at the responsibility and obligation of having an informed conscience as being about the
information and influences we see as part of what forms our conscience. Understanding
having an informed conscience as a process or way of being in relationship is a good
foundation. It really expresses that we are part of the Church, or in Paul’s terms, part of
the Body of Christ. Let’s put on hold for the moment what possible conclusions might
emerge from an informed conscience. You have identified the Catechism as one source
of information. Have you found that helpful at times? Is there a way you can or do use it
in your life?
Sue: Well to be honest I haven’t read much of it lately, but that is partly due to
the fact that it seems like I am told to go back to the Catechism when I question or
disagree with the Church. It is kind of used just as a rule book and not much else. I
know it expresses the Church’s tradition, but it can’t be the only source of relevant
information. When I am directed to the Catechism there seems to be the suggestion, like
I said earlier, that I am somehow the problem and that the solution lays in the Catechism.
I simply need to study and pray in order to correct my confusion and error. Frankly, I
think it is an intentional way to demean adults by treating them like kids by sending them
back to redo the lessons they seemingly didn’t learn well the first time round. I don’t
233

mind the Catechism, but it can’t be the end-all and be-all when it comes to informing
ourselves.
Priest: It is good that you can identify that level of feeling around being told to
engage the Catechism. Before we look at praying and studying more about a particular
issue that you question or have difficulty with accepting or practicing like contraception,
it may first be helpful to recognize if or how the Catechism has been a resource in your
development of faith. It can prevent lumping the whole relationship into one negative
category. Or maybe it is just something that you think relates to being a child. I am not
sure, but let’s see. This may shift the experience of seeing the Catechism as something
more than a rule book that is drawn out only when you differ with a specific Church
teaching. Are there positions on moral topics that you would agree with in the
Catechism, say like the Ten Commandments? After all, it has over a hundred pages on
the Ten Commandments that reflect over an eighth of the entire text.
Sue: Even though I can’t recite them all like I could when I was a girl, I am not
calling those into question. “Thou shall not kill” seems pretty obvious to me and I am
definitely on board with that one. But I know “thou shall conceive” was not one of them
and, if you ask me, it seems to be stretching the matter to try to make the case that they
are somehow connected.
Priest: So could you say the Catechism might or does serve you in some capacity
as a resource that expresses and supports your understanding of yourself as a moral
Catholic?
Sue: Sort of funny, but I can’t recall really trying to see where I stood in
agreement with the Catechism because it has mainly been used to correct me. But now
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that you put it that way, sure I think there are definitely ways it represents what I believe
and try to practice as a Catholic.
Priest: When you stated that you did not think “thou shall not kill” translates into
“thou shall conceive,” you said “if you ask me.” Well even if it does not always seem to
be the case, the Church is asking you about your stand on contraception for yourself and
your family. Let me read something out of the Catechism for you. Remember we just
agreed that this is a source that does at times represent what you believe and try to
practice as a Catholic. It states: “[One] has the right to act in conscience and in freedom
so as personally to make moral decisions. ‘[One] must not be forced to act contrary to
conscience. Nor must [one] be prevented from acting according to conscience, especially
in religious matters’.”354 Does that sound like an informed conscience inevitably aligns
with every Church teaching?
Sue: No it doesn’t. What page is that hidden on? Even if it is in the Catechism,
it doesn’t seem to get the press that all the other teachings seem to enjoy. You know as
well as I do that certainly all clergy don’t seem to come from this perspective and, in all
due respect, I can think of a particular clergyman with a whole lot more clout than you
that didn’t. I have this very clear memory of sitting in front of a television with a
neighbor watching Pope John Paul II in Monterey, CA in the early 80’s. He was giving a
speech addressing a number of things, but what struck me most was the part about noncompliance with the Church’s teaching regarding contraception. One portion was about
being selfish. He phrased it something like, “Why would we deprive our sons and
daughters of siblings? Why would we deprive them, if not for our own selfish reasons?”
354

Catechism of the Catholic Church, 439.
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Priest: Talk about a generous portion of Catholic guilt.
Sue: And as a cradle Catholic it got me. It hooked me. I am depriving my son
and daughter of siblings because I don't want the extra work. I am the problem—I am
being selfish. So we had another child. Later it was like "Oh my God." What was that
decision about? His speech really got me to that place of believing I'm being selfish.
This person, this great spiritual person, this wise and holy man who doesn’t know me
from Adam was basically saying, “Well honey, you don't have any good reason to not
have a child,” and I bought it. By our fifth child I finally got to the point of saying, "God
damn, I really do have a good reason, a really good reason because I will deprive my
children of a sane and healthy mother if I keep doing this.”
Priest: I am sure that was not an easy thing to say or realize in your life. This
may reflect the point of where listening to yourself as well as the Church led you to
exercise primacy of conscience regarding the question of contraception. As you were
informed by the Church and your life, you came to your response regarding the perceived
“thou shall conceive” mandate. The quote I read you not only expresses the teaching of
the Catechism by which you are called to inform yourself, but also draws upon the
teachings of the Second Vatican Council. The last part is actually a quote from the
“Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World.” As a priest, I certainly do
not have as much clout as the Pope, but this statement from the Catechism that was
painstakingly crafted by and representative of the Pope, cardinals, bishops, priests, and
laity as a summary of the tradition and the Second Vatican Council sure does.
Sue: So are you saying John Paul II was wrong in what he said?
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Priest: Well I wasn’t trying to say that as such…there is certainly a broader
context that he was speaking from that I do not know. Let’s put it this way. A Pope’s
voice is one among a number of voices Catholics are called to listen to as they discern
moral choices. We can both see with our own two eyes that if we go to the Catechism we
are taught that our conscience is another voice we are called to listen to when making
moral decisions. Now this may not be altogether clear to either you or me as to how that
exactly plays out in our lives, but I think we are together today to explore more fully what
that might mean for both of us as Catholics. I can’t simply open up the Catechism and
tell you what you should do in each and every instance. I can’t even do that for myself.
Even if I were in agreement with whatever moral position the Catechism supports, I
would still have to support your primacy of conscience because it is a teaching of the
Church as well. A Catholic cannot have a fully informed conscience that does not
include being informed about this teaching regarding primacy of conscience.
Sue: I certainly don’t regret the life of our children. They are wonderful gifts
from God and life wouldn’t be the same without them. I just don’t feel comfortable with
how that choice was made and, more to our point today, how that continues to affect me
in terms of my on-going choice to use contraception. Between our financial situation, my
husband’s alcoholism and behavior, and the sheer demand of it all, I just can’t have
another child.
Priest: Do you feel like you did not or do not have a choice in the matter?
Sue: It’s not that I am saying I don’t have a choice, but I feel like my choice is
not understood or supported by the Church. Frankly it feels like it is condemned. Are
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you saying that it is my responsibility or fault because I am the only one who is making
the choice and I am free to do otherwise?
Priest: No I assure you that am not trying to find fault or judge you. I would
simply like us to broaden rather than narrow how we understand our choices. I want to
look at what context influences or affects the decisions we make. It is another angle on
understanding how we develop an informed conscience. From our previous
conversations I know that as a mom you have an idea of what is meant by peer pressure
and how it can affect children’s choices.
Sue: Of course, we talked last year about Billy’s problem with those other kids
and their drinking. My own mom told me about not hanging out with a bad crowd.
You’re not saying that the Pope and the Vatican is a bad crowd are you?
Priest: No, but I appreciate your humor. I want to use your understanding of peer
pressure as a general way to realize that our choices are influenced by others. We can
neither make decisions in complete isolation nor would we want to. We don’t live in a
vacuum. The influence and resources of those around us and those who have preceded us
is invaluable, even if sometimes confusing and even conflicting. When the Church
teaches that we must follow an informed conscience, it is another way of saying our
conscience must be influenced by the Church’s teaching as well as any other source
available that assists in our understanding the situation and moral decision in question.
Without getting lost in a bunch of technical psychological terms, let’s just say that the
tradition or teaching of the Church is like a form of peer pressure. Since it is not exactly
peers as such, it might be better to see it as social persuasion. The group, in this instance
the Church, wants us to do some things and not do other things, for the sake of
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everyone’s good. This is real persuasion that has an effect and generally carries some
form of consequence. Of course we might be hearing it through our peers, but they first
received it from some form of the Church’s teaching, like the Catechism for example.
Remember the big picture view that we discussed when we were looking at how peer
pressure might affect your son?
Sue: Oh yeah that peer pressure usually just gets a bad rap, as if it is only what
happens when some kids get other kids to do dumb or dangerous things. Of course we
have all seen that happen, but it can also be present when peers pressure others to do
good or creative things like in sports.
Priest: Yes, it can have either a positive or a negative influence. Social
persuasion can be understood in a similar way. It is really neither good nor bad in and of
itself. It is simply something that occurs as people relate to one another and we live in
society—we are influenced by those we live with and this is a way to understand it on a
large scale. Its affect on a person might be beneficial or detrimental and that is not
determined simply by whether or not we are being told to do something or not do
something. For example, “thou shall not kill” is a negative social persuasion. The
Church is persuading people not to kill, so it is a prohibition. So even though it is
negative social persuasion, it is a positive thing because it values and safeguards life. A
positive social persuasion is the Church teaching us to work for justice and care for those
suffering in poverty.
Sue: It sounds like you are trying to tell me that even though the Church is
prohibiting contraception, it is a good thing. I have heard that before and it sounds like
the same old same old.
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Priest: I am actually just trying to introduce a basic idea about how we are
influenced and affected by a group, but if you want to look at it regarding contraception
we can. Basically, as you stated, the Church’s teaching about contraception is that
prohibiting contraception is a good thing. But it is vital to recognize that this is not the
Church’s only teaching that must be considered. Prohibiting contraception is the
Church’s teaching or judgment on that topic in general, but is not a judgment of you in
particular or your practice. As Catholics we are called to engage our tradition and listen
to the voices of our leadership as they present the tradition. But it is important to not lose
sight of the fact that the Church teaches that we are not to let those voices be heard so
loudly that we cannot hear the voice of our own conscience. The Church exercises
positive social persuasion when it says you can and must ultimately make that decision
yourself based upon all the relevant information you have. This is the Church’s teaching
about your ability and responsibility to make moral decisions. Remember before how
you said there are a lot of things in the Catechism that you agree with? Can you agree
with the Church that after listening and gathering all the information and influence that
might matter, then you will follow you conscience?
Sue: I think that is what I have been doing, but somehow it seems so inadequate
and isolating. In my own situation with the decision I've made, it has felt and continues
to feel as if what I am doing when I appeal to my conscience is looking for the exception
to the rule. Others have set the rules and my only option leaves me coming up short. My
appeal is that I'm the exception because of my conscience, even if supported by the
Church. I am exempting myself from the rule. It's much more difficult to say the rule is
wrong, but I think it is. I feel like I am carving out my own space where I can survive,
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but as an exception. I'm not breathing well. I'm on the life support of primacy of
conscience which allows me an exception, but boy I really feel second rate. I feel like
I'm just at the margin of my Catholic life here. I want to be able to receive communion
like everybody else and not be looked down upon or look down upon myself because of
what I have decided and am doing.
Priest: I understand how you don’t want following your conscience to leave you
feeling at a loss, as if you were a second rate citizen. I hear the isolation you struggle
with here. I don’t think the Church’s teaching intends to address how following one’s
conscience might make a person feel. But I do know that how we understand those
teachings might affect those feelings. Are you really an exception to the rule? Isn’t one
of the rules to follow our conscience? Can there be moments when I faithfully and
legitimately claim exception to one rule because I am following another rule? Might the
Church, conscious or not, have created this confusing structure because it recognizes that
one teaching might not cover every scenario? Isn’t that the case with “thou shall not
kill?” That's clearly a rule, but there are also exceptions. The Church teaches about the
right to self-defense. It teaches the just war theory. So on the one hand we might say
that exceptions are the norm, but what if you are not expressing an exception. What if
you are a voice possibly contributing to what might become a new teaching?
Sue: So now I am to just tell my friends and the Pope that I am a theologian? Do
you have some paperwork that can go along with this claim?
Priest: Well let’s not concern ourselves for the moment as to how others might
interpret what you are doing when claiming primacy of conscience and what it may or
may not offer the Church. Let’s just focus on how you might understand it. We
241

recognize that sometimes primacy of conscience does conjure the idea of an exception to
the rule, yet it is actually following another rule. A person can faithfully differ from a
normative Church teaching precisely because of following another normative Church
teaching. When we exercise primacy of conscience we are informed by the tradition and
we are the part of the Church that has been identified by the Church itself as those who
may and must differ in accordance with the teaching on conscience. The teaching on
primacy of conscience does not exclude, let alone excommunicate, those who exercise it.
The very presence of the teaching acknowledges the possibility of it being among the
expected practices of faithful Catholics. Catholics who exercise primacy of conscience
are a part of the whole, not apart from the whole. Some folks would talk about this in
terms of the Church as a system where everything and everyone stands in relationship to
everything and everyone else. So can you be faulted for putting into practice the very
teaching that your parents taught you as a child and the Church continues to teach in its
Catechism?
Sue: It does get all jumbled together doesn’t it? Usually I feel like if something
is out of order, it must be me. It never really occurred to me that the lay of the land is
actually complicated and confusing outside of me.
Priest: Well not to further complicate matters, but there also can be times when
the stance a Catholic holds isn't merely a petition for an exception considering my
circumstances, but rather an expression of a perspective that really calls to task the
normal teaching of the Church. Take slavery for example. Those who critiqued the
Church’s normative teaching that accepted slavery weren’t simply saying that there are
occasions when an exception to slavery would be appropriate and acceptable. They were
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saying the Church teachings were wrong. That is an example within the moral arena, but
we can also look at scientists like Copernicus or Galileo. They weren't asking for an
exception in their lives, they were saying as scientists that certain dimensions of the
Church’s understanding of the universe were wrong for everyone. Granted they were
called heretics and it took over four hundred years for the Church to acknowledge their
insight and wisdom, but following one’s conscience might be making a contribution to
the Church’s understanding and teaching. Martin Luther was uniquely positioned to
understand deficiencies in the Church that not everyone else could see in the same way,
or at least identify and address. His following of his conscience with “Here I stand, I can
do no other” was a great contribution to the Church. Although it took quite some time,
not unlike Copernicus and Galileo, the Second Vatican Council actually adopted most of
his reforms even though they didn’t explicitly credit him as such. Three obvious
examples are the liturgy going into the vernacular, the laity being more fully recognized
as ministers, and Catholics being urged to read the Bible. Do you think your role as a
wife and mother has given you some insight into bearing and raising children that
celibate priests and theologians might not have?
Sue: Yes of course I do. I have been arguing that all along and I am not the only
one. How many times have you heard the comment about people not wanting the Church
to decide what goes on in our bedrooms? When I hear a comment like not wanting to
have another child being framed as selfishness, I could just pull my hair out. It seems so
ignorant, arrogant, and insensitive. I know it is not from the Bible and probably isn’t
Christian, but that saying about not judging someone until you have walked a mile in
their shoes makes a whole lot of sense to me. I feel like I am being told both what shoes
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to wear and what road to walk. They give you the damn answer. The Church doesn’t
know what's going on in my life, and yet they say, “If you were really following God's
will you wouldn't be using birth control.” My voice must mean something. Parents are
the ones who are having the children. Our experience must be worth something. I
definitely have insight into what it means to be a mother that a celibate priest doesn’t
have, but all I have ever heard or hear is that the Holy Mother Church is the teacher.
When you use phrases like the deposit of faith, it's like a box that gets handed from one
generation to the next and my job is to guard and hand on the “true teaching” no
questions asked. I feel like I'm standing as an individual against the institution, against
the Pope, against the bishop, and I don't have the theological fire power that those folks
do to bring to bear. It feels like a very lonely decision and weak position.
Priest: Yeah I understand. It can seem like the deck is stacked when symbols like
the Pope, or the tradition, or the Church all seem to claim one thing, even if there is not
simply one thing to consider. It's interesting you use the word theological firepower. I
think that's a powerful metaphor of agency. Where is power or agency present? Is it
only in those symbols and persons? When we look at Church teaching, is power
unidirectional? Does teaching come only from those symbols, the Pope, the tradition, the
Church? Can you or women like you, or couples in the question regarding contraception
also be teachers to the Church? A recent study by the Church itself shows that almost
fifty percent of Catholic women in the United States choose to practice contraception.
Do you have theological firepower as a member of the Church? Do you ever have a
place to say things theological, for you to be teacher for the Church, or are the only
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teachers of the Church always those who occupy institutional and ecclesial offices or
roles?
Sue: I guess so…I certainly would hope so, but it hardly feels that way.
Priest: Primacy of conscience says that you are informed by the tradition and you
inform the tradition. You have power or agency, just as everyone who is part of the
Church does. Not that this means there are not real differences in power, but no one is
without it. Everyone can and does make a difference, especially as they make moral
choices that affect themselves and others around them.
Sue: So are you saying that though the Church would prefer we do it one way,
our conscience inevitably leads us to do what right?
Priest: Yes and no. It is right to follow our conscience, but that does not
necessarily mean that are choices will be what truly accomplishes what is good for others
and ourselves. The Church says we are to follow our conscience, but there are no
guarantees as to what the outcome will be. The obligation to act from an informed
conscience does not assure that a person is doing good, but only that they think they are
doing good. Just as part of the doctrine of primacy of conscience is having an informed
conscience, it also states that primacy of conscience does not mean we are above making
a mistake. It is called an erroneous conscience. An erroneous conscience can develop on
two levels. On one level it can develop because someone did not inform themselves—
neglected doing their homework so to speak. On another level, even if a person has
informed themselves and done all they could, the final choice still may not be something
good, even though the person seriously and sincerely thought that would be the case.
Primacy of conscience is not individualism because it is informed by and done with the
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Church according to its teaching. It is also not a guarantee that our decision will
necessarily achieve the good it is intended to achieve. Does that address your question?
Sue: Honestly, yes and no. It still has a confusing character to it.
Priest: It would be nice if the tradition was simple and clear, yet there is
ambiguity on a lot of levels. We can see from the commandment “thou shall not kill”
that rules are not always so black and white. We are called to listen to the Church’s
wisdom, but we are also called to contribute to it as well. The teaching of the Church
not only has ambiguity in it, there is also error. We can look across Church history and
think that some of its teaching might endure forever. But it is equally true that there is
plenty of stuff that's been way off base and doesn’t even endure to this day. Who's going
to make a case for slavery in this day and age? The Church provides you with a
normative teaching that basically says, follow or lead. Probably we need to do both with
more of the former than the latter given the collective wisdom of the Church. It is simply
not as easy as, “Here’s the answer. You're good to go." Can the Church be a strong
voice, but not the only voice? Listen to yourself and others as you journey in your life,
your ministry, and our world. We are all learners and teachers. There may be certain
arenas where we may be uniquely positioned to reflect upon the experience and
understand it in important unique ways. Your role and experience as a mother and wife
seems to be one. Primacy of conscience may be the Church telling us that in these
moments when it's confusing and there doesn't seem to be a clear answer, we're going to
trust you to try your best with all the resources you have been provided. And that doesn't
need to lock you out to live in the hinterlands, live at the margin of the Church, or live in
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rejection. You are having the courage to be true to yourself and the community that has
formed you. That's another way to say following our conscience.
Sue: I didn’t expect you would be able to take away the all confusion that I have
lived with for some time now. It is different to see confusion or, as you put it, ambiguity
as somewhat normal and part of the tradition. I do think this has been helpful.
Priest: Like any conversation, we have certainly wandered around, but I hope we
have stayed centered enough on your question regarding primacy of conscience that it has
been beneficial. I am certainly open to continue our conversation as you mull over and
pray with what we have discussed today.
Reflection upon Pastoral Conversation
Without the priest necessarily needing to be explicit with Sue regarding the
potential theological and psychological depth that can inform a pastoral theological
understanding of primacy of conscience and agency, the pastoral conversation has an
orientation that implicitly frames the relational dynamic in a manner that intends to
engender and/or enhance the three shifts previously identified. In terms of shift for Sue:
it allows her the possibility of differing from a normative Church teaching without that
difference necessarily being interpreted negatively; it also reinforces the possibility that
Catholics are competent and sometimes required as Catholics to responsibly make a
moral decision that differs from the Church teaching. This shift may also contribute the
following for Sue as well: mitigate any mistaken conception that there are no options
available for her; ameliorate any potential reactive behavior for Sue if she is a person that
struggles with authority that is perceived as domineering; and potentially transform or
heal her pastoral relationship with the priest by positioning it as informational, dialogical,
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and exploratory rather than judgmental and fixed. With this shift, the normative
cognitive dynamics of self-reflection, perceived self-efficacy, and positive social
persuasion may be enhanced for Sue as she considers the possibility of exercising
primacy of conscience. Finally, inasmuch as Catholics’ are called to operate from an
informed conscience, the role play also demonstrates how exercising the agency required
in informing one’s conscience also involves a step toward maturity. Sue has to examine
past understandings of what she was taught and critically update these in the light of
discerning judgments about her present circumstances. This, in turn, leads to the
possibility of revising her moral decision-making.
In terms of the shift for the priest, several benefits may be operative. First, it may
ameliorate the potentially complicated situation of being a representative of the Church
that is seen as conjuring the role of judge or arbiter of the question at hand. Second, it
may enhance the pastoral relationship by virtue of affirming Sue’s capacity to address the
moral decision in question. Finally, it may mitigate responsibility potentially being
abdicated by Sue through an unconscious desire to have the priest, in essence, make the
moral decision for her. It also may lessen any potential polarization and/or confrontation
within the pastoral relationship because the priest is not positioned in irreconcilable
contradictions while caring for Sue and representing both the ministry and governance of
the Church. In short, ambiguity within the tradition can be a resource rather than a
conundrum, as it is jointly engaged through primacy of conscience and an understanding
of agency that is supported by the Church. With this shift, the priest may function as a
source of positive rather than negative social persuasion in the process of supporting
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Sue’s self-reflection and agency in the process of moral decision-making through a
collaborative pastoral conversation.
From the perspective of the pastoral relationship between Sue and the priest, it
allows the dynamics of learning and teaching to be fluid and interchangeable. At a
minimum, the priest is located with Sue in the question instead of being the person with
the answer. Rather than the relationship being fixed from the outset (i.e., the priest
functioning in the teaching role through initiating agency and Sue in the learning role
with receptive agency), either party may function in either role with its corresponding
agency. As such, both parties may be enriched from the pastoral conversation in its
dynamic interchange, as they journey together is searching for and discerning what might
be the best moral course given the context and the question. In actuality, without trying
to assess proportionality, both Sue and the priest function as learner and teacher. In sum,
the pastoral relationship is framed systemically with all parties exercising various
expressions of agency. Because neither the issue nor the pastoral relationship is cast in
“either—or” terms, the pastoral care dynamic is more disposed to the possibility of on-going
evaluation of the issue.
Finally, as the priest supports Sue’s possible exercise of primacy of conscience from
the personalist perspective, the principal pastoral role facilitates and fosters her informing her
conscience and supports the agency she requires in the moral decision-making process. From
the personalist perspective, Sue is recognized as potentially competent and responsible for
managing her moral decision-making. The perspective of and directives from the tradition are
seriously engaged and considered, but the tradition’s affirmation about the primacy of
conscience is determinative when conflicts, such as Sue’s, exist. As such, the pastoral
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relationship holds in tension both the fluidity and stability of the tradition. Therefore, Sue can
simultaneously be faithful to the tradition and authority of the Church while occasionally
differing from it as related to a specific moral topic due to the guidance of her
conscience. Pastoral care, through the integration of a personalist perspective of primacy
of conscience, can be tailored to Sue’s specific needs, challenges, and context while also
addressing the Church’s normative teaching, not the least of which is primacy of conscience.
Another person could visit the very same priest later that day and the conversation
might look very different. Because of the unique context of each person and how the
personalist perspective ultimately prioritizes the personal autonomy and responsibility of
individuals in moral matters, there is no pat predictable outcome. Certainly the
normative teaching of the Church as well as the process of engaging primacy of
conscience is predictable in its doctrinal stability, yet the individual results can and do
vary. This is related to the very same moral issue by different persons, let alone across
different moral issues and contexts.
Future Research
The question of future research is always an open-ended one with immeasurable
possibilities. Nevertheless, some trajectories present themselves as both more immediate and
more promising. One consideration seems to stand out as a particularly strong and promising
candidate. Further exploration of the correlation between the contraceptive practices among
U. S. Catholics and the exercise of primacy of conscience merits serious consideration for a
variety of reasons. First, it is a strong (i.e., 48%) and demonstrable instance of Catholic
behavior that deviates from normative Church teaching. Second, it is within an arena of life
(i.e., human sexuality) where many Catholics may readily be in a teaching role as much as a
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learning role in terms of agency. Third, social structures (e.g., National Survey of Family
Growth) are currently in place that makes data collection relatively reasonable.
The development of instruments to examine the correlation of contraceptive
practices among U.S. Catholics and the exercise of primacy of conscience can illuminate
the degree to which theological understandings and motivations are related to the
behavior. The trajectory of Ohlendorf and Fehring’s research and others like it regarding
the contraceptive practices of Catholics points to the possibility of this correlation.
Further research could move their work beyond the stage of speculative conclusions,
especially as regards the suggestion of Catholics working from the psychological position
of “autonomous persons” rather than theological position of primacy of conscience.355 It
is very possible that a self-understanding and motivation that is moored in the
psychological position of “autonomous persons” may correlate with a theological
understanding and motivation rooted in primacy of conscience.
Given the empirical quality of SCT, the contraceptive practices of Catholics could
also be examined in terms any of the three dimensions of agency examined in this
dissertation (i.e., self-reflectiveness, perceived self-efficacy, and social persuasion).
Perceived self-efficacy would be the point I would consider first, given the breadth of
research and instruments available that address it, as well as it being particularly salient
to the question of primacy of conscience. Research of this nature could empirically

355

Although not in the arena of contraceptive practices, some research correlates selfefficacy and dissent. Dissent is not necessarily interpreted as an exercise of primacy of
conscience, yet there are parallel characteristics. For further reference, see Louise E.
Parker, “When to Fix It and When to Leave: Relationships among Perceived Control,
Self-Efficacy, Dissent, and Exit,” Journal of Applied Psychology 78, (1993): 949-959.
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explore some of the theoretical considerations that have been presented throughout this
research and lead to an even greater understanding of primacy of conscience.
Conclusion
A Catholic understanding of conscience that is both brief and broad may be ageappropriate for certain children and, in the most general terms and simplest circumstances, may
even serve some adults on a very limited level. Nevertheless, in many or most instances, the
stakes are too high and the questions too complicated for Catholics to simply appeal to the
concept of "following one's conscience" without it having more clarity and sophistication.
If “following one’s conscience” is merely code for a generic and diffuse understanding of
“going with a gut feeling,” Catholicism, whether for the individual or the organization,
will be left wanting. Such an approach does not even fully engage the Church's tradition
of conscience, let alone an enhanced one that appeals to this pastoral theological
construction of agency for Catholic moral decision-making.
This contemporary pastoral theological interpretation of the doctrine of primacy of
conscience as related to agency can be a critical resource for helping contemporary U.S.
Catholics and their spiritual guides make moral decisions that are informed but not controlled
by the established tradition of the Church. Further, by drawing positively upon a doctrine that
has been historically subordinated in the Church’s teaching, it helps Catholics better understand
and collaborate with their Church when making moral decisions, even to the point of realizing
the possibility of sometimes contributing to moral advances. The personalist perspective of
primacy of conscience since the Second Vatican Council has made a significant contribution to
the question of moral agency and authority. Its contribution is both reinforced and expanded
through this pastoral theological construction of agency for Catholic moral decision-making.
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This research is intended to take one more concrete step in making the necessary resource
possible, understandable, and available for Catholics’ moral decision-making and the
possibility of exercising primacy of conscience.
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APPENDIX A
Statement of Bibliographic Procedure—Donald A. Rickard January 9, 2006
My interest in recovering/reconstructing the traditional Catholic doctrine of
primacy of conscience coalesced during an independent study in pastoral theology with
Larry Graham. This research topic addresses my personal and ministerial experience as
well as the situation of many other Catholics in the community. From this initial work
with Graham, both a topic and several key theorists emerged that provided initial search
terms for my research and selective bibliography. The selection criterion predominantly
reflects specific terms as well as particular authors and/or theories. Although no date
parameter was included in the selection criteria, the majority of relevant materials are
from the mid-20th and 21st centuries. I expanded these initial search terms further by
consulting the Library of Congress Subject Heading 23rd Edition, the ATLA Religion
Index, and the Guide to Social Science & Religion in Periodical Literature for
synonymous and/or related terms. Finally, I continued to amplify the search terms by
noting additional keywords that surfaced in the process of searching my expanded list.
The final search terms that guided my research are as follows:
1) Conscience, primacy of conscience, liberty of conscience, freedom of conscience,
casuistry, guilt, primacy, and dissent
2) Pastoral theology, practical theology, pastoral care, pastoral counseling, pastoral
psychology, care of souls, cure of souls, and ministry
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3) Agency, power, self-efficacy, control, moral agent, moral agency, and mastery
4) Hiltner, Lapsley, Patton, Poling, Graham, Doehring, Curran, McCormick, Grisez, John
Henry Newman, Hogan, and Bandura
5) Catholic Church, Catholicism, Second Vatican Council, sociology, United States,
history, 20th century, membership, attitudes, Ex-Church members, and controversy(ies)
All of these terms were searched according to library catalogues (Taylor, Penrose,
John Vianney, Denver Public Library, and Prospector), Online Databases (ATLA
database--especially ATLA Religion and WorldCat, PYSCHLIT, Digital Dissertations,
EBSCOhost EJS, Expanded Academic ASAP, and MLA), CD-ROM Databases (Catholic
Periodical & Literature Index and Religious and Theological Abstracts), and
Amazon.com. Authors were also searched under Social Science Citation Index and Arts
& Humanities Citation Index.
The terms were searched as keywords, subject, subject heading, subject phrase,
and author (when appropriate). Searches consisted of individual terms, dual terms, and
multiple terms, moving from very general to the most specific until no hits emerged. The
process was structured as follows: the first term from category #1 (i.e. conscience) was
paired with one term from one of the next four categories (e.g. pastoral theology),
until all the terms from categories #2-#5 had been paired with the initial category #1 term
(i.e. conscience), resulting in 38 searches. Then I proceeded to the next term under
category #1 (i.e. primacy of conscience) and did a similar pairing procedure, resulting in
another 38 searches. Continuing in this fashion across all categories, the pairing process
resulted in a matrix of 837 searches. From this point, I continued to search three terms
following a similar organized sequence. I did not exceed combining more than three
283

terms, with the exception of some of the category #5 terms. Finally, additional resources
were also identified vis-à-vis the footnotes and bibliographies of these previously
identified sources.
The bibliography will primarily be divided broadly according to medium:
monographs, edited books with essays, essays from edited books, journal articles,
dissertations, and additional materials. Because of the interdisciplinary and
interdenominational character of the research, ample materials were identified for the
research. Nevertheless, the limited focused resources that emerged from a
comprehensive search process clearly demonstrate this specific question and thesis has
not been addressed.
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APPENDIX B
8 Examples of Social Cognitive Theory research
1) The Revised Scale for Caregiving Self-Efficacy: Reliability and Validity Studies.
A. M. Steffen, C. McKibbin, A. M. Zeiss, D. Gallagher-Thompson, and A.Bandura.
Journal of Gerontology Series B-Psychological Sciences & Social Sciences 57, (2002):
74-86.
Abstract: Two samples of family caregivers (Study 1, 169 Ss mean age 63.8 yrs; Study 2,
145 Ss mean age 60.2 yrs) of cognitively impaired older adults were, used to revise,
extend, and evaluate a measure of perceived self-efficacy for caregiving tasks. The
Revised Scale for Caregiving Self-Efficacy measures 3 domains of caregiving selfefficacy: Obtaining Respite, Responding to Disruptive Patient Behaviors, and Controlling
Upsetting Thoughts. The 3 subscales show strong internal consistency and adequate testretest reliability. Construct validity is supported by relationships between these 3 facets
of perceived caregiving efficacy and depression, anxiety, anger, perceived social support,
and criticism expressed in speech samples. The Revised Scale for Caregiving SelfEfficacy has potential uses for both research and clinical purposes.
2) Self-efficacy Beliefs as Shapers of Children's Aspirations and Career Trajectories.
A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli. Child Development 72,
(2001): 187-206.
Abstract: This prospective study tested with 272 children (aged 11-15 yrs) a structural
model of the network of sociocognitive influences that shape children's career aspirations
and trajectories. Familial socioeconomic status is linked to children's career trajectories
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only indirectly through its effects on parents' perceived efficacy and academic
aspirations. The impact of parental self-efficacy and aspirations on their children's
perceived career efficacy and choice is, in turn, entirely mediated through the children's
perceived efficacy and academic aspirations. Children's perceived academic, social, and
self-regulatory efficacy influence the types of occupational activities for which they
judge themselves to be efficacious both directly and through their impact on academic
aspirations. Perceived occupational self-efficacy gives direction to the kinds of career
pursuits children seriously consider for their life's work and those they disfavor.
Children's perceived efficacy rather than their actual academic achievement is the key
determinant of their perceived occupational self-efficacy and preferred choice of
worklife. Analyses of gender differences reveal that perceived occupational self-efficacy
predicts traditionality of career choice.
3) The Structure of Children's Perceived Self-efficacy: A Cross-national Study.
C. Pastorelli, G. Caprara, C. Barbaranelli, J.Rola, S. Rozsa, and A. Bandura.
European Journal of Psychological Assessment 17, (2001): 87-97.
Abstract: Investigated the replicability of the factor structure of the Children's Perceived
Self-Efficacy scales in Italy, Hungary, and Poland. The findings of this cross-national
study support the generalizability of the factor structure of children's social and academic
efficacy (aged 10-15 yrs). Perceived efficacy to resist peer pressure to engage
transgressive conduct had a somewhat different factor structure for Hungarian children.
Gender and national differences in the pattern of efficacy beliefs underscore the value of
treating perceived self-efficacy as a multifaceted attribute. There were no overall gender
differences in perceived social efficacy, but girls in all 3 societies have a higher sense of
efficacy for academic activities and to resist peer pressure for transgressive activities.
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Italian children judge themselves more academically efficacious than do Hungarian
children and more socially efficacious than their counterparts in both of the other 2
countries. An analysis of the facets of academic efficacy revealed that Hungarian children
have a high sense of efficacy to master academic Ss but a lower efficacy than their Italian
and Polish counterparts to take charge of their own learning. Polish children surpassed
their counterparts in academic self-regulatory efficacy.
4) Self-evaluative and Self-efficacy Mechanisms of Governing the Motivational Effects
of Goal Systems. A. Bandura and G. Cervone. Journal of Personality & Social
Psychology 45, (1983): 1017-1028.
Abstract: Tested the hypothesis that self-evaluative and self-efficacy mechanisms
mediate the effects of goal systems on performance motivation. These self-reactive
influences are activated through cognitive comparison requiring both personal standards
and knowledge of performance. 45 male and 45 female undergraduates performed a
strenuous activity with either goals and performance feedback, goals alone, feedback
alone, or without either factor. The condition combining performance information and a
standard had a strong motivational impact, whereas neither goals alone nor feedback
alone effected changes in motivation. When both comparative factors were present, the
evaluative and efficacy self-reactive influences predicted the magnitude of motivation
enhancement. The higher the self-dissatisfaction with substandard performance and the
stronger the perceived self-efficacy for goal attainment, the greater was the subsequent
intensification of effort. When one comparative factor was lacking, the self-reactive
influences were differentially related to performance motivation.
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5) Escaping Homelessness: The Influences of Self-efficacy and Time Perspective on
Coping with Homelessness, E. Elissa, A. Bandura, and P. G. Zimbardo. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology 29, (1999): 575-596.
Abstract: This study explored whether self-efficacy and time perspective of homeless
adults (N = 82) living in a shelter affected their coping strategies related to obtaining
housing and employment. Participants with high self-efficacy searched more for housing
and employment and stayed at the shelter for a shorter duration, whereas participants with
low self-efficacy were more likely to request an extension of their stay at the shelter.
Those high on future orientation had shorter durations of homelessness and were more
likely to enroll in school and to report gaining positive benefits from their predicament,
whereas those with a high present orientation had more avoidant coping strategies.
Despite the predictive power of self-efficacy and future orientation of proactive search
behaviors, there were no predictors of obtaining stable housing, which is a scarce
resource in the area. However, a high present orientation predicted obtaining temporary
housing. A present temporal perspective may be adaptive in finding short-term solutions
to an unstable situation, such as homelessness. The role of time perspective in crisis
situations is discussed, as well as the severe environmental constraints on the exercise of
personal control over reality dictated by social, economic, and political forces.
6) Perceived Emotional and Interpersonal Self-efficacy and Good Social Functioning.
Original Title [Italian]: Autoefficacia Percepita Emotiva e Interpersonale e Buon
Funzionamento Sociale. G. V. Caprara, E. Scabini, C. Barbaranelli, C. Pastorelli, C.
Regalia, and A. Bandura. Giornale Italiano di Psicologia 26, (1999): 769-789.
Abstract: Studied the role of perceived emotional and interpersonal self-efficacy in
psychological adjustment. 162 male and 162 female high school students aged 14-18 yrs
in Italy were administered a scale developed to measure the perceived ability to regulate
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one's own positive and negative affect. A structural equation model was used in which
depressive social withdrawal, antisocial conduct, and prosocial behavior were considered
as dependent variables that were influenced by perceived emotional self-efficacy directly
and indirectly through perceived interpersonal self-efficacy. The results partially confirm
the direct influence of perceived emotional self-efficacy on the dependent variables and
fully confirm its indirect influence through perceived interpersonal self-efficacy.
7) Impact of Adolescents' Perceived Self-regulatory Efficacy on Familial
Communication and Antisocial Conduct. G. V. Caprara, E. Scabini, C. Barbaranelli,
C. Pastorelli, C. Regalia, and A. Bandura. European Psychologist 3, (1998): 125-132.
Abstract: Tested the hypothesis that perceived self-efficacy to resist peer pressure for
high-risk activities is related to transgressive conduct, both directly and through the
mediation of open familial communication. 324 adolescents (aged 14-18 yrs) rated their
self-regulatory efficacy, openness of communication with parents, and their involvement
in delinquent conduct and substance abuse. Results of structural equation modeling
confirm that a high sense of efficacy to ward off negative peer influences was
accompanied by open communication with parents about activities outside the home and
by low engagement in delinquent conduct and substance abuse. Both the posited direct
and mediated paths of influences were replicated for males and females, although girls
exhibited a slightly weaker direct relationship between self-regulatory efficacy and
transgressive conduct.
8) Self-motivation for Academic Attainment: The Role of Self-efficacy Beliefs and
Personal Goal-setting. B. J. Zimmerman, A. Bandura, and M. Martinez-Pons. American
Educational Research Journal 29, (1992): 663-676.
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Abstract: The causal role of students' self-efficacy beliefs and academic goals in selfmotivated academic attainment was studied using path analysis procedures. Parental goal
setting and students' self-efficacy and personal goals at the beginning of the semester
served as predictors of students' final course grades in social studies. In addition, their
grades in a prior course in social studies were included in the analyses. A path model of
four self-motivation variables and prior grades predicted students' final grades in social
studies R = .56. Students' beliefs in their efficacy for self-regulated learning affected their
perceived self-efficacy for academic achievement, which in turn influenced the academic
goals they set for themselves and their final academic achievement. Students' prior grades
were predictive of their parents' grade goals for them, which in turn were linked to the
grade goals students set for themselves. These findings were interpreted in terms of the
social cognitive theory of academic self-motivation.
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